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Abstract and Keywords
This dissertation examines the ability of intellectual property and its alternatives
to both facilitate and impede innovation. The thesis begins by positing that a more
detailed and nuanced understanding of alternatives to intellectual property is required so
that such alternatives can be effectively used to mitigate the problems of the
expansionary intellectual property regime. The thesis is that substantive alternatives to
intellectual property utilize a broader range of incentive structures to encourage the
production and distribution of intellectual goods, facilitate greater access to such goods
and their informational content and engender innovative outcomes that go beyond the
narrow, instrumentalist goals of wealth creation and productivity growth. Using critical
theory as a methodology the dissertation examines both the macro-level intellectual
property regime as a whole and uses specific empirical case studies (the Songwriters
Association of Canada’s proposal for a monthly fee on internet service providers and
defensive publication). The analytical body of the dissertation begins with a critical
examination of the expansionary intellectual property regime. It provides a framework
for analyzing the case studies beginning with an examination of the incentives for the
production and distribution of intellectual works, then scrutinizes the ability of
intellectual property and its alternatives to incent innovative activity, and interrogates the
ideological aspects of innovation including its use in theories of the information society.
The two case studies are then analyzed focusing on the incentive structures used, their
ability to generate innovative outcomes and the ideological assumptions of each case.
The analysis of the case studies reveals that in its current form the Songwriters
Association of Canada’s proposal is not a substantive alternative to intellectual property,
iii

but defensive publication is. The thesis concludes with a holistic analysis of intellectual
property and its alternatives and provides specific recommendations. The thesis
concludes that policymakers must provide greater support for substantive alternatives to
intellectual property to increase innovative activity and address major political, social and
economic problems. This dissertation makes a significant contribution to the
understanding of alternatives to intellectual property and the nature of innovation.
Keywords
Intellectual Property, Alternatives to Intellectual Property, Incentives, Innovation,
Theories of the Information Society, Defensive Publishing, Songwriters Association of
Canada
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Chapter One - Introduction
I. Introduction
Several significant political and economic changes over the past 30 years have changed
the conditions for the production and distribution of intellectual goods. Politically
neoliberalism has flourished, while the option of a Soviet style socialist alternative has
crumbled. Economically the Fordist social contract between labour, the state and capital
has been reshaped with the power of multinational corporations increasing vis-a-vis
labour groups. International trade agreements have further enabled the transnational
operation of capitalism. At the same time in ‘advanced’ Western countries, and the
United States in particular, the services and informational sectors of the economy have
increased in prominence coinciding with an increasing share of manufacturing carried out
in the newly emerging (or newly industrializing) and developing world. The proliferation
of information and communications technologies (ICTs), which are integral to the
transnational coordination of capitalism, has drastically lowered the cost of production
and distribution of intellectual works. In particular digitization has allowed what were
once finite and scarce informational resources to be copied and transmitted with virtually
no marginal cost. Intellectual property (IP) mechanisms have become increasingly
important as a system for controlling and commodifying intellectual goods. These broad
social changes have resulted in many declaring that there now exists a fundamental
change in the nature of society, which is usually denoted as the emergence of an
information society or information age.
The increasing importance of intellectual goods to capitalist wealth production
necessitates, in the eyes of the producers and distributers of such goods and the owners of
capital, an increased need for control over such goods in the form of intellectual property
mechanisms. Traditionally, intellectual products were bound to physical containers, such
as a book or vinyl record. Control over the physical embodiment of the intellectual goods
ensured control over the content, but digitization has facilitated the separation of content
and carrier. As a result numerous changes have occurred in the intellectual property
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landscape. Traditional IP mechanisms have seen both an increase in term and scope of
the protection afforded. This change is particularly significant in the case of patents and
copyright. New IP rights have also been created including, as examples, protection for
mask works (semiconductor integrated circuit design), ship hull designs, databases, plant
varieties, domain names, geographical indicators, encrypted satellite signals, and the
Olympic rings. Intellectual property protection has become integrated with international
trade deals facilitating the use of powerful enforcement mechanisms used to ensure IP
rights are protected. Finally, new legal and technological mechanisms have been
established to further protect IP such as anticircumvention legislation and digital and
information rights.
The result is not only more IP rights, but much more stringent protection of these
valuable property devices that benefits large rights holders while reducing access to
intellectual goods. At the same time economic and technological changes have facilitated
the growth of a diversity of alternative ways of producing and distributing intellectual
goods that do not take the form of traditional IP rights. As examples, Open Access (OA)
publishing, Free and Open Source Software (FOSS), defensive publishing of scientific
research, prizes, voluntary payment for content and levies on copying related devices and
technologies have all emerged as alternative ways of distributing informational goods
that cannot be categorized as intellectual property rights. Computing technology has
dramatically lowered the cost of production of many types of intellectual goods, and the
internet and other communications technologies facilitate not only low cost distribution,
but also give rise to distributed and collaborative social arrangements that further
facilitate the production and distribution of intellectual works.
Proponents of both IP and its alternatives argue that their respective approach to
encouraging the creation of intellectual goods leads to innovation – a primary goal in
society. Supporters of expanded IP rights argue that such rights are necessary to
incentivize innovation, and that innovation is central to economic growth.1 Critics argue
expansive proprietary rights stifle innovation by fettering access and emphasize that
many of the crucial dimensions of innovation (such as improvements to health and
welfare) cannot be reduced to quantifiable economic variables.2 Innovation is also an
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important topic of concern for information society theorists. Proponents of information
society discourse often celebrate the information age for having an increased level of
innovative activity while failing to account for the significant role played by IP. It is
necessary to examine the discourse on innovation in various theories of the information
society to determine if innovation is simply conceived of in economic terms or if
innovation implies some other form of political and social advancement. There is an
important difference between valorizing innovation because it leads to increases in Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), and encouraging innovative activity to bring about
improvements in quality of life. This increasing emphasis on innovation requires critical
scrutiny. It is necessary to go beyond the simple rhetoric of the term to examine why
innovation is such an important goal, what the outcomes of innovation are and how best it
can be incented.
II. Problem Statement
The result of political, economic and technological change is both an expansionary
intellectual property policy regime and a proliferation of alternatives to the traditional IP
mechanisms, all of which are aimed at generating innovation. Supporters of traditional
IP devices believe that exclusionary rights that provide rights holders the ability to
appropriate the full social value of their intellectual good are the optimal policy solution
for encouraging innovation. This view is underpinned by a series of assumptions about
human behaviour and a belief that pecuniary incentives are required to spur artistic and
inventive activity.3 Proponents of increased IP rights argue that the commodification of
information is justified through the production of innovative goods and services that
increase economic efficiency (through gains in productivity) and create wealth.4 Finally,
supporters of the expansionary intellectual property regime frequently adopt neoliberal
rhetoric that views public goods including information as sources of market failure, while
adopting an uncritical view that the commodification of information is an important
economic dimension of the information age.5 Considered collectively these traits
represent the ideology of IP rights – the system of ideas including the incentives (selfinterested, pecuniary gain), and outcomes (expansion of legal rights to exclude and the
commodification of information bound in rhetoric of innovation and the information
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society) that is used to justify the expanse of IP.6 It is an ideology that is permeated by
orthodox, neoclassical economic doctrine and a neoliberal political worldview that places
wealth maximization ahead of other political, economic, social and ethical goals such as
the sharing of knowledge and the use of such knowledge to improve the quality of life.7
While wealth maximization is useful social goal,8 there are several problematic aspects to
the expansionary IP regime including decreased access to knowledge, increased social
and economic stratification, and the entrenchment of dominant economic and political
powers. By securing authors and inventors the full social value of their work,9 IP
incentivizes innovative activity; however, it is not the only mechanism for doing so, and
one that comes with significant cost.10
However, concomitant with the expansionary IP regime there has been a flourishing of
alternative mechanisms for producing and distributing intellectual goods. The term
“alternatives to intellectual property” is actually quite broad encompassing a range of
different ways to produce and distribute intellectual goods. Some alternatives seek to
completely replace the IP system, for example patronage of artists by private individuals
or groups and state financing of research. Other alternatives aim to address the
limitations within the current IP system, without wholly replacing IP. Physical goods
bundled with intellectual goods (a free T-shirt with the purchase of a CD) or service
complements (such as technical support for purchased software) are examples of business
models that still rely on the copyright regime.11 Digital Rights Management (DRM)
software and other technical protection mechanisms on their own could function as an
alternative to the legal protection provided by IP. Furthermore, many alternatives are
alternatives to a specific form of IP (usually patents or copyrights) and not the entire IP
regime. Liebowitz and Watt note that alternatives to copyright take three general forms:
those that allow copyright holders to benefit from copying (e.g. network externalities),
mechanisms that limit copying (e.g. DRM), and mechanisms that aim to completely
replace copyright (e.g. publicly funded rewards).12
Some of these alternatives such as FOSS and OA scholarly publishing have come about
as a result of technological change and deal with specific kinds of intellectual goods.
Other alternatives including prizes and patronage have long historical roots, but have
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generated renewed interest.13 While these alternatives have attracted significant scholarly
attention, others such as defensive publishing and the private ordering schemes that use
monthly fees on internet service providers (ISPs) to license infringing behaviour have
not, despite their recent increase in prominence.14
These two alternatives require a critical interrogation to determine if they embody the
same ideology as the expansionary IP regime or if they are characterized by a different
ideology. If these alternatives are characterized by the same assumptions about human
motives and encouraged to promote innovation for economic purposes then they
represent only nominal alternatives to IP.15 Conversely, if greater emphasis is placed on
other incentive structures (including altruistic and reputational motives) and the outcomes
that extend beyond wealth maximization, then these alternatives embody substantive
alternatives to the IP regime.

Without a substantive analysis of the ideology of these

alternatives it is difficult to determine if defensive publishing and monthly ISP fees that
allows non-commercial file sharing will exacerbate or relieve the problems created by
expansionary IP policy. Policymakers are best served when they not only consider a full
range of options for incentivizing innovation, but have a nuanced appreciation of how IP
and its alternatives function.
Therefore what is needed is a new framework for analyzing alternatives to IP.
Recognizing that it is impossible to examine the totality of all facets of alternative
mechanisms for producing and distributing intellectual goods, this framework will focus
on three critical dimensions – incentive structures used to encourage the production of
intellectual goods, the outcome of such activity, and the ideological assumptions
contained within the alternative. Each of these facets are integral to intellectual goods
policy. An understanding of the motives that incentivize intellectual good production is
necessary to ensure the production of such goods, while at the same time it is important
to critically analyze in what way such goods facilitate innovation (i.e. is innovation
simply an economic goal of creating new processes and products to increase productivity,
or does innovation including increasing access to information and using that information
to improve quality of life and decrease political, social and economic hardships). By
critically engaging with these facets of intellectual goods it is possible to come to a more
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holistic understanding of IP and its alternatives.
Finally, such a framework needs to account for the diverse explanatory theories of the
information society that attempt to explain the numerous economic, political and
technological changes that have facilitated the expanse and prominence of intellectual
goods. The increased focus on innovation requires the development of intellectual goods,
but it is necessary to question the deeper implications of the focus on innovation as a
societal goal. If information society theorists simply stress innovation as economic
growth then the focus on innovation embodies the same neoliberal principles as the
expansionary IP regime. Conversely, if innovation connotes some sort of political and
social advancement beyond economic growth it needs to be determined if these same
objectives are being furthered by alternatives to intellectual property.
III. Justification
This study aims at critically assessing intellectual goods. In order to do so, it will
examine and unpack both the concepts of incentives and innovation. It will also include a
specific empirical analysis of the defensive publishing and the Songwriters Association
of Canada’s (SAC) proposal for a monthly ISP fee.16 Careful scrutiny of these
alternatives is needed not only to further our understanding of these alternatives,17 but
also to determine to what degree they embody the ideology of the expansionary IP
regime.
A more nuanced understanding of IP and its alternatives is important and timely.
Encouraging the production of artistic works and inventions is an important dimension of
information policy; however, it is not simply enough to incentivize the production of
intellectual goods. While artists and inventors should be rewarded for their work, this
does not imply that they must be able to capture the entire value that work creates. 18 The
incentives provided should be appropriate both economically19 and ethically.20 At the
same time innovation must be promoted as well, though the term can and should involve
more than simply the production of new goods and services for the purposes of
improving productivity and creating wealth. The production and distribution of
intellectual goods can lead to innovative solutions to political and social problems as well
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as economic ones. By critically focusing on these two facets of intellectual goods, and
using the specific cases of defensive publishing and the SAC proposal, this analysis will
enhance understanding of how incentive structures can be used to further innovation.
A detailed understanding of intellectual property and its alternatives is particularly
consequential given the important role intellectual goods play in a diverse range of
human activities. Pharmaceutical and agricultural inventions form the building blocks of
human life, but their overzealous protection through IP can result in diminished access
and a resulting decrease in the quality of life. Educational materials whether in form of
textbooks or webpages are central to learning, yet when commodified access is provided
only to those who can afford to pay. Artistic creations are central to human culture, but
large rights holding, content producing corporations have a primary duty to maximize
shareholder value not enhance human culture. Though IP devices incentivize the
production of many important goods, the control over access they provide can potentially
undermine their usefulness as a policy tool.
Finally by critically examining the concept of innovation and its use by information
society theorists the study will further understanding of how the term is used to advance
various ideologies of intellectual goods. The critical examination of innovation is
particularly important given the high degree of emphasis placed on innovation. As
President Obama notes in the introduction to A Strategy for American Innovation,
“innovation is more important than ever.”21 While nations adopt the rhetoric of
innovation, it is unclear if such adoption is part of a broader neoliberal political agenda
aimed at expanding markets, or if such a goal is aimed at improving quality of life and
serving the public good.
There is an acute timeliness to this research with respect to intellectual property laws in
Canada. Amendments to the Copyright Act that would bring Canada into compliance
with the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) are currently before Parliament.22 Furthermore,
the issue of business method patentability in Canada continues to be examined by
Canadian courts,23 which has the potential to significantly increase the scope of patent
protection in Canada.24 While expanding IP protection in Canada is likely to facilitate
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the creation of new information markets, policymakers should also be mindful of the
dangers of an expansionary IP regime and the role alternative methods of producing and
distributing intellectual goods can play in stimulating innovation.
IV. Thesis
A simple differentiation between traditional IP rights and alternatives on the basis of their
legal status is insufficient because some alternative methods for producing and
distributing intellectual goods are based on the same underlying assumptions, principles,
and rhetoric as IP mechanisms and will further exacerbate the problems created by the
expansionary IP regime. Furthermore, it is insufficient to examine only incentives or
only outcomes – the two concepts and their interaction must be considered. Only a
holistic, critical theory of intellectual goods that examines these two central facets of the
economic and political dimensions of intellectual goods can identify the proper basis of
differentiation for determining which so called alternatives to intellectual goods are
meaningful alternatives. Recognizing these points, this analysis proceeds from the
general thesis that:
Intellectual property rights possess two specific characteristics with regards to
incentives and outcomes. IP is incentivized through a self-interested
pecuniary motive, and the outcome, which may be generally classified as
innovation, necessarily includes a legal right to exclude that limits access and
is focused on wealth creation. Therefore, true substantive alternatives to IP
must possess an alternative ideology that emphasizes social goals beyond
wealth maximization. The production of true alternative intellectual goods
must come from more than simple pecuniary motive and its outcomes should
include enhancing access to information.
There are also three specific sub-theses each addressing a specific chapter of the
dissertation. The primary argument for the incentives chapter (chapter 4) is that the focus
on pecuniary incentives to stimulate the production and distribution of intellectual goods
is misplaced as there are already numerous extant incentives for the production of
intellectual goods, and the primary goal of policy for the intellectual goods should be
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creating incentives to ensure the distribution and access to intellectual works. The central
argument of the innovation chapter (chapter 5) is that innovation is not simply the
production of new goods and services. Innovation is a far broader concept and must
reflect that innovations should not simply be new but an improvement on what exists,
innovation also includes organizational structures; it is a complex process that deals with
not only with the production of new ideas but the diffusion of the ideas, and most
importantly also includes changes to values and social norms. The key argument for the
ideology chapter (chapter 6) is that neoliberal political ideology and neoclassical
economic thought have narrowly framed innovation as a means for generating wealth and
gains in productivity. This orientation has undermined other important dimensions of
innovation – namely, the role of innovation in facilitating political, moral, and social
progress. Information society proponents also often promote a limited conception of
innovation without considering the full effects of exclusionary rights (which are usually
associated with and underpin innovative activity). The failure to fully examine the role
of IP, while at the same time lauding innovation, facilitates an overly optimistic account
of the information society. In turn this positive information age rhetoric is then easily
employed by neoliberal thinkers, policymakers and corporations to justify a vision of a
society that extols efficiency, wealth production and self-interest with a significantly
lessened concern for moral, social, political and environmental progress.
Recognizing that a substantive body of literature exists on prizes, Free and Open Source
software and Open Access publishing, these alternatives will not be analyzed in detail as
such work has been done by others. In order to determine the validity of the general
thesis, two cases will be examined, which scrutinize intellectual goods that have received
less scholarly attention. These alternatives are defensive publishing (also called preemptive publishing), and the monthly ISP proposal by the SAC.25 In addition to being
understudied these cases are also timely and representative of the diversity of alternatives
to IP.26
Finally to situate IP and its alternatives within theories of the information society it is
necessary to determine the true nature of the relationship between intellectual goods and
innovation. To facilitate this analysis the work of two important theorists of the

10
information society will be drawn upon to examine their treatment of the concepts of IP
and innovation. The examination will focus on the work of Manuel Castells and David
Harvey who have both examined the broader political, economic and social changes over
the past forty years.27 Both Harvey and Castells attempt to explain the numerous political
and economic shifts over the past 40 years through their theories with Castells
emphasizing the importance of innovation, while Harvey’s view posits that IP is an
increasingly important tool of neoliberal states for extending the power of capital.
Because these two theorists’ views contrast so sharply, they serve as useful explanatory
theories of the information society to examine IP and its alternatives against.
V. Theoretical Framework
A. Critical Theory and Overcoming Disciplinary Boundaries
The framework in the study is a multi-faceted analysis of the incentive structures and
innovatory outcomes involved in intellectual goods production and distribution, and
discourse on the information society including both theoretical discussions and empirical
analyses of cases. While the specific framework for the analysis is new, the analysis
itself is informed by scholarship in a number of fields including law, economics, and
information science. Although the study does not belong to any one academic discipline,
it can be situated as part of the broader area of information policy, which focuses the
policies that influence the creation, dissemination, processing, storage and destruction of
information.28
The analysis is theoretically informed by Critical Theory, specifically drawing on the
work of Douglas Kellner as well as Raymond Morrow and David Brown. Critical
Theory is a supradisciplinary method of analysis focusing on the interconnections
between philosophy, economics, politics, culture and society.29 Critical Theory
recognizes that important issues cut across disciplinary fields, and also views academic
disciplines themselves as artificial.30 The work draws on scholarship on intellectual goods
from a range of academic disciplines and also situates intellectual goods within broad
sociological theories on the information society. As such, the supradisciplinary nature of
Critical Theory is essential as it allows for overcoming disciplinary fragmentation.31 The
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study does not simply examine intellectual goods in economic or legal frames to the
ignorance of broader social and political contexts. Rather, this analysis contextualizes the
ascending importance of IP and its alternatives within the broader socio-economic
changes that have occurred over the past 40 years. Given the diversity of disciplinary
approaches to intellectual goods and the need to contextualize such scholarship within
broader theoretical perspectives, the analysis cannot be conducted within a single
disciplinary frame and as such must be supradisciplinary in nature. Furthermore, it is
important to note that supradisciplinarity is distinct from intradisciplinarity. The latter
implies the simple combination of empirical and theoretical insights from different
disciplines. In contrast supradisciplinarity requires careful scrutiny of both the normative
and positive claims of various disciplines as part of the integration of empirical
findings.32
However, it is insufficient to simply declare that the work is supradisciplinary without
providing justification of why certain theoretical approaches are used. The work draws
on Critical Theory because issues including commodities and consumption have
historically be an area of inquiry.33 Traditionally many critical theorists have viewed
commodities as seductive and manipulative and their consumption as a fetishistic
activity; however, Kellner has stressed that this simplistic, negative view needs to be
reconsidered as some commodities are life enhancing and fill vital needs.34 This is
particularly relevant to intellectual goods, as many important products (from
pharmaceuticals to educational textbooks) are incentivized through intellectual property
rights.
A second important dimension of Critical Theory is its normative viewpoint; it not only
critiques the existing society but emphasizes and envisions new possibilities.35
Substantive alternatives to IP, and only substantive alternatives not nominal ones, are
capable of addressing the problems of the expansionary IP regime (commodification of
information, diminution of access and the extolling of self-interest). Thus the analysis is
theoretically situated within Critical Theory both as a means of examining the subject
matter of intellectual goods, as well as providing a theoretical perspective for supporting
substantive alternatives to IP.
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In addition to Critical Theory this analysis is influenced by work in the area of law and
economics (also called the economic analysis of law). Law and economics is employed
because such scholarship has been influential with those supporting the expansionary IP
regime.36 This analysis makes extensive reference to Law and Economics scholarship and
the works of Richard A. Posner,37 William M. Landes,38 and Edmund W. Kitch39 in
particular. Posner, Landes and Kitch, who are among the leading law and economics
scholars on IP, offer both important empirical and theoretical insights into IP. However,
it is also important to note that their work is underpinned by the normative position of
law and economics scholarship. Law and economics aims to use law to promote
economically efficient40 solutions to legal problems.41 By juxtaposing the normative
approaches in Critical Theory and law and economics, the analysis is able to draw on
empirical insights from both fields while accounting for and scrutinizing the normative
framework from which those empirical findings arise. In addition to drawing on law and
economics scholarship the framework is also informed by a series of critical intellectual
property scholars including, Christopher May,42 Peter Drahos,43 and Samuel Trosow.44
May’s work critically examines the interlinkages between the global protection of IP and
the rise of neoliberalism,45 while Drahos provides a detailed account of the origins and
rise of the expansionary IP regime.46 Trosow succinctly characterizes the ideology of IP
and he also notes the role incentives and outcomes play in IP. Trosow has three salient
points on the role of incentives in the critical analysis of IP. First, the issue of incentives
requires more analysis.47 Second, critical IP policy must de-couple the notion of
incentives from innovation,48 and third, economic incentives are the result of a particular
social structure.49 Recognizing these points it is necessary to further develop the critical
theory of intellectual goods that is capable of examining a range of motives for the
production of intellectual goods and categorize these incentives appropriately. The
scrutiny of incentives is particularly important to the analysis of intellectual goods that do
not take the form of traditional IP rights as many of these alternatives do not have a direct
pecuniary incentive. Such an analysis must also be cognizant of the relationship between
incentives and the outcomes of intellectual activity. The fundamental question is not, ‘do
alternative intellectual goods promote or facilitate innovation?’ All intellectual goods
have the potential to further innovation. The primary question is one of outcomes - ‘does
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the intellectual good emphasize access, or does it emphasize exclusion and
commodification?’
In addition to the legal scholarship of law and economics and critical IP scholarship, this
study makes extensive use of both orthodox and heterodox economic theory.

Both

Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow’s theories of innovation are examined in detail at
the beginning of chapter 5. These theorists are drawn on not only because the
Schumpeter-Arrow debate on market structure and innovation has attracted considerable
scholarship, but more importantly because these two theorists offer several important
insights on the nature of innovation and the role of IP.50
Neoclassical economic theory from several theorists including Milton Friedman and Gary
Becker is also utilized. Neoclassical economic theory has become increasingly
influential in legal and political decisions on a range of subjects including IP.51 The
study explicitly examines the evolution of the neoclassical model of human behaviour,
homo economicus, and the weakness of developing policy based on such a limited and
abstract sketch of humankind.52
Discussions on innovation draw not only on the works of Castells and Harvey, but also
on a series of scholars who have critically examined the interaction between IP rights and
innovation including Josh Lerner, Adam Jaffe, Robert Merges, Wesley M. Cohen, and
Bronwyn Hall among others. These scholars have provided crucial empirical findings
that demonstrate the weakness of IP as an incentive to innovation.53 Michael Heller’s
tragedy of the anticommons thesis and Carl Shapiro’s problematization of the patent
thickets are critically examined. While these approaches provide important theoretical
insights on the dangers of fragmented and expansive IP rights, it must also be noted that
their theories do not have extensive empirical support.54 Heller and Shapiro’s work is
complemented by an examination of scholarship on the commons from Yochai Benkler,
David Boiller, and James Boyle. Through an analysis of the scholarship of these authors
and a discussion of open source software and open access scholarly publishing, it is
demonstrated that alternatives to IP can produce substantial amounts of innovation.55
Although this represents a broad range of scholars from a variety of disciplines, this
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analysis aims at overcoming academic fragmentation by using Critical Theory to focus on
the relationships between intellectual property and its alternatives with specific emphasis
on the facets of incentive structures and innovation in their political, economic, social and
legal dimensions. By decoupling incentives and innovation and then analyzing
intellectual goods in this manner it becomes possible to determine which so-called
alternative intellectual goods represent substantive alternatives to IP. After such a
classification it is then necessary to discuss the primary goal of intellectual goods – the
furthering of innovation – within the context of theories of the information society.
B. Normative Framework
The supradisciplinarity of Critical Theory represents only one half of the reason for its
use as the theoretical frame. The second and more important element of Critical Theory
is that it posits that normative questions, questions of the form ‘what ought to be,’ can
and should be subject to scrutiny.56 The scrutiny of normative claims is essential to the
study. Not only is the critical examination of normative theories necessary to integrate the
theories and empirical findings of different disciplines, it is needed to reflexively link
such findings to a course of action (in this case policy recommendations).57 Furthermore
normative issues have profound ideological implications, particularly in the area of policy
analysis.58 This analysis specifically aims to explicate the ideological dimensions of
innovation, neoliberalism and theories of the information society.
The normative framework used in this study explicitly rejects the normative view of law
and economics (that legal problems should be addressed in an economically efficient
manner), and ideological underpinnings of law and economics and neoclassical
economics. The generation of increased wealth and productivity, while important, are
not a justification for the commodification of information and the diminution of access to
intellectual works. Innovation is an important policy objective; however, it must be used
to address political, social, and moral problems and not only economic issues. It is also
crucial to note that innovation should not be blindly celebrated as some innovations
produce harmful and unforeseen consequences. Rhetoric on innovation and its positive
connotation should not be used as a guise to advance policies that disproportionately
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benefit those in already privilege positions whether they are nations, corporations or
individuals.
Drawing from Critical Theory, the normative framework in this study aims to promote
progressive change. The framework employed aims at determining which alternatives to
IP are best suited to overcome the problems of the expansionary regime. The outcome of
this study, its policy recommendations,59 is geared toward ensuring greater support for
substantive alternatives. It should be noted that while it is a laudable goal to conceive of
a world no longer bound by the concepts of ownership through exclusive rights and
waged labour, such a goal is not immediately realizable in the near or even medium term.
However, greater support for substantive alternatives, which reject the ideology of IP, can
contribute to the long term innovation in social norms and values that will be necessary to
realize such a future.
C. Incentives for Producing and Distributing Intellectual Goods
Incentives have traditionally been a topic of central concern to scholars of intellectual
goods. Justificatory theories of intellectual property of both utilitarian and Lockean
strands place prominence on the role of incentives.60 The U.S. Constitution, the
document from which all American intellectual property law emanates, clearly
recognizes the role incentives play in the production of intellectual goods,61 and both
patents and copyrights are premised on the concept of incentivizing creative and
inventive behaviour by exchanging the product of such labour for a legal right to exclude.
A similar justification for intellectual property is given in Canada: “the premise
underlying intellectual property (IP) throughout its history has been that the recognition
and rewards associated with the ownership and invention of creative works stimulate
further inventive and creative activity.”62 While direct pecuniary incentives are the
dominant incentivizing system, a broad range of other incentives exist. Intellectual goods
are produced not only for financial gain, but also for recognition, political and religious
ends, and altruism. Furthermore, inventive and creative behaviour has taken place
throughout human history and is a natural trait of the human species.63 For intellectual
goods that will be sold as or embodied in commodities (e.g. most patented products),
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being the first to market is also a strong incentive in the creation of such goods. It is
necessary to recognize all of these motives drive both individuals and groups to produce
and distribute intellectual goods. In many cases more than one motive may be at work.
A critical theory of intellectual goods must not only account for the presence of these
motives, but must also have a way of examining to what degree each motive is
emphasized. For example, Nobel laureates receive both a medal and a substantive cash
prize, but the recognition of being named a Nobel laureate is equally if not more
important.
In examining the range of motives for producing intellectual goods it becomes obvious
that a spectrum of incentives exists. On one extreme are those motives that are most selfinterested, and on the other extreme are those motives that are informed by a
common/public interest. It is important to also recognize that intellectual goods may be
produced as the result of not one single incentive, but a range of incentives at a time.
Someone may author a work to seek recognition, are naturally creative and desire some
financial remuneration. However, it is clear that the intellectual property system is based
on a pecuniary incentive.64 Thus, while a range of motives may factor into the
production of intellectual property, the primary motivation and justification behind such a
system is pecuniary gain facilitated through exclusionary rights.
Examining alternatives to intellectual goods it is clear that some are also predicated on
providing a financial incentive to innovate – most notably a prize system. The desire for
recognition, altruism, the advancement of political ends, natural creativity and
inventiveness, and a desire to exchange ideas and knowledge with others also incentivize
the creation of intellectual goods. Of course self-interest plays an important role in some
of these motives, most notably recognition and the advancement of political ends, but in
these cases any pecuniary gains play a secondary role. Altruism and the desire to share
information and knowledge with others are the least self-interested motives, and should
be perceived as emanating from a common/public/general interest. It should also be
noted that even altruism and the desire to share with others possess a degree of selfinterest of the creator insomuch as one derives a feeling of satisfaction from doing good
unto others.65
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While a range of incentives exist for encouraging the production of intellectual goods,
what is specifically unique about the expansionary IP system is not that it includes a
pecuniary motive (several alternative intellectual goods systems also include some
pecuniary reward), but the degree to which this incentive is emphasized. The current IP
system is premised on the assumption that pecuniary gain is not an incentive but the
incentive for producing intellectual goods.66 It conceives of intellectual goods creators as
instrumentally minded commodity producers.67 The instrumentalist, economic
conception of IP is most pronounced in the U.S. system given its specific lack of moral
rights,68 and the increasing tendency to view IP in solely instrumentalist terms is reflected
internationally in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS).69 The TRIPS Agreement, which was signed as part of the series of trade
agreements establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO), not only requires WTO
members to stringently protect IP using minimum levels of protection based largely on
American standards, but also contains the deliberate exclusion of a requirement for
member states to adhere to Article 6bis of the Berne Convention (which provided for an
authors’ moral rights).70 The exclusion of authors’ non-economic moral rights in TRIPS
evinces that copyright law has adopted an increasingly instrumentalist economic standing
reflecting the expansionary trend in IP to treat such rights in solely economic terms.
Given the expansionary IP system’s exclusive focus on the pecuniary incentive it then
becomes possible to assess alternatives in this regard. If a so-called alternative relies
solely on the prospect of financial gain to incentivize intellectual good creation then it
cannot be considered a real alternative in regards to the incentive structure it employs.
True alternatives should draw on more than pecuniary incentive to promote the creation
of intellectual works.
D. Outcomes – Access or the Right to Exclude
A simple analysis of incentives is insufficient without reference to the outcomes. The
analysis of outcomes has two central dimensions – the presence or lack of an exclusion
mechanism and the nature of the innovative outcome. Exclusionary power is a central
aspect to IP, while prominent alternatives to IP (Free and Open Source Software, Open
Access publishing and prizes) place specific emphasis on ensuring access. An analysis of
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the degree of access provided by alternatives to intellectual goods is a second, central
facet of the analysis.
Though the IP system encourages the production of intellectual goods, part of its design
is to provide authors and inventors with an exclusion mechanism to protect their
intellectual property. The justification behind such exclusion mechanisms is that they are
necessary to prevent groups and individuals from enjoying benefits from the inventive
and creative work of others without bearing the cost (the free-rider problem).71 Exclusion
mechanisms serve a self-fulfilling role in IP – by introducing artificial scarcity they
create a marketable commodity and produce a financial incentive for creative and
inventive behaviour.72 The right to exclude others from use is not only an important, but
central mechanism to intellectual property rights.73 Although the IP system does spur
inventive and creative behaviour one of its most significant features is its requirement to
do so through the use of legal exclusion mechanisms.
Given the expansionary IP regime’s focus on exclusion, true alternatives should lack such
mechanisms and encourage access. For many alternative intellectual goods access plays
a central role. As examples, Open Access materials are freely accessible,74 Free Software
and Open Source software provide access to the source code,75 and prize systems tend to
place knowledge in the public domain.76 Proponents of these systems argue that
increased access results in more innovation.77
In many cases supporters of alternatives draw on the concept of the commons and an
information or knowledge commons in particular,78 while others highlight the danger of
too many exclusive proprietary rights.79 The idea of common property to which
individuals have a right of access unlike private and state property,80 serves as a useful
mechanism for describing a number of resources from common farm land, fish stocks,
the electromagnetic spectrum and information.81 Though similar to many natural
commons, the information commons is particularly unique: not only is information
inherently non-rival in consumption and non-excludable, information tends to become
more useful as it is shared (or in economic terms it possesses a strong network effect).82
In particular both Open Access scholarly publishing and Free and Open Source Software
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have a strong intellectual linkage with the concept of the commons.
Access oriented discussions do, however, contain some important qualifications. The
term is often employed but with differing meanings; to some ‘access’ implies available at
no cost, while for others the invocation of access applies that the information is available
without restrictions or exclusions.83 The Free Software movement, founded and launched
by Richard Stallman, notes that the use of “free” refers to the concept of liberty rather
than price; it is, “‘free’ as in ‘free speech’, not as in ‘free beer.’”84 It should also be noted
that the concept of access and the limitation on restrictions is specific to distribution and
not necessarily use. Creative Commons licenses, a simple and common legal licensing
system that allows authors and creators to release their works to the public with less
restrictions than copyright but without placing the works completely in the public
domain, contain no restrictions on distribution, but do allow authors to choose from a
variety of restrictions on use including the ability to bar usage for commercial purposes
or derivative works.85 Willinsky notes at least 10 differing variants of OA scholarly
publishing, each of which possesses a different economic model.86 While there is
considerable heterogeneity within access-oriented alternatives to IP, these alternatives are
unified by their lack of exclusion mechanisms.
Recognizing the differences in the treatment of access/exclusion it becomes possible to
create a second spectrum for the outcomes of intellectual goods. On the one hand there
are those that facilitate broad access like Open Access publishing, FOSS and prizes, and
on the other hand are intellectual property mechanisms that emphasize the legal right to
exclude. In the same way true alternatives should not simply emulate the incentive
structure of the expansionary IP regime, they should not produce the same outcomes. As
such true alternatives to IP should facilitate some sort of access to the informational
content of the intellectual good. In some cases the access facilitated is direct and costless
access to the informational good itself (such as in OA publishing), while in other cases
the final good itself may still have a cost, but the informational aspects of the goods are
accessible (such as the source code in FOSS).
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E. Outcomes - The Nature of Innovation
While the presence or lack of an exclusion mechanism is indicative of the degree to
which an intellectual good represents an alternative to the IP system, an equally important
outcome is the role these goods play in society at large. Both IP and its alternatives aim
at addressing an important societal goal – facilitating innovation; however, the term
‘innovation’ has a specific, ideologically loaded conception within IP. IP and its
alternatives are not incentivized without good cause; they are encouraged because they
bring about new processes, products and methods. For the proponents of IP innovation is
construed in an economic sense and they extoll the production of new products and
processes for the purpose of wealth maximization.87 Other dimensions of innovation
such as the ability of innovation to improve human welfare and quality of life are seen as
secondary.88
While the expansionary IP regime views innovation in solely economic terms, proponents
of alternatives tend to emphasize the broader social improvements generated by
information. In cases where the discourse of economics is employed, authors adopt a
clearly socially oriented viewpoint (focusing on social and consumer welfare).89 And in
general the social benefits of innovation, which are extremely difficult to quantify and
measure, are highlighted as the primary reason for encouraging the production of
intellectual goods in an accessible manner.90 Substantive alternatives to IP should
embody a view of innovation that recognizes its broader political and social dimensions
beyond productivity and wealth maximization.
F. Towards a Conceptual Mapping of Intellectual Goods
Taken collectively these traits can be used to create a conceptual mapping of intellectual
goods. The expansionary IP regime is marked by an exclusive focus on economic
incentives, the limitation of access through exclusion mechanisms, and an emphasis on
innovation as a means for wealth production. If a so-called alternative intellectual good
shares these two characteristics then it is only an alternative in name and not in character
and ideology.
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Substantively alternative intellectual goods should facilitate access and their creation be
incentivized through a variety of motives and for more than solely economic purposes.
Substantive alternatives may still have an economic cost; however, cost and other
technological and legal mechanisms are not used simply as means to restrict access. The
incentive structure may include a financial reward, but not rest solely on a view of
humans as motivated only for instrumentalist purposes and wealth maximizing means.
What emerges from combining the concept of incentives and outcomes is a conceptual
map of intellectual goods marked on either end by these two characterizations. With this
conceptual framework it will be possible to analyze defensive publishing and the SAC
proposal to determine if they are largely reflective of the ideology of the expansionary IP
regime, or if they represent some sort of substantive alternative.
Finally, it is important to state that substantive alternatives are not necessarily anticapitalist in nature. While the commodification of information within capitalist societies
does limit access, in many ways this treatment of information is less restrictive than other
authoritarian societies (for instance, Soviet photocopiers were locked in special rooms
which were sealed with wax each evening to prevent any unauthorized copying).91
Substantively alternative intellectual goods can have a synergistic relationship with
capitalist markets by either creating markets for complementary markets or increasing the
value of existing goods through network effects.92 While not anti-capitalist in nature,
substantive alternatives are opposed to the recent (1970 onward) change in the
intellectual property regime that focuses on expanding private ownership of intellectual
goods.
Summarizing the conceptual mapping of intellectual goods with respect to incentives and
outcomes, the expansionary intellectual property regime is characterized by:


An almost exclusive focus on pecuniary incentives



The limitation of access through exclusion mechanisms for the purposes of
controlling and commodifying information and an emphasis on wealth
maximization
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Conversely, substantively alternative intellectual goods possess:


A range of incentives for creation, including both financial and non-financial
motives



An emphasis on facilitating access by limiting legal and technological restrictions
on the use of information and making such information available to improve the
human condition

Given these two conceptions of innovation, which are reflective of the characteristics and
ideology of the differing approaches to intellectual goods, it also possible to examine
theories of the information society and the use of the term innovation within these
theories. If innovation is promoted within a theory of the information society primarily
as a mechanism for encouraging economic growth, then it is clear that the logic and
ideology of the IP system is being advanced. Conversely if the aims of innovation are
cast in broader social and political terms, then theory of the information society reflects
the character and ideology of substantive alternatives of IP. This technique of analyzing
theories of the information society is particularly useful when a theory contains only a
limited discussion on the role of intellectual property rights. One needs to move beyond
an uncritical discussion of innovation to determine the underlying assumptions behind
this concept and determine their relationship to IP and its alternatives.
G. Innovation and Theories of the Information Society – Castells and Harvey
The declining share of manufacturing in the U.S. and other economies and rise of
financial, information and service sectors following the period of post war prosperity
have attracted the attention of many scholars who seek to explain the change. A variety of
theories have been employed to describe the emergence of a so-called ‘information
society.’93 Though information and innovation are central to discourses on the
information society, an explicit discussion of the role of IP and its alternatives is not
always present. This section provides a general overview of some of the theories of the
information society and a more detailed discussion of the writings of Daniel Bell, Manuel
Castells and David Harvey.
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i. Overview and General Examinations of Theories of the Information Society
Discussions on theories of the information society usually begin by highlighting Daniel
Bell’s The Coming of Postindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, despite the
fact that more critical works on the subject predate Bell’s.94 Though the subject has been
approached by a range of authors,95 common themes permeate the literature: a social
revolution comparable to the social changes experienced in the Industrial Revolution, the
emergence of a new postindustrial/information economy, a shift in political practices and
the nature of community, and the decline of the state.96 In an effort to support their
claims, theorists often point to changes in: the prevalence of ICTs, occupational shifts
away from manufacturing, the increasing economic value of information, the
pervasiveness and importance of networks (both social and technological), and an
increased emphasis on the production and interpretation of signs and symbols.97 While a
number of scholars emphasize the degree to which the modern society represents a break
from industrial capitalism, a diverse body of critical literature suggests that many of the
overarching and most significant themes of industrial-capitalism are still present in the
information society.98 Information society proponents tend to engage in naïve
technological determinism and information exceptionalism, which overemphasizes the
role of information in modern society while downplaying the fact that information has
been significant throughout history.99 Despite the contested academic discourse, the
concept of an information society has had a powerful influence on policy makers from
Japan,100 to the E.U.101 and the U.S.102 and Canada.103 However, policy makers, like
information society advocates, have tended to adopt a narrow and simplistic,
technologically determinist approach privileging information and communications
technologies.104
Given the increasing prominence and rhetorical power of theories of an information
society, it is necessary to interrogate those theories, and in the context of this study such
an investigation must have a particular emphasis on the treatment of innovation and IP.
The focus on the concepts of change and technology naturally intersect with the idea of
innovation. While innovation and the role of information are explicitly discussed by
information society theorists, an important element that is implicated in this discussion
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and must be scrutinized is how intellectual goods are to be produced and distributed.
With the increasing focus on information and innovation, theories of the information
society must also account for IP and its alternatives.
ii. Manuel Castells’ Theory of the Network Society
Castells’ views on the informationalization of society are contained in his three volume
work, The Information Age and subsequent writings. He differentiates between modes of
production (capitalism and statism) and modes of development (industrialism and
informationalism),105 adding that informationalism and capitalism are linked, but that
neither is dominated by the other.106 In this regard Castells’ work is not dissimilar from
Bell, and both put knowledge at the centre of productivity.107 Castells argues that this
new mode of development is oriented towards knowledge production unlike industrialism
that was growth oriented.108 Castells emphasizes that informationalism is more flexible
than industrial society. Both workers109 and production processes are more flexible in
informationalism.110 Flexibility is also reflected in what Castells argues is the prominent
new organizational structure, the network firm.111 While networks take on more
significance, Castells suggests the bargaining power of unions is declining,112 and state’s
traditional basis of power, a monopoly on violence, is being eroded by networks of
criminals and terrorists.113 Despite their declining power, nation states retain their
influence.114
Castells’ model of informational capitalism offers some distinct advantages. By
constructing axes of development and production Castells is able to argue that the
increasing informationalization of society is a profound shift, but he does not suggest that
this shift comes in the form of a move away from capitalism. The breadth of Castells’
model is another advantage. He connects numerous processes to informationalization
ranging from environmental movements115 to the integration of the E.U.116 Castells’
analysis reveals informationalism’s ability to act on a wide variety of social structures
and institutions. A third strength of Castells’ analysis is his focus on how the increasing
informationalization of society produces patterns of resistance. Castells identifies how
movements such as the Zapatistas and the American militia movement are not only
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reacting against informationalization, but also employing information technology in their
resistance.117 The recognition of resistance movements is important because it highlights
the dialectical nature of the relationship between the mode of production and resistance.
Informationalism not only produces its own discontents, it also provides them new ways
in which to resist.
Many of the weaknesses of Daniel Bell’s analysis can also be leveled at Castells.118 In
many regards there is little difference between the two. Both stress the importance of
knowledge in productivity, and both suggest that the major change that has occurred is
not a shift away from capitalism, but a shift away from industrialism. Both also express a
degree of technological determinism (though Bell is far more determinist than
Castells).119
Castells’ model is not without its own unique difficulties, which are numerous. His
argument that industrialism was growth oriented is problematic in that it neuters the
concept of the mode of production from any connection to politics. While industrialism
did have an economic growth orientation, the 20th century is ripe with examples where
the primary focus on industrialism is service within a military-industrial complex. The
evisceration of the connection between the mode of development and the political realm
is even more important in informationalism. If society’s principal focus is on knowledge
accumulation, then the political dimension of informationalism is crucial. It is not
unreasonable to conceive of a political system oriented on knowledge production in the
form of surveillance.120 Who controls the information being produced and who has access
will be the fundamental questions, and they are also political ones. To separate the mode
of development from the political weakens Castells’ model.
An analysis of Castells’ work is relevant because he places specific emphasis on the
importance of innovation in informationalism, and in doing so draws on one of the
earliest and most important innovation theorists, Joseph Schumpeter. Castells argues that
the spirit of informationalism is the spirit of ‘creative destruction.’121 The heart of
Schumpeter’s creative destruction was the entrepreneurial drive to innovate new goods
and services.122 Thus, for Castells innovation is the ethos of the network society calling
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it, “the primordial function.”123
Castells pays little attention to the role of IPRs in The Information Age only noting that
the incorporation of TRIPS into the global trade system helps ensure the dominance of
multinational corporations.124 He does discuss the subject in some of his more recent
work noting that efforts to protect IP undermine privacy.125 Though he claims that one of
the primary factors of innovation is new knowledge, this discussion takes place without
an explicit discussion of the role of IP.126 Castells’ theory of a network society places
innovation at its centre, but his discussion of the role that IP plays in this regard is
severely lacking. In this regard his work is typical of proponents of the information
society – it stresses the (largely technical) benefits of innovation, but presents only a
cursory discussion of the role of IP and commodification of information in achieving this
innovation. Castells’ omission of a substantive discussion is notable. Furthermore, by
avoiding the subject while embracing the concept of innovation, he ignores the role of IP
in facilitating exclusion. Holistic theories of the information society should account for
the role played by IP and its alternatives, and given Castells’ negligence in critically
examining the connection between IP (and its alternatives) and innovation, it is necessary
to examine his theory of informational capitalism to determine how this omission
facilitates his extolling of innovation.
iii. David Harvey’s Theory of Flexible Accumulation
David Harvey expresses many of the same views on social relations and the logic of
capitalism as several other critics of the information society; however, his concept of
flexible accumulation makes him distinct among this group as he does not see the
changes in society as a simple extension of existing capitalist trends. Like Castells,
Harvey stresses that the rigidities of Fordism have given way to increased flexibility in
production and consumption.127 However, Harvey does not place information at the
centre of the decline of Fordism; rather he asserts the inherent contradictions in the
Fordist-Keynesian paradigm that caused its collapse.128 Harvey’s model possesses some
elements of post modernism, such as a focus on aesthetics,129 but in a similar vein to
other critical theorists such as Schiller, Habermas and Giddens,130 he argues there are
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more continuities than difference between the modern and post-modern period.131
Harvey places specific emphasis on the role of information in coordinating and
facilitating control.132 He also stresses the increasingly individualistic and consumptive
nature of society.133
Harvey’s model has several advantages. Like Castells and Bell he accepts the premise
that a change has occurred in industrial capitalism; however, he differentiates himself
emphasizing that such a change is a shift of the accumulation of surplus value. Working
from a Marxist perspective he views capitalism as dynamic, and he also focuses on social
relations. As such his model does not focus on a single driving force propelling society
forward, but on the range of forces. His model shows considerable breadth covering
subjects from shifting perceptions of space and time,134 to the aesthetic135 to the role of
finance.136 And though he covers diverse subjects, he is careful to link them to the
regime of flexible accumulation. Harvey’s model possesses one limitation for those
seeking to examine the informationalization of society - knowledge and information are
not at the centre of his focus. While this is a limitation, it should not be considered a
weakness. Harvey’s approach shows that it is possible to assess the range of changes
occurring in society without a central focus on information. Harvey does discuss the role
of IP within the neoliberal state.137 Capital still has primacy over information. For
Harvey increasing informationalization is but one of many factors driving change in
society.
Though Harvey does not place central emphasis on information, he still engages both the
subject of innovation and the role of IP. He argues that Schumpeter obscures the real
motivation for innovation - the pursuit of profit – and that the Schumpeterian view of the
individual innovator has mythologized the entrepreneur.138 The mythologizing of
entrepreneurial ingenuity results in a fetishistic belief that all problems have
technological solutions.139 Harvey goes even further in his criticism of innovation. He
notes that the focus on the development of new products and services results in the
production of goods for which there exist no naturally occurring market or demand.140
He goes on to argue that innovation is destabilizing noting:
Talented interlopers can, furthermore, mobilize technological innovations to undermine
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dominant social relations and institutions; they can, through their activities reshape
common sense to their own pecuniary advantage. There is an inner connection, therefore,
between technological dynamism, instability, dissolution of social solidarities,
environmental degradation, deindustrialization, rapid shifts in time-space relations,
speculative bubbles, and the general tendency towards crisis formation within
capitalism.141

In one way both Castells and Harvey are similar in that they afford innovation a central
role; however, the two possess radically different views as to the benefit/peril posed by
innovation.
Harvey also explicitly discusses the role of IP. IP, and patents in particular, play a central
role in the encouraging of innovation, which is a key goal for the neoliberal state.142 He
claims that IP encourages rent seeking and the depletion of natural commons.143 Unlike
Castells, Harvey obviates the connection between IP and innovation.
Contrasting and comparing the work of Harvey with that of Castells and Bell, with
particular emphasis on their treatment of IP and innovation is not only illuminating in its
own right. The significant differences between the authors provide a suitable basis for
discussing the concepts of innovation and IP within theories of the information society.
Although the three authors did not write at the same time this does not preclude
comparison of their works. Bell’s work comes nearly a generation earlier than that of
Castells and Harvey, yet his work is foundational. Furthermore, the 25th anniversary
edition of Bell’s seminal The Coming of Post-Industrial Society contains a lengthy
introduction written in 1999 where he reaffirms many of his original arguments.144 While
the thesis concentrates on Castells’ Information Age trilogy written at the end of the 20th
century, it also examines his more recent writings over the past decade particularly with
reference to his treatment of IP. In contrast the works of Harvey examined span a
broader period of time (1982-2010), but are consistent in their critical treatment of the
development of capitalism since the early 1970s. By juxtaposing the works of Bell,
Castells and Harvey and their treatment of innovation and IP new insights are provided
on information society discourse and its relationship to broader trends within capitalism.
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VI. Objectives and Research Questions
In order to examine the thesis and sub-theses the following research questions will be
employed:
1) To what degree does the Songwriters Association of Canada’s proposal for a
monthly ISP fee to license non-commercial file sharing represent and reflect
the ideology of substantive alternatives to the expansionary intellectual
property system?
2) To what degree does defensive publishing represent and reflect the ideology
of substantive alternatives to the expansionary intellectual property system?
3) Within theories of the information society how is the term “innovation” used,
and to what degree does the usage of the term by various theorists reflect
either the ideology of the expansionary IP regime or substantive alternatives
to IP?
To answer these questions this study will require a detailed analysis of both the range of
incentive structures and outcomes involved in the production and distribution of
intellectual goods. In this regard it will be necessary to examine the underlying
assumptions and theoretical perspectives behind these incentive structures and outcomes.
Furthermore the study will critically engage with the discourse on innovation both with
respect to intellectual goods and theories of the information society. To facilitate this
discussion, two case studies of lesser studied alternatives to IP will be used to determine
the degree to which they reflect the character and ideology of substantive alternatives to
the expansionary IP system.
VII. Methodology
A. Structure of the Analysis – An Intensive Research Design
Following the review of literature on defensive publishing and the SAC proposal, the
dissertation begins by documenting the expansionary IP regime. The study contains three
distinct but connected parts that form a holistic study of intellectual goods and their
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relationship to theories of the information society. The first part of the analysis is aimed
at examining the theory and discourse surrounding the incentive structures and outcomes
that exist in the production and distribution of intellectual goods. The second part
critically scrutinizes the idea of innovation and the connection between intellectual goods
and innovation. The third part then examines the ideological aspects of innovation
including a specific examination of its treatment in theories of the information society. In
turn the analysis of incentives, innovation and ideology inform the case studies that are
the core of the empirical analysis of the study. The final section of the study concludes
by analyzing alternatives to IP, the expansionary IP regime, the Canadian and U.S.
outlook and offers recommendations and questions for further study. More detailed
information on the subject matter in each of these analyses is contained below in the
Organizational Plan.
The study is based on a holistic intensive research design.145 Morrow and Brown note
that intensive research designs tend to focus on a limited number of cases but with a
focus towards greater detail, and in turn these analyses avoid the pitfalls of abstracted
empiricism and postmodernist relativism.146 Intensive research designs are comparative
in nature, and the particular strength of such a design is that it allows both explications of
individual cases as well as limited generalization.147 The adoption of such a design
permits both theorization and causal and interpretive analysis.148 Though the use of case
studies tends to be associated with qualitative research, the study explicitly rejects the
qualitative-quantitative dichotomy as a false dichotomy,149 and adopts an
antifoundationalist epistemology that rejects the view that knowledge can be based in a
fundamental principle and allows for not only empirical data collection but normative and
reflexive reasoning.150
B. The Case Study Method
Despite the trend in many social sciences towards variable oriented natural science
models, the case study remains a vital method for providing social knowledge.151 Cases
generate not only new empirical insights, but facilitate the development and refinement
of theory.152 They are particularly useful for studying under-researched phenomena.153
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Given the study’s focus on alternatives to IP that have received little scholarly attention,
the case study method is particularly well suited.
The selection of cases is a particularly important aspect of the case study method. Cases
should be singular entities that are sufficiently both similar and dissimilar to each other to
allow meaningful comparison.154 The use of new cases and case types is particularly
important as it allows theoretical innovation.155 It is important for cases to be different
enough to capture the range of variation that exists from the larger group from which they
are drawn.156 While cases are generally compared at the same level of analysis (e.g.
comparing one state with another, or one family with another), varying the level of
analysis can help to provide insight on connections between specific cases and macrolevel phenomena.157 Though the cases chosen for this study do possess a degree of
heterogeneity, these differentiations will be particularly useful for critically examining
alternatives to IP. Alternatives to IP are particularly heterogeneous and range from
alternative methods of compensating artists and creators (such as the bundling of
intellectual goods with physical commodities) to methods of limiting infringement (e.g.
TPM) to systems that would entirely replace IP devices (patronage and prizes). Given
the broad range of alternatives, it is necessary to examine cases that reflect such
diversity.158 Specific attention has been paid to ensuring that the cases studied include
alternatives to both traditional forms of IP (i.e. the use of levies and surcharges on
internet access is an alternative to copyright, while the pre-emptive publishing of
scientific content is an alternative to patenting such research).
C. The Cases
Two cases will be examined to form the empirical core of the analysis. Defensive
publication is the practice of publishing research material in an effort to prevent others
from being able to patent a substantively similar invention. Two of the core requirements
of patentability are that inventions be novel and nonobvious.159 To establish what is
already known in a field national patent offices conduct searches of technical and
academic literature looking for evidence that the claimed invention is not new or would
be obvious. In patent law this state of existing knowledge is called “prior art.” Once
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something has been established as prior art, it is no longer patentable subject matter as it
does not meet the criteria of being new or nonobvious. Defensive publication is the
practice of publishing research materials to establish prior art. Because a patent provides
the legal right to exclude others from the use of the protected subject matter, defensive
publishing is used to prevent rivals for patenting a specific invention and being excluded
from using that invention as a result. Despite several theoretical models attempting to
illustrate how defensive publishing would work in various patent races, there have only
been a small number of empirical studies.160
The second case study will be an examination of the SAC monthly ISP fee proposal.
Initially the SAC proposal was conceived of as an ISP levy in October of 2007 that would
have licensed file sharing of music through a levy of residential broadband internet
access.161 This proposal would have required legislative change, and both rights holders
and consumers would have been compelled to participate. The proposal was revised in
March 2009 to allow both rights holders and internet subscribers to opt out of the levy.162
In January 2011 the SAC modified its proposal from a levy proposal to a private ordering
scheme. This new proposal is still optional for both rights holders and internet
subscribers. The current proposal is a “business to business” model where the SAC,
rights holders and ISPs partner to license file sharing in exchange for a monthly fee, and
as such does not require any legislative change163 Because the SAC is no longer
advocating for a levy proposal, this analysis focuses on the current SAC proposal from
January 2011.While there is an extant body of literature on levies, particularly in the
European context, the discussion of levies in Canada has centered on the blank media
levy, and critical analyses of the SAC proposal, particularly its most recent proposal, are
missing.164
D. Selection of the Cases
The selection of these specific cases comes from a consideration of several factors
beyond the general lack of empirical literature. Each case represents an alternative to a
different intellectual property mechanism (patents in the case of defensive publishing and
copyright in the case of the SAC proposal). Furthermore, given the dominance of patent
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and copyright literature in IP literature it is logical to ensure that a case involving each of
these two IP mechanisms is scrutinized. Though the cases do vary in level of analysis
(the defensive publishing case examines an alternative to IP, but not focused on any
specific form of defensive publishing,165 while the SAC’s proposal is a very specific
alternative but part of a broader group of alternatives (including levies)) this will allow
for a comparison of how alternatives function in the general versus the specific context.
Furthermore, although the SAC proposal would apply only to Canada, because it is a
business to business approach, the model could be used elsewhere, and the SAC notes
that the Swedish performing and mechanical rights society (STIM) has put forward a
similar proposal.166 Also, the defensive publishing analysis will include explicit analyses
of specific venues for defensive publishing, while the analysis of the SAC proposal will
include discussion of other means through which ISPs and rights holders partner to
enforce IP rights.
These cases are also timely. Though defensive publishing has been practiced for some
time, there has been a marked increase in the quantity of defensive publications.
According to one calculation the number of defensive publications has doubled in the
period from 2000 to 2004 from the 1995 to 1999 period.167 Specialized forums for
defensive publishing (such as the services offered Research Disclosure and IP.com) have
emerged to facilitate easier defensive publishing. At the same time more patents are
being granted and patent applications being filed.168 Increased patent activity
incentivizes greater defensive publishing. The SAC proposal is part of an ongoing
copyright reform process in Canada. SAC officials appeared before parliamentary
committees in both 2010 and 2011 to discuss their proposal.169 Three previous copyright
modernization bills in Canada have failed (Bill C-60 in 2005, Bill C-61 in 2008, and Bill
C-32 in 2010) and there is currently another bill (Bill C-11) before Parliament that would
amend the Copyright Act,170 though the current SAC proposal requires no legislative
changes.
Finally both of these alternatives represent substantive changes from the existing IP
practices. The SAC proposal would legitimize and license a prodigious volume of
infringing activity.171 While rights holders licensing and monetizing their rights set forth
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in the Copyright Act, this approach is novel because it originates from the SAC who are
not the rights holders. Another crucial element of the SAC proposal is the inclusion of
ISPs, who play an essential role in the telecommunication of intellectual goods.
Defensive publishing goes even further than creating an alternative revenue scheme; it
attacks the patent system from its very foundation by eliminating proprietary rights to
inventions while facilitating access to the information behind disclosed knowledge.
Though a number of alternatives to traditional intellectual property devices have become
more important due to the expansionary IP regime, defensive publishing and the SAC
proposal are particularly important to analyze at this juncture due to their timeliness,
importance, and lack of existing scholarship.
E. Source of Data
In examining the cases this study will draw on a range of primary sources. The defensive
publishing case will draw empirical evidence from the various venues used to
disseminate defensive publications. The websites of IP.com172 and Research
Disclosure173 provide a wide range of information on defensive publication including
white papers on defensive publishing, access to corporate disclosure journals,174
information about which companies are engaging in defensive publication, and some
statistical information on defensive publishing. This material will be complemented with
other primary sources of information including Peer to Patent,175 and information on the
Statutory Invention Registration (SIR) system in the United States.176 These primary
sources will be complemented with additional secondary material including the academic
literature discussed in the literature review and other relevant policy documents including
cases that have dealt with defensive publishing including the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision in In re Hall.177
The analysis of the SAC ISP proposal will draw heavily on the detailed proposal
available on the SAC website.178 In addition to the proposal details, the SAC website
provides answers to a number of common questions on the proposal,179 quotes from
artists and a video interview with singer Randy Bachman.180 To aid in the analysis of this
case this study will also examine the less detailed Writers Guild of Canada ISP
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proposal,181 and the alternative agreements between rights holders and ISPs in other
jurisdictions.182
F. Micro-Level Analysis and Macro-Level Theorization
While the case study method is extremely useful for providing detailed and nuanced
understandings of specific cases, its ability to provide limited generalizations and new
theoretical insights is underappreciated. The case study method facilitates what Morrow
and Brown describe as “intensive explication.”183 In this regard, such an investigation
can explicate the political and economic aspects and relations of a given social system
(intellectual goods production and distribution).184 Combined with the intensive
explication is complementary logic of comparative generalization, which produces
limited generalizations through the comparison of cases.185 The combination of intensive
explication and comparative generalization case studies can move beyond specific,
limited empirical data to provide understanding on broader social phenomenon. This
important aspect of case studies is echoed by Sjoberg, Williams, Vaughan and Sjoberg,
who note:
The advantages of case studies (as we perceive them) is that researchers
who utilize them can deal with the reality behind appearances, with
contradictions and the dialectical nature of social life, as well with a whole
that is more than the sum of its parts.186
The case study method provides a vital link between theory and evidence, and it must be
both simultaneously informed by theory and able to provide new theoretical insights.187
Hence the design of the study; the cases will draw on the theoretical framework and
literature on intellectual goods incentives, innovation and theories of the information
society, and in turn can be used to provide greater understanding not only on
incentivization, innovation and the ideology of IP and its alternatives.
VIII. Limitations
This study contains some limitations, particularly with respect to scope, although these
limitations do not impinge upon the importance of the study and its justification.
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The study does not focus exclusively on any single national set of IP/innovation policies,
and is not meant as an exhaustive examination of these policies in any one country.
Despite this limitation, the nearly global standards set for IP protection in TRIPS and
related international IP agreements suggests that this study can provide insights relating
to most national IP policies. While no specific country is the sole focus of the study,
much of the analysis is focused on the United States and Canada, and notable differences
in policy (such as the lack of moral rights protection in the United States in comparison to
other countries) will be highlighted. The focus on the U.S. is twofold. Not only is the
country the locus of the expansionary IP regime, it is also the jurisdiction where trends
identified by information society theorists have tended to be most pronounced. Although
both information society trends and expansionary IP policies have occurred in other
jurisdictions, these phenomena are most noticeable in the U.S. Canada also feature
prominently because it not only serves as a useful comparator to the U.S. (given the
relatively close geographic, economic, political, and social conditions), but unlike other
advanced nations, Canada has been less supportive of expansionary IP policies.
The study will only examine in detail two alternatives to IP. While a broad range of
alternatives exists and some of these will be unanalyzed it is hoped that the framework
provided here could be expanded to these alternatives in future studies. The study is also
not an exhaustive comparison of patents and copyrights. Though patents and copyrights
are both intellectual property mechanisms, there are important distinctions between them
as well as differences between patent and copyright statutes and jurisprudence in different
countries.188 Despite this limitation, the study pays particular attention to the differences
between patents and copyrights and differences in national treatment and conditions as
they relate to the three facets of the analysis (incentive structures, innovatory outcomes
and ideological characteristics).
Finally the study will be limited to sources available in English; however, it is posited
that an extensive body of literature in English exists to inform the study, and for the study
to be completed in a reasonable and timely manner such a limitation is necessary.
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IX. Organizational Plan
Following the literature review (Chapter II), the first part (Chapter III) of the analysis will
involve an investigation of the prominent dimensions of the expansionary IP regime. It
will highlight how traditional IP mechanisms have expanded in scope, term, and severity
of penalties for infringement, the rise of sui generis IP devices, and the incorporation of
IP into the global trade system with a concluding comment on some countervailing
trends.
The next part of the analysis (Chapter IV) will focus on incentives. It will begin with an
examination of the role of incentives in IP looking at the role of incentives in justificatory
theories of intellectual property, the incentives-access tradeoff/paradigm that
characterizes intellectual property and the different motives of various types of actors
(inventors and creators, rights holding organization, heirs, and researchers). The second
part of the chapter will focus on economics and the pecuniary incentive looking first at
homo economicus and the assumptions behind the pecuniary incentive. It will then
examine the discursive shift in economics literature to a sole focus on pecuniary
incentives for encouraging intellectual goods production and then examine how this shift
has influenced legal thought. This section will conclude with a discussion of the dangers
of an exclusive focus on pecuniary incentives. The final section of the chapter will look
at other incentives for intellectual activity with a two part discussion focusing first on
non-economic incentives for inventive and creative behaviour followed by a discussion
on the role of incentives to create versus incentives to disclose information.
Chapter V will examine innovation. The first section of the chapter will examine the
innovation models put forward by Arrow and Schumpeter and the empirical literature
examining these models. After discussing the economic foundations of innovation the
next part of the chapter will discuss the economic importance of innovation with a
specific discussion on the role of the rate of innovation. The third section of the chapter
will examine the relationship between IP and innovation drawing first on the empirical
evidence on IP and innovation before then examining the underappreciated link between
creative and artistic activity and innovation, the patent thickets/anticommons problem
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and the idea of an information commons.
Building on the preceding analysis in Chapters IV and V, Chapter VI examines the
ideological dimensions of innovation. The first section of the ideology chapter will
examine the role innovation plays as a societal goal beginning with an examination of
some national policies on innovation. The section will then highlight the dangers of the
increasingly empty rhetoric on innovation, before finally trying to recast innovation in
non-economic terms as part of a broader trend of societal goals from the Enlightenment
that have aimed at using science and technology to progress political and social
improvement. The second section of the chapter will examine the use of innovation in
theories of the information society focusing on the work of Bell, Castells and Harvey.
Chapter VII forms the core of the study and is an empirical analysis of the cases
identified: the SAC proposal and defensive publishing. The analysis in the previous three
chapters will be used to help critically interrogate these two alternative intellectual goods
to determine if they reflect the ideology of the expansionary IP regime or if they
represent substantive alternatives from it. Each alternative will be specifically analyzed
in terms of the incentives utilized, innovative outcomes and ideological aspects.
Chapter VIII will discuss and analyze the findings of the case studies in the context of the
two chapters on innovation and incentives and theoretical framework. By looking at the
specific cases and the incentives and outcomes in these cases it will be argued that a
broad range of incentives for the creation of intellectual goods exists. More importantly,
there is a marked difference in the outcomes of how intellectual goods are produced.
While all intellectual goods are potentially innovative, those that prioritize exclusion are
well suited for stimulating economic growth, but such growth comes at the price of
reduced access and limited social and political advancement. By building on the
discussions in chapters III through VI and the empirical analysis in chapter VIII this
discussion will not only examine the implications of the expansionary IP regime and
some of its alternatives, but also discuss how the ideologies of these systems are
advanced in various theories of the information society through use of the term
innovation. Finally this section will include a discussion of how the dangers of the
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expansionary IP system can be mitigated through the encouragement of substantive
alternatives to IP and questions for further research.
X. Conclusion
The proposed study aims to provide greater understanding of the role of incentives and
innovation with respect to alternative intellectual goods within the context of an
expansionary IP regime and theories of the information society. In furthering this
understanding the analysis will focus on two alternative intellectual goods as case studies
– defensive publishing and the Songwriters Association of Canada’s ISP proposal. This
study is particularly timely given the ongoing expansionary trends in IP and concomitant
increase in importance of alternatives to IP.
This study’s contributions are three fold. First, it provides an empirical analysis of two
understudied alternatives to IP. Second, it provides specific evidence-based policy
recommendations for policymakers as an outcome. Finally and most importantly, it
provides a new faceted framework for analyzing alternatives to IP to determine if
alternatives are substantively or only nominally different from IP.
Notes to Chapter One:
1

United States Trade Representative (USTR), 2009 Special 301 Report, (2009) 3:
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Full%20Version%20of%20the%202009%20SPECIAL%20301%20
REPORT.pdf ; World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), “World Intellectual Property Day 2010 –
Innovation Linking the World,” (2010): http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2010/article_0010.html
; WIPO Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Report on the International Patent System, SCP/12/3,
(2008), 8: http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_12/scp_12_3_rev_2.pdf ; William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright,” Journal of Legal Studies, 18, (1989), 325;
Edmund W. Kitch, “Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property,”
Vanderbilt Law Review, 53, (2000), 1727; Kenneth W. Dam, “The Economic Underpinnings of Patent
Law,” The Journal of Legal Studies, 23(1), (Jan. 1994), 248, 247.
2
Carl Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,”
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 1, (2000), 120; Michael Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too
Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives, (New York: NY, Basic Books,
2008), 78, 105-106; Eric von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 12;
Yochai Benkler, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm,” Yale Law Journal, 112, (2002),
423.
3
Kenneth J. Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention,” in The Rate and
Direction of Incentive Activity: Social and Economic Factors, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1962), 615; WIPO, Report on the International Patent System, 8; Landes and Posner, “An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Law,” 325-6; Stanley M. Besen and Leo J. Raskind, “An Introduction to the Law
and Economics of Intellectual Property,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5(1) (Wint. 1991), 5; Stan J.

40

Liebowitz and Richard Watt, “How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music?
Copyright and Its Alternatives,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(4), (2006), 539 n. 12.
4
Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), Moving Forward to Canada’s Advantage: Strategic Plan
2007-12,(n.d.), 6: http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/corp_StrategicPlane.pdf/$FILE/corp_StrategicPlan-e.pdf ; European Patent Office (EPO), “The Economic Importance of
Patents,” 2008: http://www.epo.org/topics/innovation-and-economy/economic-impact.html ; United States
-Executive Office of the President - National Economic Council, A Strategy for American Innovation:
Driving Towards Sustainable Growth and Quality Jobs, (Sept. 2009), 4:
http://www.manufacturing.gov/interagency/documents/SEPT_20__Innovation_Whitepaper_FINAL.pdf
5
Samuel E. Trosow, “The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge: Using Social Theory of
the Information Age as Tool for Policy Analysis,” Manitoba Law Journal, 30, (2003): 418-419; David
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 64; James Boyle,
“Introduction: A Nondelegation Doctrine for the Digital Age?” Duke Law Journal, 50 (Oct. 2000), 16.
6
In this case “ideology” refers to the systematic scheme or ideas and concepts relating to the political and
social that justify action (see, Oxford English Dictionary, (Oxford University Press, 2001):
http://dictionary.oed.com).
7
This point does not suggest that proponents of intellectual property do not see any non-economic benefit
to innovation; however, the economic benefits of innovation are superordinate to other innovation related
outcomes.
8
Richard Posner goes further suggesting that wealth maximization is not only an economic goal, but an
ethical framework that is superior to utilitarian/consequentialist viewpoints (Richard A. Posner,
“Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory,” Journal of Legal Studies, 8, (1979), 119-136).
9
The ability of intellectual property rights to provide their owners the ability to receive the full social value
(full appropriability) of their work is reflected in Kitch’s prospect theory of patents (Edmund W. Kitch,
“The Nature and Function of the Patent System,” Journal of Law and Economics, 20(2), (Oct. 1977), 2701); however, Lemley notes that full appropriability is not endorsed by all proponents of IP (Mark A.
Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,” Texas Law Review, 83, (2005), 1040, n. 33).
10
In economic terms this cost is referred to as deadweight loss, and is the result of having goods priced
above marginal cost.
11
Hal R. Varian, “Copying and Copyright,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), (2005), 135.
12
Liebowitz and Watt, “How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music?” 535-36.
13
The history of prizes to encourage artistic and inventive behaviour is roughly as old as the history of
modern intellectual property devices. The British Parliament authorized the Longitude Prize in 1715, only
a few years after it enacted its first modern copyright statute (The Statute of Anne) (H. Quill, “John
Harrison, Copley Medallist, and the £20 000 Longitude Prize,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of
London, 18(2), (Dec. 1963), 146). The French have a similarly long historical use of prizes. Nicolas
Appert won a prize from the Napoleonic government for his invention of a food canning process, and Louis
Daguerre’s photographic method was awarded a prize form the Second Republic (Suzanne Scotchmer,
Innovation and Incentives, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004), 43-4). While prizes have not played as
strong a role in the U.S., James Madison did propose including the use of prizes in the Constitution;
however, his proposal was not adopted (Edward C. Walterscheid, “To Promote the Progress of Science and
the Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States
Constitution,” Journal of Intellectual Property Law, 2(1), (Fall 1994), 45-6). With respect to modern
prizes there are considerable prizes made available from foundation for advances in spaceflight and
genomics (X Prize Foundation, “Overview,” (2010): http://www.xprize.org/x-prizes/overview),
mathematics (Clay Mathematics Institute, “Millennium Prize Problems,” (2010):
http://www.claymath.org/millennium/), and even the U.S. Department of Energy is offering a prize for
advances in light bulb technology (United States Department of Energy - L Prize, “Transforming the
Lighting Landscape,” (2010): http://www.lightingprize.org/).
14
See chap. 2 for a review of the literature on these two alternative types of intellectual goods, and chap. 1,
s. VI.C for a detailed discussion of the two cases.
15
In this regard DRMs and other technological protection measures represent only a nominal alternative to
traditional IP devices.
16
See chap. 1, s. VI - Methodology for a detailed discussion of the cases and proposed analysis.

41

17

See chap. 2, highlighting the lack of empirical investigations on defensive publishing and levies on
copying related technologies.
18
An often used counter example is the work of teachers who earn far less than the value they produce. A
recent study concluded that skilled kindergarten teachers have a significant impact on the future income of
their students (to the degree of $170,000 USD a year), yet they are remunerated at a much lower level (Raj
Chetty et. al., “How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evidence from Project
Star” NBER Working Paper No 16381, (2010), 41).
19
Over-incentivization of the production of intellectual goods is economically harmful as it diverts
resources away from other economically valuables areas of activity and induces rent-seeking (William M.
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press, 2003), 396; Lemley, “Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding,” 1032).
20
Several commentators have suggested that full appropriation raises ethical concerns. Hettinger notes
that much of the market value of IP is created through market structures and the previous of work of others,
and as such the concept of full appropriability is not suitable (Edward C. Hettinger, “Justifying Intellectual
Property,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18(1), (Wint. 1989), 38). Ghosh argues that full appropriability
is both economically inefficient and undermine the ethical concept of distributive justice (Shubha Ghosh,
“The Fable of the Commons: Exclusivity and the Construction of Intellectual Property Markets,” U.C.
Davis Law Review, 40, (2007), 873).
21
Barack Obama, as quoted in, United States - National Economic Council, A Strategy for American
Innovation, (cover page).
22
As of the date of writing, Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011, has
passed second reading (Canada – Parliament of Canada, “House Government Bill 41st Parliament, 1st
Session: C-11,” LEGISinfo, (n.d.):
http://www.parl.gc.ca/LegisInfo/BillDetails.aspx?Mode=1&Language=E&billId=5134851&View=0).
23
Canada (Attorney General) v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2011 FCA 238.
24
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2010] 4 FCR 541, 2010 FC 1011.
25
See chap. 1, s. VII.C for a detailed discussion of the two cases.
26
See chap. 1, s. VII.D for a detailed discussion of case selection.
27
See chap. 1, s. V.G for a discussion of the work of these theorists and the justification for choosing to
use their work.
28
Sandra Braman, Change of State: Information, Policy, and Power, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006),
71-74.
29
Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), 7; Douglas
Kellner, “Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory,” Sociological Perspectives, 33(1), (Spring 1990),
12; and Raymond A. Morrow and David D. Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 1994), 275.
30
Kellner, “Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory,” 24; and, Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory
and Methodology, 275.
31
Kellner, “Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory,” 12.
32
Kellner, “Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory,” 20.
33
Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, 159.
34
Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity, 161.
35
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 11.
36
Samuel E. Trosow, “Information for Society: Towards a Critical Theory of Intellectual Property Policy,”
(PhD diss., UCLA, 2002), 201.
37
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 7th Ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2007); Posner,
“Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory,”; Richard A. Posner, “Intellectual Property: The Law and
Economics Approach,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(2), (Spring 2005); Richard A. Posner, The
Economics of Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); and Richard A. Posner, “Rational
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law,” Stanford Law Review, 50, (1998).
38
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, “The Economics of Trademark Law,” The Trademark
Reporter, 78, (1988), Landes and Posner, “An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law,”; and Landes and
Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law.
39
Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System,”; and Kitch “Elementary and Persistent Errors in
the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property.”

42

40

For Posner, he specifically notes that his conception of economically efficient is “wealth maximizing”
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 13.
41
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6-13.
42
Christopher May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures,
(London: Routledge, 2000); and Christopher May, The Information Society: A Skeptical View, (Cambridge:
Polity, 2002).
43
Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, (Aldreshot: Dartmouth Publishing, 1996); and Peter
Drahos and John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy, (London:
Earthscan, 2002).
44
Samuel E. Trosow, “The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories: Copyright, Commodification and
Capital,” The Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 16(2), (July 2003); Trosow, “Information for
Society,”; Trosow, “The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Information.”
45
May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights, 162-181.
46
Drahos and Braithwaite, Information Feudalism, 85-149.
47
Trosow, “Information for Society,” 283; and, Samuel E. Trosow, “The Illusive Search for Justificatory
Theories: Copyright, Commodification and Capital,” .
48
Trosow, “Information for Society,” 278.
49
Trosow, “Information for Society,” 283; and, Trosow, “The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories,”
239.
50
See chap 4, s. I.
51
See chap. 4, s. II.B.
52
See chap 4, s. II.A.
53
See chap. 5, s. III.A.
54
See chap 5, s. III.C.
55
See chap 5 s. III.D.
56
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 250.
57
Kellner, “Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory,” 12; and, Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory
and Methodology, 23.
58
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 50-51.
59
See chap 8, s. V.
60
An illustrative example of a utilitarian approach to IP is found in the U.S. Constitution, Article I, section
8, clause 8, which states Congress is empowered, “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
securing for a limited time to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries” (U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 8). Lockean justifications of IP are based on the
chapter on property in Locke’s Second Treaties of Government (John Locke, Two Treaties of Government,
Rev. Ed., (New York, NY: New American Library, 1963), 327-344). For a discussion of the role of
incentives to intellectual property see: Arrow, “Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for
Invention,” 619-623; Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed., (New York:
Harper Perennial, 2008), 81-86; Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry
into Profits, Capital, Credit, Interest and the Business Cycle, Redvers Opie (trans.), (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1934), 65-75; Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose, “The Patent Controversy of the
19th Century,” The Journal of Economic History, 10(1), (May 1950), 21-25; Glynn S. Lunney,
“Reexamining Copyrights Incentives-Access Paradigm,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 49, (Apr. 1996), 492499; Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, 9-13; Hettinger, “Justifying
Intellectual Property,” 40-43; Kitch, “The Nature and the Function of the Patent System,” 265-270;
Trosow, “The Illusive Search for Justificatory Theories,” 237-240,
61
U.S. Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 8.
62
CIPO, “About Intellectual Property: The Role of IP,” (2009):
http://www.cipo.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr00332.html
63
The history of civilizations that lacked modern, western intellectual property devices including of
Ancient Egypt, Greece and Rome, China and India provide clear indication of this point. A intrinsic
motivation towards creativity and inventiveness can also be gleaned a child’s natural proclivity to draw
when given crayons or makers or build when given blocks.
64
Steven Shavell and Tanguy Van Ypesele, “Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights,” Journal of Law
and Economics, 44, (2001), 5; Kitch, “The Nature and Function of the Patent System,” 266; Landes and

43

Posner, “The Economics of Trademark Law,” 267-8; Landes and Posner, “An Economic Analysis of
Copyright Law,” 325-6; Michael McAleer and Les Oxley, “Intellectual Property and Economic
Incentives,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(4), (2006), 484; Kenneth Carlaw, Les Oxley, Paul Walker,
David Thorns, and Michael Nuth, “Beyond the Hype: Intellectual Property and the Knowledge
Society/Knowledge Economy,” Journal of Economic Surveys, 20(4), (2006), 641; and, Dam, “The
Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law,” 248, 263.
65
This point is developed from the argument that is possible to create a non-falsifiable definition of selfinterest subsumes all actions including altruistic ones as self-interested. Because this ‘weak’ definition of
self-interest categorizes all behaviours as self-interested it provides little analytical insight as every possible
action is seen by definition to be motivated by self-interest. See, Russell B. Korobkin and Thomas S. Ulen,
“Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics,”
California Law Review, 88(4), (July 2000), 1061; and, Posner, “Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law,” 1557.
66
Leibowitz and Watt note, “The more modern view of the rationale for copyright is firmly based upon the
monetary motives behind creation,” arguing that while the early literature on copyright included
discussions of a wide range of motives for the production of IP, it has come to take on an entirely and
exclusively economic focus (Liebowitz and Watt, “How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the
Market for Music?” 539 n. 12), and see chap. 4, s. II.B.
67
Wendy J. Gordon, “Render Copyright unto Caesar: On Taking Incentives Seriously,” University of
Chicago Law Review, 71, (2004), 88.
68
“Moral Rights” with respect to copyright is a specific set of rights given to the authors that are noneconomic in nature and deal with ensuring the artistic integrity of the work and the authors reputation.
Though the Berne Convention (Article 6bis) provides for the protection of authors moral rights, the United
States does not recognize moral rights, and specifically excluded them from TRIPS.
69
For a more detailed discussion of the role of TRIPS in the expansionary intellectual property regime, see
chap. 3, s. II.C.
70
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 15 Apr., 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 United Nations Treaty Series
(UNTS) 99, art. 9, cl. 1.
71
Harold Demsetz, “Information and Efficiency,” Journal of Law and Economics, 12, (1969), 13.
72
Tom G. Palmer, “Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified? The Philosophy of Property Rights and
Ideal Objects,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 13, (1990), 864-5.
73
Kitch, “Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property,” 1729-1730.
74
Ajit Pyati, “A Critical Theory of Open Access: Libraries and Electronic Publishing,” First Monday,
12(10), (Oct. 2007), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1970/1845
75
Jonathan Zittrain, “Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Propriety Software,” University of
Chicago Law Review, 71, (2004), 271-2.
76
Michael Abramowicz, “Perfecting Patent Prizes,” Vanderbilt Law Review, 56, (2003), 126.
77
Zittrain, “Normative Principles for Evaluating Free and Proprietary Software,” 278.
78
See among others: Yochai Benkler, “The Political Economy of the Commons,” Upgrade, 4(3), (2003),69; May, A Global Political Economy of Intellectual Property Rights: The New Enclosures, 13; Lawrence
Lessig, The Future of Ideas, (New York: Random House, 2001), 85; Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual
Property, 55-57; Vandana Shiva, Protect or Plunder, (London, Zed Books: 2002), 43-5; Lester C. Thurow,
“Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights,” Harvard Business Review, Sept.-Oct. 1997, 101;
Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons,” in
Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom,
Eds., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 3-26; David Boiller, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,”
in Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom,
(eds.), (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 27-40; Nick Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx: Cycles and
Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology Capitalism, (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 2019; James Boyle, “The Second Enclosure Movmement and the Construction of the Public Domain,” Law
and Contemporary Problems, 66, (Wint./Spring 2003), 33-74.
79
Shapiro, “Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting,” 120;
Heller, The Gridlock Economy, 26; James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon, “Symmetric Tragedies:
Commons and Anticommons,” Journal of Law and Economics, 43, (2000), 11-12.

44

80

Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 56.
Hess and Ostrom, “Introduction: An Overview of the Knowledge Commons,” 4.
82
Boiller, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” 34.
83
Shubba Ghosh, “How to Build a Commons: Is Intellectual Property Constricting, Facilitating or
Irrelevant,” Understanding Knowledge as a Commons: From Theory to Practice, Charlotte Hess and Elinor
Ostrom, Eds., (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007), 210.
84
GNU Operating System, ‘The GNU Operating System,” (2011), http://www.gnu.org/
85
Creative Commons, “About Licenses,” n.d., http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/
86
John Willinsky, The Access Principle: The Case for Open Access to Research and Scholarship,
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006), 212-6.
87
Posner argues that the purpose of any legal incentive structure is to produce wealth-maximizing
behaviour (Posner, The Economics of Justice, 75; Heald contends that American patent law has always
attempted to maximize wealth (Paul Heald, “Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of
Preemption,” Iowa Law Review, 76, (1991), 964-5)).
88
McAleer and Oxley, “Intellectual Property and Economic Incentives,” 488; Richard Gilbert, “Looking
for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are We in the Competition-Innovation Debate?” Innovation Policy and the
Economy, 6, (2006), 159. See also Merges discussion of how the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which handles all appeals on patent infringement cases, has adopted a limited view of innovation as
commercial success with reference to the patent requirement for nonobviousness (Robert P. Merges,
“Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation,” California Law
Review, 76, (1988), 837-8).
89
Erik Brynjolfsson and Xiaoquan (Michael) Zhang, “Innovation Incentives for Information Goods,”
Innovation Policy and the Economy, 7, (2006), 99; Paul Romer, “When Should We Use Intellectual
Property Rights,” American Economic Review, 92(2), (2002), 215; Erik Brynjolfsson and Adam Saunders,
Wired for Innovation: How Technology is Reshaping the Economy, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010),
110-112.
90
Michael Carrier, Innovation for the 21st Century: Harnessing the Power of Intellectual Property and
Antitrust Law, (New York: NY, Oxford University Press, 2009), 2-3.
91
Bridget Kendall, “The New World Order,” BBC News, 15 Aug., 2001:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1480801.stm
92
Boiller, “The Growth of the Commons Paradigm,” 37.
93
In addition to ‘information society’ Carlaw et. al identify 14 other terms used by various authors to
describe the new change from industrial society (Carlaw et. al., “Beyond the Hype: Intellectual Property
and the Knowledge Society/Knowledge Economy,” 669-690).
94
Trosow, “The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge,” 420-421.
95
For a discussion of the numerous approaches to information society theories see: Frank Webster,
Theories of the Information Society, 3d Ed., (London: Routledge, 2006), 8-31; May, The Information
Society: A Skeptical View, 1-12; and Carlaw et. al., “Beyond the Hype,” 669-690.
96
May, The Information Society, 12-16.
97
Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 8-21.
98
May, The Information Society, 149-150; and, Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 6-7, and
270-273.
99
Trosow, “The Ownership and Commodification of Legal Knowledge,” 440; and, Webster, Theories of
the Information Society, 12.
100
Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 10;
101
European Commission, “Information Society,” (2010):
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/index_en.htm
102
United States - America.gov, “U.S. Delegation Cites Consensus on Key Information Society Issues,”
America.gov (10 Dec., 2003): http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2003/December/20031210163112rellufj0.6401483.html
103
Industry Canada, “European Union – Canada Joint Statement: Electronic Commerce in the Global
Information Society,” (2008): http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/gv00386.html ; Industry
Canada, “Canada – United Kingdom Joint Statement on Global Electronic Commerce and E-Government,”
(2008): http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/eng/gv00387.html ; Industry Canada, “Canada – Costa
Rica Joint Statement on Global Electronic Commerce,” (2008): http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic81

45

ceac.nsf/eng/gv00382.html ; and, Industry Canada, “Convergence Policy – Backgrounder,” (2009):
http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/smt-gst.nsf/eng/sf05267.html
104
Ajit Pyati, “WSIS: Whose Vision of an Information Society?” First Monday, 10(5), (May 2005):
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1241/1161
105
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Volume 1 - The Rise of the Network Society, 2nd ed., (Oxford:
Blackwell, 2000), 14.
106
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 13.
107
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 17.
108
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 17.
109
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Volume II - The Power of Identity, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997),
173.
110
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 166.
111
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 164.
112
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 302.
113
Castells, The Power of Identity, 302.
114
Castells, The Power of Identity, 243.
115
Castells, The Power of Identity, 110-33.
116
Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Volume III - End of Millennium, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell,
2000), 338-365.
117
Castells, The Power of Identity, 68-9, 106.
118
Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 115, 120.
119
Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 120.
120
Giddens specifically emphasizes the heightened surveillance mechanisms developed by the nation state
and capitalism (Anthony Giddens, “Living in a Post-Traditional Society,” in Reflexive Modernization:
Politics, Tradition, and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994),
92).
121
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 215.
122
Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 84.
123
Manuel Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 100.
124
Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, 120.
125
Castells, The Internet Galaxy, 182.
126
Castells, The Internet Galaxy, 103.
127
David Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), 147.
128
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 142.
129
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 154.
130
Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 265.
131
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 116.
132
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 158-9.
133
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 171, 285.
134
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 284-307.
135
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 154.
136
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 164-5.
137
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 64.
138
Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 105.
139
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 68.
140
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 69.
141
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 69; this quote echoes an earlier sentiment from Harvey on
innovation, that it “exacerbates instability, insecurity, and in the end, becomes the prime force pushing
capitalism into the periodic paroxysms of crisis” (Harvey, The Condition of Post Modernity, 106).
142
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 64.
143
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, 68, and 160.
144
Daniel Bell, The Coming of Postindustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, spec. anniv. ed.,
(New York: Basic Books, 1999), ix-lxxxcv.
145
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 250.

46

146

Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 250.
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 250.
148
Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies,
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1987), 51.
149
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 207.
150
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 222.
151
Gideon Sjoberg, Norma Williams, Ted R. Vaughan, and Andree F. Sjoberg, “The Case Study Approach
in Social Research,” A Case for the Case Study, Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg,
Eds., (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 27, 44; and Charles C. Ragin,
“Introduction: The Problem of Balancing Discourse on Cases and Variables in Comparative Social
Science,” Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research, Charles C. Ragin Ed., (Leiden: E.J.
Brill, 1991), 3.
152
John Walton, “Making the Theoretical Case,” What Is a Case? Exploring the Foundations of Social
Inquiry, Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, Eds., (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press,
1992), 127.
153
York Bradshaw and Michael Wallace, “Informing Generality and Explaining Uniqueness: The Place of
Case Studies in Comparative Research,” in Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research,
Charles C. Ragin Ed., (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991), 164.
154
Ragin, “Introduction,” 1.
155
Diane Vaughan, “Theory Elaboration: The Heuristics of Case Analysis,” What Is a Case? Exploring the
Foundations of Social Inquiry, Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, Eds., (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 1992), 174.
156
Larry J. Griffin, Christopher Botsko, Ana-Maria Wahl, and Larry W. Issac, “Theoretical Generality,
Case Particularity: Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Trade Union Growth and Decline,” Research,” in
Issues and Alternatives in Comparative Social Research, Charles C. Ragin Ed., (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1991),
111.
157
Vaughan, “Theory Elaboration,” 184.
158
Liebowitz and Watt, “How to Best Ensure Remuneration for Creators in the Market for Music?” 53536.
159
In Canada see the Patent Act (R.S., 1985, c. P-4) sections 28.2 and 28.3, and in the United States see the
Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 102 and 103).
160
See chap. 2, for a review of the literature on defensive publication and a discussion of the existing
empirical studies.
161
SAC, “Our Proposal: Detailed,” (2011): http://www.songwriters.ca/proposaldetailed.aspx
162
Michael Geist, “Songwriters rewrite bid for legalized file sharing,” Toronto Star, (23 Mar. 2009):
http://www.thestar.com/article/606488
163
SAC, “Our Proposal: Detailed.”
164
See chap. 2, for a review of the literature on levies and the Songwriters Association of Canada ISP levy
proposal.
165
See chap. 1, s. VII.D for a discussion of the specific venues of defensive publishing that will be
included in the analysis.
166
SAC, “Proposal FAQ,” (n.d.): http://songwriters.ca/proposalfaq.aspx
167
Justin P. Johnson, “Defensive Publishing by a Leading Firm,” (2004), 19:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=606781
168
In 2000 there were 295,926 U.S. utility patent applications of which 157,494 were granted; by 2009
these numbers had increased to 456,106 and 167,349 respectively (USPTO, “U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar
Years 1790 to Present,” (2011): http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm
169
Canada - House of Commons – Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage, “Evidence: Thursday,
October 28, 2010,” 40th Parl., 3rd sess., (2010):
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4740661&Language=E&Mode=1&Parl
=40&Ses=3 ; and, Canada – House of Commons – Legislative Committee on Bill C-32, “Evidence:
Tuesday, March 1, 2011,” 40th Parl. 3rd sess., (2011):
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4998663&Mode=1&Parl=40&Ses=3&L
anguage=E
170
Bill C-11, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, 1st Sess, 41st Parl, 2011.
147

47

171

The existing blank audio media levy allows for non-commercial private copying, but this does not
include the right to share music through file sharing applications as the uploading of music would
constitute a communication of the work to the public by telecommunication, a right of copyright which is
not licensed by the existing levy (Copyright Act, s. 3(f), and 80(2)(c)).
172
IP.com, “IP.com,” (2011): http://www.ip.com
173
Research Disclosure, “Research Disclosure,” (2011): http://www.researchdisclosure.com/
174
Corporate disclosure journals such as the Xerox Disclosure Journal and IBM Technical Disclosure
Bulletin were used by large firms before the internet as means to disclose research findings.
175
While Peer to Patent is technically not a forum for defensive publication, it does serve a similar
function as a prior art database and is particularly relevant given that it is a joint venture of the New York
Law School and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). It contains several useful
sources on prior art invalidation/defensive publishing (Peer to Patent, “Welcome to Peer to Patent,” (2010):
http://peertopatent.com/).
176
USPTO, Manual of Patent Examining Procedure, 8th ed. (2010), 1100-7 (s. 1111):
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.htm
177
In re Hall, 781 F. 2d. 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
178
SAC, “Our Proposal.”
179
SAC, “Proposal FAQ.”
180
SAC, “Songwriters’ Perspectives,” (n.d.): http://www.songwriters.ca/songwritersperspectives.aspx
181
Writers Guild of Canada, “Writers Guild of Canada Presents New Ideas for More Canadian Stories
Online,” (Feb. 24, 2009):
http://www.wgc.ca/images2/New%20Media%20Press%20Release%2002%2024%2009.pdf
182
Center for Copyright Information, “Music, Movie, TV and Broadband Leaders Team to Curb Online
Content Theft: Announce Common Framework for ‘Copyright Alerts,’” (7 Jul. 2011):
http://www.copyrightinformation.org/node/704
183
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 211.
184
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 212.
185
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, 212.
186
Sjoberg, et. al., “The Case Study Approach in Social Research,” 39.
187
Charles C. Ragin, “‘Casing’ and the Process of Social Inquiry,” What Is a Case? Exploring the
Foundations of Social Inquiry, Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, (eds)., (New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 225.
188
For a discussion of the differences between copyright ant patents see David Vaver, Intellectual
Property Law: Copyrights, Patents and Trade-marks, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011).

48

Chapter Two – Review of Relevant Literature
This chapter reviews the existing academic literature on the two case studies.1 The first
section provides an examination of the literature on defensive publishing and the second
section examines the extant literature on the use of levies or surcharges on copying
related technologies and the SAC’s proposal.
I. Defensive Publishing
Though defensive publishing continues to attract increasing scholarly attention, much of
the academic analyses of the subject focus on its theoretical usage or on more practical
measures such as how to ensure a defensive publication will be counted as prior art.
There is a noticeable dearth of empirical studies on the subject.
Though defensive publishing has been practiced for over 50 years2 it is only in the past
ten years that the topic has attracted scholarly attention. A number of scholars have
attempted to model how defensive publishing would be used in a patent race. In 2000,
Parchomovsky analyzed the use of defensive publishing using a game theory model of a
patent race.3 He speculated that there were three motives for defensive publishing: it is
used by laggards in a patent race because they believe rivals are further ahead in the
patent race, it may be used because firms believe that rivals may secure financing more
easily and therefore patent soon, at it may result from a firm choosing to exit a particular
patent race but seeking to spoil that ability of others to obtain a patent.4 He determined
that defensive publishing lowers the expected value of a patent and suggested that it may
be used by firms trailing in a patent race but not by those leading.5 Using the same game
theory modeling approach, Litchman Baker and Kraus argued that Parchomovsky’s
conclusions were flawed. Their model suggests that defensive publishing tactic is not
attractive to patent race laggards, but may be may be an option for patent race leaders
who seek to drive out competitors and signal their superior research in a particular area.6
They also suggested that bargaining between rivals would limit the attractiveness of
disclosure by firms in patent race, and that the legal rules surrounding prior art make
effective defensive publishing more difficult.7 Examining situations involving
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cumulative innovation, Bar-Gill and Parchomovsky suggest that defensive publication by
a firm signals to others that the firm is not attempting to appropriate all from subsequent
follow-on inventions. In doing so such a signal should spur cumulative innovation.8
They conclude by recommending the provision in US patent law that allows inventors to
file a patent application up to one year prior to the date of application (35 U.S.C. §
102(b)) be removed.9 In a similar vein to Parchomovsky and Litchman as well as Baker
and Kraus, Bar uses an economic model of a patent race to analyze the role of defensive
publishing; however, her model is novel in that it treats prior art as endogenous.10 She
concludes that laggards have an incentive to use defensive publication to prolong patent
races.11 A similar conclusion is reached by Baker and Mezzetti on the basis of their
modeling of a patent race.12 Ponce has also used economic modeling to determine the
impact of defensive publishing, but unlike others his model considers the relationship
between secrecy and publication.13 Based on the model he concludes that defensive
publishing should induce the use of secrecy by other firms.14 Finally, Gill also models the
use of disclosure in a patent race, concluding that defensive publishing is used by leading
firms to signal their commitments to a research area with the caveat that it will not be
used for technologies with low development costs.15 While the various economic models
demonstrate the potential uses of defensive publishing, they also clearly evince the case
for greater empirical research.
Several authors have commented on various dimensions of defensive publishing without
using economic models. Eisenberg has suggested that defensive publishing may not result
in increasing the known prior art and may in fact make patenting easier for rivals.16 She
also suggests that filing a patent application (which can later be abandoned or converted
into a Statutory Invention Registration (SIR) under US patent law) is a superior strategic
maneuver to defensive publishing.17 Merges notes that defensive publishing should be
seen as part of a broader phenomenon of increasing dynamism in the public domain, and
suggests that defensive publishing is a facet of a variety of “property preempting
investments.”18 Heller notes that defensive publishing and other property pre-empting
investments can be used to overcome anticommons problems.19 Colson, who is the
President and CEO of the defensive publishing venue IP.com, has written articles on how
defensive publication should be considered as part of a comprehensive innovation and
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intellectual property strategy.20 He advocates using defensive publishing for non-core
technologies suggesting it does not have to be solely defensive in nature as it can also
serve as a misinformation tactic when used strategically.21 He advocates that defensive
publications not be placed in academic journals (because of the lack of control over the
publication time) or websites (due to legal difficulties in establishing the date of
publication).22 Using a similar approach Barrett highlights the role defensive publishing
can play in biotechnology. He also emphasizes the weakness of academic journals and
websites, while also suggesting that defensive publications be sufficiently detailed so as
to constitute prior art.23Adams and Henson-Apollonio have written that defensive
publishing can play a role in agricultural research, and similar to Barrett and Colson give
guidance on how best to defensively publish.24 They also suggest that defensive
publishing is important to maintaining the public good nature of innovation.25 Boettiger
posits that broadly written defensive publications are most useful for defeating patents,
while stating that early disclosure supports collaborative innovation.26
Despite the numerous commentaries on how best to pursue defensive publishing and the
numerous economic models, empirical investigations are severely lacking. To support
the prediction that laggards use disclosure to extend patent races, Baker and Mezzetti
examined IBM patent applications that cited the IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin
focusing on the difference in time between the date of publication of the cited material
and the patent application. Based on the observation that in 54% of the cases the
difference between citation publication and the patent application was less than five years
they concluded that firms defensively publish when engaged in patent races.27 Johnson’s
study of the disclosure venues Research Disclosure and IP.com revealed that IBM,
Motorola and Siemens accounted for 78% of the disclosures before 2000.28 He also
found that from 1990-2004 35% of disclosures dealt with software or business methods
related subject matter.29 Henkel and Jell examined patent filings with the German Patent
and Trademark Office (GPTO) to look for evidence of defensive publishing. Specifically
they looked for patents applications that fit a specific pattern – those filed with GPTO
with no foreign or internal priority (direct filings) that the applicant neither requested for
examination nor put forward subsequent filings, arguing that the logical explanation for
such a filing would be as a cost effective and authoritative way of establishing prior art.30
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They concluded 5% of direct filings fit this pattern, and suggested that such publications
had to be motivated by a desire to defensively publish.31 A 2008 study by Henkel and
Pangerl surveyed 44 company patent professionals, nine officials at the European Patent
Office (EPO), two patent lawyers and the CEO of a firm offering defensive publishing
services.32 Their interviews revealed that large firms had a greater propensity for
defensive publishing, firms used patent applications as a mechanism for defensive
publishing, there was no reported use of defensive publishing as a strategy by laggards
involved in patent races, and that the most important motive for disclosure was the ability
to continue to use the technology and not be encumbered by the proprietary rights of
others.33 These findings are particularly insightful given that they not only looked at
motivations for patenting, but also suggest that many of the theoretical models created by
others lack empirical support. Though limited in number the few empirical studies of
defensive publishing have been very informative and particularly useful in addressing the
suitability of the economic models developed; however, there still remains shortcomings
in the literature on defensive publishing. Considerably more room exists for further
empirical investigations.
Though authors have examined various facets of defensive publishing such as how to
maximize its effectiveness or its use in patent races, the extant empirical literature is
clearly lacking. There is a clear need of further empirical research as a means to assess
the various models and expand understanding of the role defensive publishing plays as an
alternative to traditional patenting.
II. The Songwriters Association of Canada’s Internet Service Provider (ISP)
Monthly Fee Proposal
Literature on levies or surcharges on copying related technologies is concentrated in three
groups: articles examining the European use of levies, proposals by scholars for levies
including ISP levies, and criticism of such proposals. To date the SAC’s proposal has
received only passing scholarly attention and it has escaped critical scrutiny.
Much of the literature on levies is concentrated on their use by European nations.34
Helberger and Hugenboltz note that the European landscape is considerably varied with
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some countries having no exceptions for private copying (Ireland and the United
Kingdom), while other countries such as Belgium and Portugal forbidding private
contracts and licensing agreements from restricting private copying rights. 35 UlmerEilfort compares the levy systems in 18 EU countries and concludes the German system
is by far the broadest and also produces the most revenues.36 His analysis reveals that
despite the wide use of levies in Europe, levies on internet access have not been used.37
Mezei proposes that the United Kingdom adopt a levy system similar to the one found in
continental Europe suggesting that it would lead to less confrontation between rights
holders and users.38 Christie compares the use of levies in common law and civil law
countries and finds that levies are more common in civil law countries which tend to
place a higher emphasis on author’s moral rights.39 He concludes that the Canadian
introduction of a levy system, along with many of those used in Europe, represent a
tendency of nations towards a middle ground where private copying is permitted but
artists are remunerated for such an exception.40
Several authors have put forward their own levy proposals. Lunney compares the use of
levies with a regime that would use strong encryption technology to protect digital
content concluding that a levy based system would be superior.41 He posits that the
extensive use of technological protection measures (TPMs) would allow rights holding
groups to distort prices to a greater degree than the market distortions caused by a levy.42
Lunney also believes that a levy would help incentivize the production of a broader range
of works.43 Ku discusses the use of a levy on computer, audio and video equipment and
internet service.44 He claims that a 2 percent levy placed on the sales at electronics and
software stores could generate $1.3 billion (USD) in revenues, and suggests that artists
could be remunerated based on demand calculated through services such as
Billboard.com and tracking file sharing.45 Netanel has a detailed proposal for a levy that
would apply to a broad range of media products and in exchange legalizes peer-to-peer
(P2P) file-sharing and non-commercial remixes so long as the original author is
credited.46 His proposal would permit the free exchange of several kinds of copyrighted
works including movies and music but not computer programs, and would result in a levy
of about 4% being placed on range of copying related technologies from CD burners to
VCRs, blank digital media, computers, and internet access.47 He argues that such a levy
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would be able to compensate creators and rights holders for their losses and prevent users
who do not engage in file sharing from having to cross subsidize heavy users of P2P.48
Fisher advocates for a levy system similar to the one proposed by Netanel.49 Though his
proposed levy would apply to a range of goods, he suggests that the primary source of
revenue come from an ISP levy.50 However, Fisher acknowledges that a system of
funding artists through general taxation, though less appealing politically, would be
superior to a levy system.51 Lessig endorses Fisher’s levy system, though he believes that
the use of levies should be a temporary measure.52 Specifically he proposes a system that
would generate revenue to compensate for lost CD sales, but allow noncommercial
sharing of copyrighted materials that are no longer available for sale and works that are
not protected by copyright.53 Litman examines the proposals of Lunney, Ku, Netanel,
and Fisher concluding that that when confined to music (and not extended to other kinds
of works) they represent sensible solutions that simply extend existing laws and business
practices.54 However, Litman suggests that rights holders should have the option to opt
out of the levy system and restrict their works from being shared online.55 In their
analysis of the Finnish levy system, Oksanen and Valimaki conclude that a flat $5
broadband connection levy would serve as a suitable mechanism for remunerating
artists.56 However, they suggest that the levy and the necessary changes to Finnish
copyright law would likely run afoul of TRIPS Article 13 which limits exceptions to
copyright to those that do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work.57 Ultimately
they conclude government subsidy of artists, although politically unpopular, would be
more practical than an internet levy.58 Finally, Allison has examined a range of solutions
for dealing with the challenges posed by file sharing in a report prepared for the
Department of Canadian Heritage.59 She compares several different models including a
levy system, a TPM based system to reduce file-sharing, a continuance of the status quo
and increased enforcement and concludes that a levy system would be attractive for its
ability to curb litigation and enforcement costs.60 Despite the advantages of a levy
system, she does not recommend any single approach and calls for more research.61
Numerous scholars have addressed the idea of a levy system, and while each proposal
contains its own intricacies and limitations, they serve as a useful reference point to
contrast and analyze the SAC proposal.
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While some scholars have advocated for a levy system, there have also been arguments
made against the use of levies. Liebowitz notes that levies distort the market for goods
they are placed on.62 He notes that calculating the size of the levy as time progresses
becomes increasingly difficult because there is no market to signal the appropriate
value.63 Finally he suggests the levy will result in cross-subsidization where those who
do not engage in infringing activity end up subsidizing those who do, and that artists will
also suffer as it will be difficult to determine the amount of remuneration for each artist.64
Eckersley posits that a residential ISP levy with the value of the levy dependent on the
property value would be superior to a flat ISP levy; however, he notes that such
propositions are politically unviable and unconstitutional in the United States.65 deBeer
has examined the potential for levies with a specific focus on Canada.66 He claims that
levies constitute a subsidy, and that direct government subsidization would be preferable
as it could be used to better promote Canadian music and culture.67 deBeer argues that
levies may be unconstitutional, and would violate the Berne three step test that limits
exceptions to copyright.68 Echoing the concerns raised by Liebowtiz, deBeer highlights
the problems of cross-subsidization and market distortion.69 Yu finds five deficiencies
with levy proposals.70 He suggests it will be difficult to determine how to allocate
revenues if sufficient revenues can even be collected, create cross subsidization and
market distortion, and rewards file sharers who have engaged in illegal conduct while it
penalizes rights holders.71 He concludes by noting that legal changes alone cannot solve
the problem posed by file sharing and that a comprehensive solution must consider the
logic of markets, technological infrastructures and the role of social norms.72 Merges
believes that compulsory licensing schemes including levies will bring some short term
gains but are detrimental in the long run.73 He argues that negotiations over the amount
of remuneration will induce rent seeking and become increasingly costly over time and
undermine the proper function of intellectual property markets.74 Gratz reviews the
proposals of Fisher, Netanel and Litman concluding that two former proposals simply
represent unjustified transfer of wealth from rights holders to artists, while concluding
that Litman’s suggestions are morally indefensible as they limit artists’ rights.75
Davidson has examined the issue of ISP levies in Canada and while he feels that the use
of such levies would not act as a fetter on internet usage, he suggests that such a levy
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would cause serious problems with regards to national treatment. Foreign nationals
would likely contest Canadians being given free access to copyrighted material.76 A
review of the literature critical of levies reveals several common arguments against levies
(cross subsidization, market distortion, calculating and distributing the remuneration and
international implications) that a thorough levy proposal would have to address.
The Songwriters Association of Canada has attracted some minor commentary from the
academic community, though in its current form it has not received a substantive
analysis. Hébert analyzed an earlier version of the SAC proposal in 2008.77 Though
Hébert concludes that the SAC proposal is one with great promise, the SAC levy is only
mentioned in two sentences and there is no discussion of how the proposal would
function or how potential problems with an ISP levy would be overcome. Furthermore,
the report is clearly biased as it was written for the SAC.78 Sookman has written a
detailed analysis of the SAC’s levy proposal and found that it would not meet the
limitations on exceptions to copyright found in the Berne Convention, TRIPS, the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and the Rome Convention.79 However,
because the proposal has been modified, Sookman’s conclusions no longer hold. In
2010, Gervais concluded that the SAC’s then current proposal, an ISP levy that would
allow rights holders to opt out, would not run afoul of international treaties.80 Finally,
Goel, Miesing and Chandra, note the SAC proposal as an example of an ISP levy in their
analysis of the impact of file sharing on the media industry, but do not assess the proposal
in any detail.81 Simply put, to date there has been no critical analysis of the Songwriters
Association of Canada proposal, and any discussion to date has focused on the SAC’s
levy proposal which it has now abandoned in favour of a voluntary ISP monthly fee.
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Chapter Three – The Expansionary Intellectual Property
Regime
The expansionary IP regime has been marked by several trends in the area of intellectual
property over the last 35 years. Traditional IP mechanisms have expanded in scope of
coverage and term of protection. New forms of IP protection have arisen to cover a wide
range of intellectual goods from semiconductor chip layouts to plant varieties.
Concomitant with these changes is the incorporation of IP within the global trade system
and increasing economic importance of IP. This chapter is not an exhaustive description
of all the expansionary changes, nor is it a detailed discussion of the nature of patents and
copyrights themselves.1 A complete cataloguing of all changes is beyond the scope of
the chapter. Rather this chapter aims to provide an overview of the expansionary regime,
identifying both its breadth and depth.
A survey of the nature of the expansionary IP regime is necessary to demonstrate the
range of changes that have occurred. While not all expansionist policies have been
adopted in all countries and some countervailing tendencies exist, when viewed in its
totality the expansionary regime evinces a sustained and pervasive trend towards the
increased commodification of intellectual goods through exclusionary IP rights. An
analysis of the expansionary IP regime forms the contextual background against which
support for substantive alternatives to IP is based.
I. Expanse of Traditional IP Mechanisms (Copyright and Patent)
A. Copyright Expansion – Term, Scope and Enforcement
Both copyright and patent law have seen increases in the term and scope of protection
over the past 35 years. The following section details the expanse of these rights, focusing
in particular on changes in the United States (where such changes have been most
pronounced), but also highlighting some notable trends in other jurisdictions.
Beginning with the 1976 Copyright Act, there have been two substantive increases in the
term of copyright protection in the United States. The 1976 act greatly increased the term
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of protection; the term of protection increased from a 28 year term with the option of a
single renewal for an additional 28 years of protection (for a total term of 56 years of
protection) to life of the author plus 50 years of protection after their death (life plus 50).
Works made for hire (i.e. copyrights held by corporations) lasted for either 75 years after
first publication or 100 years after first creation with the term expiring whenever the first
of these conditions is met.2 This change brought the United States in line with many
other national governments as life plus 50 was a requirement of the Berne Convention,
which the U.S. was still not party to at this time.3 The 1976 changes not only
significantly extended the term of copyright in the United States, but also signaled that
the U.S. had a clear interest in modernizing and strengthening its protection for creative
and artistic works.
In 1998 with the term on many major U.S. copyrights including Disney’s Mickey Mouse
character set to expire, the copyright term was further extended. For works by
individuals the term was extended to the life of the author plus 70 years, and both
conditions for works made under hire were also extended by 20 years.4 Though
welcomed by Hollywood and other copyright intensive industries, the Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA) of 1998, did attract significant opposition
including a legal challenge of its constitutionality (Eldred v. Ashcroft5) which reached the
Supreme Court in 2002. Despite arguments in support of the petitioners, including an
amici curiae brief by 17 famous American economists, five of whom were Nobel
Laureates, that argued the CTEA provided no new incentives to innovate and was
injurious to consumer welfare,6 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the law
in a 7-2 vote.7 The majority decision specifically held that, “The CTEA may also provide
greater incentive for American and other authors to create and disseminate their work in
the United States.”8 The decision of the majority explicitly rejected the economists’ brief
that calculated a 20 year extension would only increase the present value of payments to
authors by less than half of one percent.9 The CTEA and decision in the Eldred case
reflect a clear American interest in extending the term of copyright protection in an effort
to provide greater pecuniary incentives.
The increases in copyright length in the U.S., however, should not be seen as exceptional.
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A number of countries have lengthened the copyright term beyond the life plus 50 years
requirement found in Berne and TRIPS.10 Five years before the CTEA, the Council of
the European Communities (forerunner to the Council of the E.U.) passed Council
Directive 93/98/EEC which stated that the duration of copyright in member states should
be harmonized at life plus 70 years.11 Amendments to Directive 93/98/EEC in 2006
reaffirmed the E.U.’s harmonization goal of a life plus 70 years term.12 In 2003 Mexico
surpassed both the E.U. and U.S. by declaring a life plus 100 years copyright term.13
Unlike many other developed nations, Canada has not endeavored to recently extend the
term of copyright protection, which remains at life plus 50.14 None of the four most
recent proposed copyright modernization bills15 included a term expansion.16 While the
Canadian example demonstrates that the recent extension of copyright term is not
universal, there has been a general trend towards longer and longer terms of protection.
Even though the U.S. Constitution explicitly forbids an infinite copyright there have been
advocates for indefinitely renewable copyrights.17 Thus the discussion around perpetual
copyright has already begun.18
The significant expanse in the term of protection for copyrights has mirrored a similar
increase in the scope of protection. Though there has been a general historical trend to
expand the scope of copyright to allow for new mediums of creative and artistic works
(namely sound recordings and motion pictures/other audiovisual works), there have been
two significant expansions to the scope in the past 30 years. The most significant of these
changes is the consideration of computer software as a literary work and therefore subject
to copyright, which occurred in 1980 in the U.S.19 The decision to add software to the
domain of copyright in the U.S. was driven by the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) report to Congress.20 The report
concluded that extending copyright protection to software would not result in software
monopolies.21 At the time the research for the report was conducted there were only
200,000 microcomputers in the U.S.22 Menell’s study of the impact on copyright law on
software innovation concluded that while copyright does facilitate some innovation in the
development of programs it blunts other positive network externalities and provides for
an overly long term of protection.23 By 1994, TRIPS explicitly declared that computer
programs be considered literary works, effectively securing near global inclusion of
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software within the copyright system.24 While the expansion of copyright earlier in the
20th century to include audio and then audiovisual works reflected a logical extension of
the idea of protecting artistic works, the more recent enlargements of copyright are
indicative of expansionary IP regime that seeks to create new markets by commodifying
increasingly diverse forms of intellectual work.
A discussion on the expanse of copyright would be incomplete without reference to two
other important developments – the ratcheting up of penalties for infringement, and legal
protection for technological protection mechanisms that increasingly are used in addition
to legal means to restrict access to copyright works. In the U.S., while there have been
several legislative changes that have increased the penalties for copyright infringement 25
the most far reaching of these changes was the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) (1998), which was passed in the U.S. to implement two 1996 WIPO treaties.26
The DMCA prohibits circumvention of technological protection measures (TPMs)
essentially providing copyright owners who use TPMs a second layer of legal protection
for their works.27 The DMCA also criminalized devices and services whose primary
purpose is circumventing TPMs.28 Both of these legal protections were backed by
substantive civil and criminal penalties.29 In addition to the protection for TPMs, the
DMCA contained safe-harbor provisions in the form of a notice and takedown system
aimed at providing internet service providers a method for limiting their own liability. 30
Unfortunately, the notice and take down system incentivizes rights holders to be
overzealous in claiming infringement and motivates ISPs and end-users to takedown
material without a thorough examination of whether its use is infringing.31 The DMCA is
illustrative of the third dimension of copyright expansionism, the increase in the severity
of penalties for infringement and the extension of copyright protection to include
anticircumvention legislation.
An effort to increase the strength of protection afforded by copyright continues to remain
an important dimension of the expansionary regime. The currently pending Canadian
copyright bill (Bill C-11) would introduce broad protection for TPMs and allows for only
limited circumstances where circumvention would be permitted.32 Particularly
worrisome is the fact that the pervasive TPM restrictions would prevent circumvention
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even when it is done for what would be otherwise non-infringing activity such as
exercising one’s fair dealing rights.33 At the time of writing Congress is also considering
further increasing penalties for copyright infringement. The Commercial Felony
Streaming Act (S 978)34 aims to make it a felony to cover songs and upload them to
YouTube with commercial intent.
The marked increase in penalties for copyright infringement reflects the overall
expansionary nature of the copyright regime, particularly in the U.S. Beginning with the
1976 Copyright Act, which has been amended over 60 times since,35 there has been a
steady expansion in the scope and term of copyright with a corresponding increase in
penalties for infringement.
B. Patent Expansion – Term, Scope, and Pro-Patent Institutions
While the expansionary nature of the IP regime is clearly evident in copyright policy, it
has also been mirrored in changes to patent policy, most notably with respect to the scope
of patentable subject matter. Extensions to the term of patent protection, in light of the
numerous other expansionary trends in IP, are relatively minor through still reflective of
an overall trend towards greater rights protection. In the last two decades of the 20th
century patent terms have been extended to 20 years (up from 17 years) in a number of
jurisdictions.36 The 20 year level of protection has become the effective global standard
with the completion of TRIPS in 1994.37 Although the extension of patent term protection
is only three years, it still represents a nearly 18 percent increase in the duration of
protection.
The pharmaceutical sector has also received special consideration with respect to patent
term. The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act (also known
as the Hatch-Waxman Act) provides the USPTO with the authority to extend patents for
pharmaceuticals that undergo lengthy regulatory review,38 and also made it easier for
drug companies to enforce their IP rights against manufacturers of generics.39 European
drug companies enjoy similar benefits. Supplementary Protection Certificates established
in European Economic Community Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1768/92, and
furthered by European Community Regulation (EC) No. 1610/96, provide prolonged
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intellectual property protection for medical, pharmaceutical, and plant protection
products that, while subject to patent, require additional protection with regards to term
due to the lengthy regulatory and approval processes involved.40 Although the increased
term for patent protection provides owners an increased period of insulation from
competitors, the expansionary trends in patent policy have been most pronounced with
respect to a broadening of scope.
The scope of patents (that which is considered patentable subject matter) has been
heavily influenced by the decisions of the USPTO and higher level courts including the
U.S. Supreme Court, which have decided a number of precedent setting patent cases.
Ananda Chakrabarty’s controversial 1972 patent application for a human made microorganism was ultimately decided in a 5-4 Supreme Court ruling in 1980 (the Diamond v.
Chakrabarty case). Not only did the majority decision hold that a human made
bacterium was patentable; the court went even further by quoting a 1952 Congressional
Committee Report that argued “anything under the sun that is made by man,” is
patentable subject matter.41 Following the precedent set in the Diamond v. Chakrabarty
case, the USPTO granted Patent No. 4,736,866 to Harvard College in 1988 for a
transgenic mouse.42 Though the transgenic mouse’s susceptibility to cancer was certainly
novel and useful for important oncology research, the patent demonstrated that the
USPTO was increasingly adopting the doctrine expressed by the Supreme Court that
possessing the quality of life should not be a barrier to patentability.
While the 1980s saw the expanse of patentable subject matter to include various forms of
life beyond plants, the scope of patentability was further expanded in the 1990s by
granting patents for business methods and software in the U.S. Though the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in the 1972 case Gottschalk v. Benson rejected a computer program that
converted decimal numbers into binary, a quarter century later software emerged as a
clearly patentable subject matter.43 In 1993 a patent was granted to Signature Financial
Group for a financial data processing system.44 The decision was held up on appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Justice Rich, who forty years earlier
explicitly rejected the notion that business methods could be patented,45 writing for the
court stated:
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Today we hold that the transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a
machine through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it
produces “a useful, concrete and tangible result” – a final share price…46

Though the 1981 Supreme Court case Diamond v. Diehr held that software was
patentable when it represented a ‘process,’47 the 1996 State Street Bank decision
considerably expanded patentable subject matter beyond processes to ‘methods,’
including computerized, software based business methods.48 The trend towards business
methods patents led to Amazon’s patenting of its ‘1-Click’ online shopping method,49 the
patenting of a step-by-step method of custodial instruction,50 and even a method of
putting in golf.51 Recent court decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
and U.S. Supreme Court in the Bilski case (Bilski v. Kappos) have helped to clarify the
patentability of business methods to a degree.52 Although the Supreme Court did not
endorse the notion that all processes were necessarily patentable, it clearly stated that
court had no intent to make business methods unpatentable.53 The court also recognized
the potential problems of business method patents stating, “if a high enough bar is not set
when considering patent applications of this sort [business methods], patent examiners
and courts will be flooded with claims that would put a chill on creative endeavor and
dynamic change.”54 Although the patentability of business methods remains an
unresolved issue, the expansion of patentable subject matter to include a variety of living
mechanisms demonstrates the expansionary nature of the IP regime.
The tendency in U.S. policy towards expansionary patent scope has been far more
measured in other regions. Australia, South Korea and Japan allow business methods
patents;55 however, the European Patent Convention explicitly prevents the patenting of
computer software and non-technical business methods.56 The Canadian Intellectual
Property Office (CIPO) does allow for patents on software in some cases; however, a
number of functional elements must be present which greatly limits the availability of
software patents.57 CIPO also explicitly rejects many business methods patents in fields
such as economics, law, and marketing by noting that such areas are not fields of
technology.58 However, a recent Federal Court decision regarding Amazon.com’s 1-click
business method has stated that there is no business method exception in Canadian law.59
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An appeal of the case was heard by the Federal Court of Appeal on June 21, 2011, and
the court ruled that Amazon.com’s patent application be re-examined on an expedited
basis.60 Stemming from the Federal Court decision in the Amazon.com case the Canadian
Commissioner of Patents has revised the Manual of Patent Office Practice to state that
“electronic processes within a computer are considered to satisfy the requirement for a
physical change,”61 allowing for a greater range of patentable methods. Canada also
allows the patenting of “lower life forms” such as microscopic algae, bacteria, viruses,
and multipotent stem cells, but not “higher life forms” which includes animals, seeds, and
fertilized eggs (plant varieties are protected under the Plant Breeder’s Rights Act).62 The
Harvard Mouse patent was also rejected in Canada with appeals of the decision reaching
the Supreme Court that decided a higher level life form was not patentable.63 In 2003 a
more limited patent was granted to Harvard College in Canada for the transgenic mouse,
but only after claims to the composition of matter had been removed.64 In its decision the
Supreme Court rejected the view expressed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty that anything under the sun made by humans is patentable.65 The European
Patent Office granted a patent for the Harvard Mouse in 1992,66 and a 1998 E.U. directive
aimed at harmonizing patent laws allows for the patenting of plants or animals with
human introduced genetic properties, but not the patenting naturally occurring plant and
animal varieties.67 While there has been some expansion in scope in other jurisdictions,
the expansionary trends are most pronounced in the United States.
The final dimension of the expansion of patent law that requires noting is not an expanse
per se, but a structural change in U.S. patent administration. In 1979 the USPTO stopped
issuing patents for a brief period,68 resulting in only 48,854 utility patents being issued
that year and the first time in the previous 15 years that the number fell below the 50,000
mark.69 Since the end of the 1970s, the United States has crafted a policy environment
that encourages patenting resulting in nearly 220,000 utility patents being granted in
201070 – a nearly four and half fold increase in thirty years. The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act,
which allows universities and small businesses to patent inventions that result from
federally funded research, provided an early indicator of the increasingly pro-patent
attitude in the United States.71 The Bayh-Dole Act was complemented by the StevensonWydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 that allowed government employees to seek
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patents for federally funded research in certain situations.72 Four years later some of the
restrictions in the Bayh-Dole Act were eliminated to facilitate more university patenting.73
In 1982 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) was created through a
merger of the appellate section of the U.S. Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.74 The CAFC has brought increased consistency and coherency to
judgments in patent appeal cases;75 however, it has done so by adopting a decidedly propatent attitude. In one of the earliest empirical studies Robert Merges argued that the
Federal Circuit, “assumes a simplistic conceptual model of innovation.”76 He further
argued that the Federal Circuit’s approach to evidence and downplaying of the
requirement of non-obviousness rewarded non-technical innovations such as superior
marketing programs of distribution systems.77 As a result commercial success is now
viewed by the CAFC as an indicator of non-obviousness.78 Although market sales can
indicate that a new product was not obvious, sales can also result from other factors that
have nothing to do with the degree of obviousness including effective marketing.
Through its decisions the CAFC has eliminated the best mode requirements79 for
software,80 undermined the principle that patents should only be granted on technologies
at or near practical application,81 and in Madey v Duke (2002) it narrowly interpreted the
research exception indicating that university researchers operating on a non-commercial
basis could still be liable for infringement.82 In 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
hear an appeal in the Madey v. Duke case cementing the CAFC’s narrow interpretation of
the research exception.83 In a 2003 study, Landes and Posner found that the Federal
Circuit has resulted in an increase in: the number of patent applications, the success of
those applications, and the overall amount of patent litigation, with the only confounding
factor being the more pro-patent attitude of the USPTO,84 and Posner has called the
CAFC “extraordinarily pro-patent.”85 Finally the U.S. International Trade Commission,
which has the power to ban imported goods that infringe on American IP at the border, is
increasingly being used as an alternative venue to civil litigation for firms looking to
maximize the legal leverage their IP rights provide.86 The pro-patent attitude at the
USPTO and Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, along with the forum-shopping
provided by the ITC have reinforced the expansionary trends in patent policy.
The past 35 years have seen a significant expansion of the two traditional mainstays of
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intellectual property – copyright and patents. In addition to longer terms more material is
available for protection, and there has also been a significant expanse in terms of
penalties with reference to copyright and an increasingly pro-patent attitude at both the
USPTO and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The expansionary tendencies
have manifested themselves most prominently in the United States, although other
countries have also seen some expansionary trends. For example, since the late 1990s
Japanese policymakers have adopted a more pro-patent policy.87 This general
expansionary tone, along with the creation of several new sui generis IP mechanisms,
provide for an increasingly broad array of mechanisms for protecting and commodifying
intellectual work.
II. Rise of Sui Generis Mechanisms for IP Protection
At the beginning of the 20th century there existed only a handful of IP devices (copyright,
patent, trademark and industrial designs). Over the course of the second half of this
century the number of IP mechanisms increased by nearly a dozen. While these new
devices tend to be narrower in scope, they reflect a broader trend towards more IP
protection. Often these new mechanisms are created to facilitate commodification of
intellectual goods that traditional IP devices did not protect. The expansionary nature of
sui generis mechanisms is best evinced in four new areas: semiconductor layouts,
databases, geographical indicators, and plant varieties, though several other mechanisms
have also been created.
Legal protection for semiconductor layouts (also known as mark works or integrated
circuit topographies) is one of the newest forms of IP, but also a sui generis mechanism
that demonstrates considerable expanse despite its short history. The U.S. established
protection for semiconductor layouts as a new IP mechanism in 1984 with an eight year
term of protection.88 Within five years an international treaty designed to protect
semiconductor chips was negotiated in Washington, though the treaty never entered into
force.89 For proponents of increased protection, the perceived shortcomings of the
Washington Treaty were addressed in the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS incorporated the
text of the Washington Treaty, but specifically excluded the section on compulsory

69
licensing.90 Furthermore, the term of protection was extended by 25% to ten years.91
While the short history of integrated circuit protection reflects the expansionary trend in
IP, what is most puzzling is that a term of protection of eight and now ten years is needed
for integrated circuits that have shown a consistent pattern of obsolescence in two years
since the mid-1960s (Moore’s Law).92 The creation and extension of a unique
mechanism for protecting semiconductor chips is just one of a pattern of new,
expansionary sui generis mechanism.
A second sui generis mechanism that demonstrates the expansionary nature of IP is
protection for databases. Traditionally copyright has held that a compilation of facts is
not protectable subject matter. This view was reflected by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
1991 Feist Publication Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service case. In the Feist case the Court
ruled that a compilation of facts was protected by copyright only if it involved some sort
of original selection or arrangement and even in such a case the protection only covered
the selection or arrangement not the underlying facts.93 While the Feist decision
provided quite limited protection for database arrangement, the E.U. took a decisive step
towards database protection by creating a sui generis mechanism in 1996. Directive
96/9/EC explicitly protected the contents of the database from extraction and/or reuse.94
Though no sui generis database protection exists in the U.S. or other non-European
jurisdiction, the creation of a special mechanism to protect data demonstrates how new
mechanisms are being created to go beyond the bounds of traditional IP devices.
A secondary sui generis IP mechanism that receives greater protection in Europe than in
the U.S. is protection for Geographical Indicators (GIs). GIs are used to indicate that
goods of a specific geographical origin have qualities, characteristics or a reputation that
is tied to the place of origin (for example, champagne is from the Champagne region of
France).95 Though geographical indicators are often tied to agricultural products
(recognizing that geography is linked with unique climatic factors that substantively
influence the quality of the product), GIs are also applied in cases where a particular
region has a well know reputation for producing a good (though the production quality
could be equal or superior elsewhere). In 1989 the EEC introduced protection for some
alcoholic drinks including wine and spirits,96 and two years later expanded GIs to include

70
foodstuffs.97 TRIPS also requires protections for GIs.98 In the U.S., GIs are less
numerous; however, the U.S. protects a number of foreign GIs (such as Jamaican Blue
Mountain Coffee (from Jamaica), Cognac (from France), and Darjeeling tea (from India))
and some domestic GIs (Idaho potatoes, Florida oranges, Vidalia onions, Napa Valley
wines, and Washington State apples).99 Though GIs are conceptually similar to
trademarks, the creation of new IP devices to provide new protections is another example
of the expanse in sui generis forms of protection.
Since the Neolithic Revolution, the cultivation of various strains of plants has been a core
dimension of food production. In 1961 the International Convention for the Protection of
New Varieties of Plants (UPOV100) created a new sui generis mechanism for plant
varieties effectively facilitating their commodification. UPOV covers all botanical
genera and species including non-agricultural plants such as decorative flowers101 with a
minimum term of protection of at least 15 years (which was even longer for some
species).102 While traditional IP mechanisms at this time did not allow for the patenting
of living materials, UPOV changed this tradition, and began the expanse of IP into living
things.
In addition to these four sui generis mechanisms several other unique IP devices have
also been created. Domain names are a new form of IP and are administered by the
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) (which in turn is part of the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)). Under ICANN’s Uniform
Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, WIPO is the primary dispute resolution venue
hearing 60 percent of all disputes.103 The protection of encrypted satellite signals is
provided for in a number of Free Trade Agreements.104 The U.S. DMCA contained a
special section establishing a sui generis protection mechanism for ship hull designs with
a 10 year term.105 Finally, even the Olympic Rings are a new form of IP protection
covered by the WIPO administered Nairobi Treaty. 106 While some of these IP devices are
quite limited and largely supplement existing mechanisms, they are indicative of the
overall nature of the expansionary IP regime.
III. Incorporation of the IP System to the Global Trade System and Rise of
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Economic Importance of IP
A. IP and Trade
The linking of the IP system with the global trade regime that occurred in the 1980s and
1990s is not the first time IP and free trade were discussed together. In the 1860s and
1870s proponents of free trade were some of the principal advocates for the anti-patent
movement.107 Though 19th century proponents of free trade saw exclusive rights as
clearly contrary to the concept of free trade, a century later the U.S. and other advanced
economies took an interest in tying IP to trade to take advantage of the powerful
sanctions and enforcement mechanisms that the global trade system provided.
IP has been a global issue for over a century, specifically since the 1883 Paris Convention
for the Protection of Intellectual Property and the 1886 Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. These two treaties were marked by the
principles of minimum standards and nation treatment, but unlike recent developments
allowed considerable flexibility in national implementation. By 1967 the need for an
international body to promote the protection of IP and administer the Paris and Berne
Conventions (along with several other international IP treaties that had been negotiated)
led to the creation of a specialized United Nations agency - WIPO.108 Though there had
been numerous revisions to the text of Paris109 and Berne110 by the mid-1970s,
discussions at WIPO were becoming increasingly difficult due to the large number of
member countries. American disillusionment with WIPO (and in particular its lack of an
enforcement mechanism for the treaties it administered) led to an emphasis of linking
trade and IP starting in the Tokyo Round and gaining significant traction in the Uruguay
Round of world trade talks.111 Corporate lobbies from the entertainment, pharmaceutical
and software sectors were instrumental in persuading the U.S. government to marry
international trade rules with the IP system.112 The 1987 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report Strengthening Worldwide Protection of Intellectual Property Rights
explicitly stated that the U.S. would advance stronger IP protection in bilateral
discussions and at world trade negotiations.113
The Reagan administration’s strategy (continued by successive administrations both
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Democratic and Republican) of linking trade and IP bore early fruit. The 1998 Canada United States Free Trade Agreement obliged both countries to work together in the
Uruguay Round to strengthen IP protection.114 By 1993 and the completion of the
NAFTA, the provisions for IP protection were considerably expanded. Detailed
requirements in Chapter 17 of the agreement cover a broad range of IP devices including,
copyright, patents, semiconductor layouts, trade secrets, geographical indicators,
industrial designs, and encrypted satellite signals.115 In addition to the obligatory
minimum standards for IP protection, the dispute resolution system in NAFTA allows for
the suspension of benefits against a nation that violates the terms of the agreement. This
clause is notable because it allows the suspension of benefits to be targeted to a sector of
the economy where it can have meaningful effect; for example if Mexico does not hold
up its copyright obligations to the levels specified in NAFTA, after going through the
dispute resolution process Canada or the U.S. could suspend their NAFTA obligations to
another sector of the Mexican economy (e.g. agriculture) to make the suspension more
effective.116 The NAFTA model of clear minimum IP standards and a flexible
sanctioning system that could be targeted for maximum effect foreshadowed the global
model of IP protection that would result at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round.
The culmination of the Uruguay Round of trade talks was the 1994 Marrakesh
Agreement that not only established the World Trade Organization (WTO), but formally
brought together three major trade agreements (the Multilateral Agreement of Trade in
Goods (which itself included the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and
several other goods related trade agreements), the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS) and Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)).117 Incorporating the texts of the Paris and Berne Conventions as well as
other more recent IP treaties, TRIPS spelled out the minimum levels of IP protection
required for a broad array of IP devices. Like NAFTA, the WTO agreements also
included a powerful dispute resolution mechanism that provided for suspension of
obligations in sectors that would prove effective.118 TRIPS did contain some concessions
to developing countries; it provided a transition period for member countries,119 and
Article 8(1) allows nations to formulate their laws so that public health, nutrition and the
public interest in key economic sectors can be protected, but any such provisions must be
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consistent with TRIPS.120 The effectiveness of these measures is limited by the broad
levels of IP protection that countries must adhere to. The agreement establishes a global
floor for the minimum standard of protection for IP rights. Copyright protection must
include software,121 and patent protection must be available “in all fields of
technology.”122 Lured by the potential for access to the lucrative American consumer
market, developing nations adopted significantly higher IP laws often without full
understanding of the implications.123
The experiences of developing nations at the Uruguay Round have resulted in changes at
the most recent round of world trade talks, the Doha Round.124 The 2001 Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health not only allowed nations greater control over
health policy, but also gave nations the right to grant compulsory licenses.125 Another
concession to the least developed nations came in 2005, when requirement that these
nations be TRIPS compliant was extended from 2006 to 2013.126 While developing
nations have achieved some successes at the WTO’s Doha Round, the U.S. has
demonstrated a continued ability to strengthen IP rights by working through a variety of
venues (forum-shopping).
Though frustrated with WIPO in the 1970s and 1980s, after the Marrakesh Agreement,
the U.S. has displayed renewed interest in WIPO as a venue for expanding intellectual
property rights. In the mid-1990s the U.S. championed two new copyright treaties at
WIPO – the WCT127 and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT).128
Though TRIPS was completed only a few years earlier the WCT and WPPT further
expanded copyright protection for signatories. Under the terms of the WCT, databases
are considered intellectual creations in their own right and protectable under the scope of
copyright (a concession to European interests),129 rental rights were restricted on a range
of copyrighted material,130 and most importantly member states were required to provide
legal protection for TPMs and rights management systems.131 The U.S. DMCA passed
only two years later represented the maximalist approach with regards to meeting WCT
requirements. Though not every U.S. proposal was successful at the WCT and WPPT
negotiations, the two ‘TRIPS-plus’ treaties inflated the required levels of copyright
protection beyond the TRIPS requirements.132 While the TRIPS-plus WCT and WPPT
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were successfully negotiated, proponents of the expansionary IP regime were
unsuccessful in negotiating a WIPO database treaty. 133 Resistance to increased
harmonization of patent practices has also stalled the proposed WIPO Substantive Patent
Law Treaty that aims to limit a nation’s ability to individually set standards for the
conditions of patentability (novelty, utility and non-obviousness, among other
measures).134 Resistance to the Substantive Patent Law Treaty has been so great that
WIPO is now no longer even working on the treaty. 135 The broader multinational
resistance at WIPO and WTO has led to an American strategy of strengthening rights
through bilateral negotiations.
While WIPO and the WTO have become increasingly difficult venues for proponents of
the expansionary IP regime, several recent smaller multilateral agreements have included
more expansionary trends. The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
has led efforts to ratchet up international IP protection, and on October 1, 2011 eight
nations signed the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that aims to strengthen
global IP enforcement.136 ACTA will require signatories to provide effective enforcement
against any act of infringement.137 Furthermore, in the case of commercial copyright
infringement, which includes activities carried out for an indirect economic or
commercial advantage,138 penalties must include both imprisonment and monetary fines
sufficiently high to create a deterrent effect.139 Reinforcing existing IP rights is also a
discussion point in the recently announced Trans-Pacific Partnership trade negotiations
taking place between nine countries.140 The ongoing discussions between Canada and the
E.U. to negotiate the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement also include IP as
one of a number of subjects under discussion.141
In addition to the use of smaller multilateral agreements, the U.S. in particular has
adopted the strategy of strengthening IP rights by making them part of Free Trade
Agreements (FTA). Using NAFTA as a model the U.S. negotiated 11 bilateral
agreements in the 2000 to 2007 period, each with a specific chapter or article relating to
IP.142 In addition to the bilateral deals, the US signed multilateral agreements with six
Central American nations in 2004.143 The desire by the U.S.’s trading partners for
unfettered access to its domestic market results in the American ability to have
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considerable influence on the terms of the FTA and the amount of harmonization
required with U.S. practices. The recently negotiated Korea – U.S. FTA requires Korea
to change 169 of its national laws, while there are no changes required to American
law.144 Finally, the U.S. is also linking the topic of IP protection to Trade and Investment
Framework Agreements (TIFAs) with a broad range of countries and regions.145
The ability of the U.S. to secure stronger levels of IP protection over the past 25 years has
resulted in a carefully planned strategy of forum-shopping and leveraging the desire by
other nations to access the U.S. market. By linking IP with trade, an even more important
mechanism for expanding IP rights has been realized – the powerful enforcement
measures of trade treaties, and in particular the ability to retaliate where most effective
when obligations are not upheld, represent one of the central dimensions in the
expansionary nature of IP.
B. Economic Ascendency of IP
The linking of the global trade system with intellectual property rights is directly related
to the increasing importance of IP both in the U.S. and in other advanced economies.
Following a period in the late 1970s that was characterized by a decline in the number of
U.S. patents granted, there has been a noticeable and substantive growth in the number
granted (from 48,854 domestic utility patents in 1979 to 167,349 domestic utility patents
in 2009), which coincides with the expanse of patent scope, term and protection.146
The increasing emphasis on IP has resulted in a number of efforts to improve
enforcement and protection. In 1999, the U.S. created a special body, the National
Intellectual Property Law Enforcement Coordination Council (NIPLECC), to coordinate
IP enforcement activities at a number of federal departments,147 and in 2008 the position
of Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator within the Executive Office of the
President was created.148 The emphasis on IP protection in the U.S. has resulted in both a
website (www.stopfakes.gov) and a toll-free hotline (1-866-999-HALT) for reporting IP
infringement.149
The estimates of the contribution of IP industries to the overall U.S. economy are
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substantial. According to a 2006 U.S. government estimate half of exports and 40% of
economic growth can be attributed to IP industries.150 In 2008, Secretary of Commerce
Carlos Gutierrez suggested that the value of IP to the U.S. economy was 40% of GDP, or
$5 trillion.151 Estimates by industry associations also emphasize the importance of IP to
the U.S. economy. The International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) notes that
“core” copyright industries alone contributed 6.44% of U.S. GDP in 2007,152 and
Business Software Alliance (BSA) estimates that in 2009 pirated software had a global
value of $51.4 billion.153 The Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) argues
that global music piracy results in the loss of 71,060 U.S. jobs.154 Despite the increasing
importance of IP to a number of U.S. industries, a recent GAO report cautions that many
estimates on the effects of piracy and counterfeiting overestimate the monetary value of
infringement of IP. The GAO notes that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
estimate piracy losses at $200-250 billion and Custom and Border Protection’s estimate
of 750,000 job losses due to counterfeiting cannot be substantiated.155
Although the exact value of IP to American industry is unclear, the estimates do reflect
the increasing importance of IP industries to the overall American economy. Along with
financial, business and professional services, IP intensive industries have helped sustain
moderate U.S. growth levels, while American manufacturing has continued to decline.
These broad structural changes in the makeup of the U.S. economy are generally
reflected in western Europe, Japan and other advanced economies. The economic
ascendency of IP has both been supported by and created pressure for expansionary IP
policies.
IV. Countervailing Trends
Against the expansionary intellectual property regime there have been some
countervailing developments. In addition to the Doha Declaration developing countries
have been successful at preventing the WCT and WPPT from being incorporated into
TRIPS, and WIPO treaties on database protection, harmonization of substantive patent
laws and the rights of broadcasters and webcasters have been stalled.156 WIPO has also
adopted a Development Agenda that includes 45 recommendations that aim to ensure IP
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obligations do not unduly encumber developing nations.157 One of the recommendations
specifically states that WIPO, “consider the preservation of the public domain within
WIPO’s normative processes and deepen the analysis of the implications and benefits of
a rich and accessible public domain.”158 However, the success of developing nations at
multilateral forums has been tempered by the increasing use of TRIPS plus requirements
in bilateral trade agreements.
In Canada the current copyright bill would introduce a number of new changes that are
not designed to principally benefit rights holders. Bill C-11 includes the expansion of
fair dealing to include education, parody and satire159 and several new exceptions such as
UGC and format and time shifting;160 however, all of these changes would be
undermined by the pervasive new protections given to TPMs.
Although the United States is the nexus of the expansionary IP regime, there have been
some non-expansionary developments. Language in decisions from several recent
Supreme Court cases evinces that not all members of the high court believe that
expanding IP protection is justified. The 2006 U.S. Supreme Court decision in eBay v.
MercExchange161 introduced a new four factor test that must be used before a permanent
injunction will be issued as a result of an infringement case somewhat mitigating the
power of business method patent holders.162 In Ebay Justice Kennedy wrote in his
concurring opinion that:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the product that companies seek
to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in
negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the infringement and
an injunction may not serve the public interest. 163

Furthermore he noted that business method patents tended to be vague and of suspect
validity.164 In KSR v. Teleflex, the Supreme Court rejected the CAFC’s test for nonobviousness noting that it set the bar too low for establishing non-obviousness and stated,
“the results of ordinary innovation are not subject of exclusive rights under the patent
laws.”165 In Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories,
Inc., Justice Breyer wrote in his dissenting opinion that, “too much patent protection can
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impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts.’”166 And most
recently in the Bilski case, Justice Stevens argued, “the breadth of business methods, their
omnipresence in our society, and their potential vagueness also invite a particularly
pernicious use of patents that we have long criticized.”167 While the U.S. Supreme Court
has not put a halt to the patenting of business methods, it is clear that at least some of the
justices are concerned over how such patents can negatively impact innovation. With
regards to copyright two recent bills that would expand the powers of copyright owners the Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual
Property Act (PROTECT IP Act) of 2011 (S 968),168 and House of Representatives
version of the PROTECT IP Act, the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) (HR 3261)169 –
have now been stalled due to opposition from several major internet companies and
websites including Google, Yahoo!, Amazon.com, Facebook, Twitter and Wikipedia.170
Finally, the recently passed Leahy-Smith American Invents Act171 has delivered long
awaited patent reform in the U.S. The act introduces numerous changes to the patent
system including moving the U.S. from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file system,
introduction of a post-grant review system allowing interested parties to challenge the
validity of a patent after it is granted, and expanding the prior use defense from
methods172 to all kinds of patentable subject matter.173 The Coalition for Patent Fairness,
whose membership is largely comprised of large software and electronics companies,174
supported the recent U.S. patent reforms,175 while groups including the American
Inventors for Patent Reform and National Small Business Association were critical of the
changes.176 While the aim of the act is to reduce unnecessary litigation and spur job
creation and innovation,177 because most of the act has yet to come into effect it remains
unclear exactly how far the act will go in achieving this goal. Furthermore, the act is not
without expansionary elements such as the weakening of the best mode requirement by
eliminating the provision that would invalidate a patent when an inventor fails to disclose
the best mode.178 While these countervailing developments must be noted, the dominant
trend is still towards expansionary IP rights, and both Canada and the U.S. have pending
legislation179 that would further serve the interests of rights holders while limiting the
rights of end users.
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V. Incentives and the Expansionary IP Regime
This chapter has provided an overview of the expansionary IP regime noting the increase
of protection for traditional IP devices, the rise of sui generis IP mechanisms, and the
linking of IP within the global trade system. The economic ascendency of IP and the
expansionary IP regime should not suggest that society has entered some sort of novel
epoch where intellectual work is prized, but instead reflects the tendency within
capitalism to conquer new markets and commodify new goods and services. While the
promotion of innovation is an important societal goal, policymakers in a number of
jurisdictions, and the U.S. in particular, have chosen to incent innovative activity by
relying on exclusionary rights that limit access but provide rights holders with
increasingly lucrative means for appropriating the returns for their innovations.
Facilitating much of the expansionary trend has been an increased rhetoric on the
importance of providing incentives for intellectual activity and a general exaltation of
innovation. These economic shifts are a central driver for the U.S. to seek out stronger IP
laws and have also given rise to an increasing discourse on the emergence of an
information society.180 The reliance on exclusionary rights to incent innovation would be
justified if no other mechanisms existed to encourage artistic and creative work; however,
the next chapter demonstrates that IP is not the sole incentive for innovation. The
following chapter forms the first facet for differentiating between IP and its alternatives
by critically examining the central concept of incentives in IP and innovation discourse.
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Chapter Four - Incentives
This chapter examines the role of incentives in the production and distribution of
intellectual goods. The central argument for this chapter is that the focus on pecuniary
incentives to stimulate the production and distribution of intellectual goods is misplaced
as there are already numerous extant incentives for the production of intellectual goods,
and the primary goal of policy for the intellectual goods should be creating incentives to
ensure the distribution and access to intellectual works. In an effort to critically
interrogate the incentive-innovation linkage in IP and intellectual goods, it decouples the
two concepts that in are typically conflated.1 By separating incentives from innovation it
permits scrutiny of the arguments on incentives. It is insufficient for policymakers to rely
on the simplistic argument that the greater the (pecuniary) incentive, the greater the
innovatory returns. While greater pecuniary incentives can lead to more artistic and
creative behaviour, such activity is necessarily concentrated where the returns appear to
be most lucrative. Instead, policymakers must rely on empirical evidence to guide
innovation policy, and they must also realize that to engender innovation that will address
political, social, moral and economic problems, then a broad range of incentives are
required. Given the overreliance on pecuniary incentives in the IP system, substantive
alternatives, which draw on a range of incentives, are of critical import for achieving a
wide spectrum of innovatory outcomes.
This analysis proceeds by first examining the linkages between IP and incentives
focusing on the use of incentives in justificatory theories of IP, the incentive-access
paradigm that shapes much of the utilitarian and economic analyses of IP and concludes
by examining the range of incentives produced by the creation of exclusionary rights to
intellectual goods. The second section examines the role of the pecuniary incentive in
economic analyses of IP. It begins by looking at homo economicus, the ideal type
characterization of human beings that microeconomic analyses are premised on. It then
looks at how the focus on pecuniary incentives to stimulate intellectual goods production
has taken on increasing influence in both economics and judicial thought, and finally it
concludes with a discussion of the dangers of an exclusive focus on intellectual property.
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The final section looks at two remaining, but central, aspects of incentives approach.
Human beings’ natural proclivity for artistic and inventive behaviour is explored and the
concluding subsection reframes the incentives problem as the need for incentives to
encourage the distribution of intellectual goods not their production.
I. Incentives for Intellectual Property
Incentives are given a privileged role in IP analyses. This section examines why
arguments surrounding the need for incentives are given a privileged position by
proponents of IP by first examining the connection between incentives and justificatory
theories of IP, then looking at the tension between incentives to produce and distribute
intellectual goods and access to such goods, and finally concluding by looking at the full
range of incentives and disincentives created by exclusionary IP rights.
A. Justificatory Theories of Intellectual Property and Incentives
An examination of the role that incentives play in intellectual property must begin with
an examination of the justificatory theories of IP. Of the three primary justificatory
theories of IP – Kantian/Hegelian, Lockean and utilitarian – incentivization discourse
manifests itself most prominently in the latter where it is central, but it still plays an
important role in the Lockean justification. Although the incentives are most heavily
stressed in the utilitarian framework, an examination of judicial decisions demonstrates
that the courts frequently blend the Lockean and utilitarian approaches.
i. Personality Based Justifications (Kant and Hegel)
One approach to justifying IP is based on the writings of Immanuel Kant and G.W.F.
Hegel that views artistic creations as a manifestation of an individual’s personhood and
as such deserving of protection.2 Kant explicitly condemned the illegal copying of
books.3 However, Kant’s focus on the importance of speech led him to conclude that
copyright should not be extended to translations and derivative works.4 Hegel’s writings
on intellectual property deal with both artistic works and invention. In Philosophy of
Right Hegel claims property is essential noting that it is required to provide individuals
freedom to interact with each other through mutually consenting contracts.5 Hegel
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specifically argues that inventors and authors should retain control of their intellectual
property noting, “the author of the work or inventor of the apparatus remains the owner
of the general method of multiplying such products.”6
Though powerful, personality based arguments for IP are not without critical
shortcomings. Arguments that suggest property is an extension of personhood confuse
one’s internal will and being with one’s ability to manifest such will in a physical
environment.7 Artistic works and inventions are independent of their creators.8
Furthermore, the importance of personality as expressed through works of art and
invention does not imply that their creators should be entitled to the full economic value
of their work. Finally, while Kant’s and Hegel’s arguments are better suited to works of
individual creation by independent persons, this justificatory scheme presents some
problems for intellectual goods produced by a collective or under the scope of
employment – is the latest Hollywood movie a manifestation of the will of its director,
leading actor or the studio’s CEO or primary shareholder?
Kant’s and Hegel’s personality based approaches to IP create what is arguably the
strongest justification for such rights and for the moral (as opposed to the economic)
rights in copyright in particular. This approach has a much stronger resonance in
continental Europe than in Anglo-American jurisdictions.9 Their influence is reflected in
the 1957 French copyright law which designated moral rights as perpetual, inalienable
and imprescriptible.10 In the Anglo-American context their influence has been muted.
Though both Britain and Canada provide moral rights for authors,11 moral rights have
almost no statutory grounds in U.S. copyright law.12 In the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988 the U.S. specifically excluded itself from the moral rights
provisions in Berne,13 and the both the NAFTA and TRIPS incorporation of the Berne
text specifically omit the moral rights provisions.14
While Kant and Hegel’s arguments on IP neither give specific impetus to incentives nor
feature prominently in Anglo-American IP, they serve an important role beyond
providing an alternative justificatory schema for comparison. Their celebration of the
author (and the inventor) lends itself to rhetorical arguments that place central emphasis
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on the role of individual creators in the development of intellectual goods and displace
notions that such individuals must necessarily draw from a wealth of ideas and
inspiration located in the public domain. Personality based justifications for IP extol the
value of individual contribution, and this rhetorical concept of romantic ownership has
been coopted by proponents of the expansionary regime even when alternative
justificatory schemes are used as a technique for framing the IP debate in a way that
favours rights holders.15
ii. The Lockean Justification
The writings of John Locke on the subject of common property in Two Treaties of
Government have been extended to the idea of intellectual property.16 The Lockean
justification is premised on the idea that when one mixes one’s own labour with
something from nature, the result is the property of the individual.17 The investment of
one’s labour raises the value what was once common, and therefore appropriation is the
appropriate labour-desert.18 Locke indicates that there are two important conditions that
must be met to justify the taking of common property – one should not take so much as to
create spoilage, and one must leave “enough and as good” for others.19 Because
intellectual goods are non-rival in consumption and not prone to rotting like agricultural
products or deterioration like industrial goods, any appropriation from the intellectual
commons would appear to never run afoul of the two Lockean provisos.20
One of the primary appeals of the Lockean approach is that the IP as a natural right
argument reduces the need for empirical evidence.21 Unlike the utilitarian approach that
seeks to balance incentives and maximizing the benefit to society and therefore requires
careful consideration of the optimal balance, the labour-desert argument provides a
strong, natural right claim for the ownership of IP.22 For the Lockean advocate the
incentive is simply a just desert.
The extension of Locke’s theory of appropriation to intellectual goods is not without
some practical shortcomings. Relying only on Two Treaties is insufficient; Locke
specifically wrote on the subject of copyright where he condemned providing copyright
to ancient works and suggested that the term for copyright should be at most 70 years
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after death of the author.23 Even working from just Locke’s writing on tangible property
raises some problems. Given the cumulative nature of information one must question
why an individual is entitled to the full value of the resulting creation or invention and
not only the value of what was added.24 Furthermore just because someone is entitled to
the fruits of their labour this does not necessarily mean that one should be able to extract
the full market value of their work through exclusionary rights.25 Though personal
liberty was paramount for Locke, natural rights justifications of ownership over non-rival
intangibles appear to needlessly infringe upon personal liberty.26
Lockean justifications of IP have always held a degree of appeal in Anglo-American IP
debates,27 but have tended to take a secondary role to utilitarian justifications. Despite
playing a secondary role, Locke’s writings have continued to have an effect, particularly
the notion that individuals who mix their labour with what is common deserve a fair
reward. The rhetoric of a just desert is often used to supplement utilitarian arguments
based on providing incentives.
iii. Utilitarian/Consequentialist Justificatory Scheme
Although the Lockean justification appears to provide a stronger justification for IP, in
the United States the most common justificatory scheme used is a utilitarian argument
based on incentives.28 The utilitarian/consequentialist view of IP treats the temporary
monopoly provided through IP rights as a mechanism for encouraging creative and
inventive behaviour with the aim of advancing the arts and sciences and improving
society as a whole. This justificatory theory is clearly present in the U.S. Constitution’s
article 1, section 8, clause 8 where the explicit aim of IP is “to promote science and the
useful arts.”29 It has also heavily influenced U.S. Supreme Court decisions in cases
involving IP.30 Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, viewed patents favourably
arguing, “of all the methods of exciting and rewarding industry, this [patenting] is the
least burdensome, and the most exactly proportioned to the merit of invention.”31 He also
believed that a patent system had clear superiority over its alternatives including the use
of prizes to incent innovative activity.32
Although proponents of the utilitarian approach emphasize maximizing the greatest good
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for society, there are several different interpretations of how such this goal is
accomplished ranging from quantifiable approaches such as wealth maximization or
maximization of consumer welfare to more abstract conceptions including maximizing
total utility or general happiness.33 The policy goal in the utilitarian approach to IP
should be to find the optimal incentive level – the minimum level of incentive required to
induce the greatest amount of creative and inventive behaviour.34 Though IP rights limit
access to information, the common, yet often unchallenged assumption, is that without
sufficient incentives information will be under produced.35 Complicating the balancing
act is the fact that the greater the incentive provided (the more powerful the right to
exclude) there is a corresponding decrease in access to the intellectual good and a
deadweight loss as the copyrighted work, patented invention or other IP protected good
or service is sold above marginal cost. While the tension between incentives and access
does occupy an important role, Boyle suggests, however, that balancing discourse is
largely illusionary as the rhetoric employed when framing the factors to be balanced
predetermines the appropriate balance.36
Economic analyses of law, including those of IP, adopt a utilitarian view point that
focuses on maximizing the efficient use of resources (though most law and economics
scholars also concede that clearly delineated, strong property rights are essential37). IP
creates property rights that are seen as necessary for the efficient use of any valuable
resource.38 Emphasis is placed on maximizing wealth through allocative efficiency.39
Neoclassical economic theory treats intellectual goods, which are non-rival in
consumption and lack an exclusion mechanism (without IP), as a source of market
failure, and remedies this market failure through the creation of a legal right to exclude.40
Posner acknowledges that property rights on non-scarce goods such as information
induce wasteful rent seeking,41 which occurs when economic actors engage in nonproductive actives, such as lobbying in order to profit. However, he argues such rights
are justified as producing the incentive to invent and create in the first place, which offset
the losses from rent seeking and the decreased access to intellectual goods created by
IP.42 The dominant utilitarian approach places the greatest emphasis on the role of
incentives in the production of intellectual goods, and when viewed in economic terms
the issue of incentivization becomes paramount.
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iv. Judicial Blending of Utilitarian and Lockean Justifications
In the case of the two major Anglo-American justificatory approaches to IP, there are
numerous instances where the courts have combined the incentives and labour-desert
arguments. The mixing of natural rights arguments and utilitarian principles is a common
feature across all systems of property.43 In IP cases the courts acknowledge the role
incentives play in encouraging innovative behaviour, but rather than focus on ensuring
that the incentive provided is minimal, so as to provide the greatest benefit to society, the
importance of a just or fair reward to the creator is also stressed. In one of the earliest
copyright cases in Great Britain, Millar v. Taylor (1769), the courts stated:
It is wise in any state, to encourage letters, and the painful researches of learned men. The
easiest and most equal way of doing it, is, by securing to them the property of their own
works….
He who engages in a labourious work, (such, for instance, as Johnson’s Dictionary,) which
may employ his whole life, will do it with more spirit, if, besides his own glory, he thinks it
may be a provision for his family. 44

A view that was reflected only a few years later in decision in Sayre v. Moore (1785):
We must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that men of
ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may not be deprived
of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the world
may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts be retarded. 45

The blending of natural rights and utilitarian approaches continues to be favoured by
courts. Similar language is also seen in modern decisions such as the 1985 U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises in which the court declared:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is intended to increase and not to impede
the harvest of knowledge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave insufficient deference to
the scheme established by the Copyright Act for fostering the original works that provide the
seed and substance of this harvest. The rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their labours. 46

This mixing of utilitarian and Lockean elements was recently evinced in the 2002
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Supreme Court of Canada decision in Théberge v. Galerie d’Art du Petit Champlain
where the court not only cited Millar v. Taylor, but also noted:
The Copyright Act is usually presented as a balance between promoting the public interest in
the encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and obtaining a just
reward for the creator (or, more accurately, to prevent someone other than the creator from
appropriating whatever benefits may be generated).47

The blending of Lockean and utilitarian approaches has been used by judges to justify IP
mechanisms, including the incentive function of IP rights. Tempering the utilitarian
approach with the Lockean idea of a just desert allows justices to focus on creating fair
rather than optimal incentives – a considerably easier task. Judicial reasoning such as the
examples cited above has a second appeal; Lockean and utilitarian analyses provide an
illusion of objectivity and neutrality.48 However, justificatory systems that provide moral
arguments for the private appropriation of the intellectual commons are on their own
insufficient, and any analyses of IP must go beyond moral theory and examine the social
effects of exclusionary rights.49 If exclusionary incentives are to be provided as a means
to encourage the production and distribution of intellectual goods, it is necessary to then
examine how such incentives are balanced against the need for access to intellectual
goods. The next section examines the tension between incentives for intellectual goods
production and mechanisms to ensure such goods are accessible.
B. The Incentive-Access Paradigm
One of the central aspects of intellectual property is perceived tradeoff between the
creation of incentives for the production of intellectual goods and access to such goods.
Incentives and access are inversely related.50 The incentive-access paradigm suggests
that as authors and inventors are given greater control over their intellectual property the
incentive to create such works increases, while the access to such goods falls; conversely
if broad access is provided, then the incentive to create such works is diminished. In
economic terms IP allows the producers of intellectual goods to charge a price above
marginal cost and recoup the cost of creating the first copy, but the imposition of a price
above marginal costs imposes a deadweight loss on society.
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The inherent tension between incentives and access is reflected in both major branches of
IP. The limited term of IP devices is one feature designed to facilitate eventual access. In
the case of copyright, fair use/dealing exceptions are the primary mechanisms through
which continued access is provided, although such exceptions are (and must be)51 limited
to prevent a dulling of the incentive effect. In the case of patents access is provided by
the disclosure stipulation52 and the minimum requirements that patents be non-obvious,
novel and useful.
Underneath the incentive-access paradigm a second important consideration is taking
place – should authors and inventors receive the cost of creating or developing their work
or its value (with the incentive being considerably stronger in the latter case).53 In the
extreme advocates who believe that the incentive should be the full market value argue:
The fundamental premise of our copyright law is that the best way to encourage the creation
of valuable works is to let authors capture the market value of those works. This means that
even if we don’t want to give the Dr. Seusses of the world the power to enjoin uses of uses
that offend them, we do want to protect their ability to share in all the profits that their work
gives rise to.54

Though strengthening the incentive is alluring in that it should result in greater
production of intellectual goods, there exist several problems with providing authors and
inventors the full social value of their work. The value of a work is influenced by several
factors including the structure of the market and ability to market and distribute the
work.55 In the case of copyright the pecuniary incentive is greater for works that have
larger markets. The value of an individual’s artistic or inventive endeavour is not
necessarily the market value of an exclusionary right, and the conflation of the two
ignores the value of the contribution from the public domain.56 Furthermore market size
does not necessarily reflect the social value of a work. Inventions are only valuable when
accompanied by business models that facilitate diffusion (and sales) of the product or
process.57 Popular music and films have the potential to reach massive sales volumes,
while more specialized works such as Cree language children’s books will never sell
millions of copies; however, market size is not a proxy for the real value a work
contributes to society. For works produced under contract or within the scope of
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employment the individual artist or inventor often receives minor compensation in
contrast to the value corporate rights holders can extract from IP. Chesbrough’s informal
survey of major high tech companies reveals that individual employees are offered
relatively small perks (between $500 and $2500 depending on whether the patent is
issued) for work leading to a patent.58 Individual artists face a similar situation as the high
level of uncertainty about achieved success in the commercial market undermines the
suggestion that pecuniary incentives are central.59 Even though some artists earn
royalties, payments tend to be small except for established superstars.60 Although the
incentives argument is premised on the idea that incentives for individuals spur
intellectual activity, it is disjoint from the fact that the actual monetary rewards for
individuals are quite small. Proponents of greater incentives conveniently overlook that
the ‘full market value’ incentive is not available to most Dr. Seusses of the world but
their publishers. The argument that certain kinds of activity need to be encouraged61 does
not necessarily extend itself to the argument that the incentive should be the price the
market will bear for a good protected by IP, particularly when such incentive is created
by exclusionary rights that limit access.
Though important, the tension between incentives and access should not dominate the
debate around IP to the exclusion of all other factors. Other factors that must be
considered include the problem of rent seeking, transaction costs, and the cost of
enforcement.62 On its own the incentive-access paradigm cannot provide any answer as to
the ideal degree of protection for IP, as the two factors tradeoff against each other.63
Choosing to maximize either incentives or access is a normative judgment and one that
should not be made without both factoring in the other dimensions of IP and looking at
empirical data.
It is also important to remember that within the utilitarian approach there are other roles
played by IP, though the incentive function is dominant.64 Kitch’s prospect theory of
patents suggests that the incentive-access problem is overemphasized resulting in an
obfuscation of the signaling function of patents.65 He has repeatedly argued that the
limiting of access is incorrectly framed as a monopoly right as IP rights do not
necessarily confer market power in economic terms.66 Thus it is important to be mindful
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of the other functions of the IP system when examining incentives and access. In this
regard the next section includes an analysis of the whole range incentives produced by IP.
Cognizant of the incentive-access tension, it is only with a thorough examination of the
multitude of behaviours incented by IP that one can critically assess the role of
incentives.
C. Incentives for Various Types of Actors Involved in the Production and
Distribution of Intellectual Goods
While a simplistic static analysis would suggest that IP rights create incentives for
engaging in creative and industrious behaviour, the reality is much more complex with a
wide variety of incentives being created for a diverse range of actors. The IP regime
creates a series of incentives on top of an already existing set of motives for intellectual
work. Besides the incentives to create, propriety rights also introduces a series of
incentives for maximizing the benefit of such rights that includes engaging in strategic
behaviour, litigation incentives and the encouragement of rent-seeking behaviour.
Though the rhetoric of individual authors and inventors is often employed, IP rights
create similar but distinct incentives for employers and heirs. Finally IP also introduces a
series of disincentives. This section examines the full range of incentives and
disincentives produced by IP.
i. Preexisting Incentives for the Creation and Distribution of Intellectual Goods
Although the IP system introduces a pecuniary incentive for intellectual work, there are
already preexisting incentives for the creation and distribution of intellectual goods.
Though additional pecuniary incentives do not necessarily diminish the role played by
existing incentives, arguments in favour of IP must be mindful that incentives to engage
in intellectual activity already exist and can be quite powerful.
Often authors and inventors make their work available because they want to be the first to
market (also known as the first mover advantage). The first to market incentive is
particularly strong for goods that cannot be easily copied or reverse engineered.67
Initially entrepreneurs are often more concerned with market share than profits.68
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Though being the first to market is typically associated with the production of inventions
where manufacturers want to have their good in the marketplace before rivals to establish
the market and/or brand, first to market is also a motive for publishers of creative works.
Despite the lack of copyright protection for British authors in the United States in the
middle of the 19th century, American publishers often paid more than British ones for
advanced copies of British works so that they could be the first to publish the book in the
United States.69 Some software publishers, including Microsoft, tolerate a degree of
piracy in new markets hoping that it will contribute to lock-in and that users can
eventually be converted to using licensed copies.70 Numerous empirical studies
demonstrate that the first mover advantage is a superior incentive to IP.71 For many
intellectual goods, particularly those that can be branded, the desire to be first in a market
provides enough incentive.
For some intellectual goods, ideological and religious motives are primary as evinced by
the presence of partisan and religious publishers.72 The Ludwig von Mises Institute
provides thousands of hours of audio and video as well as thousands of free books on the
Austrian School of economics and libertarian political and social theory.73 The Jehovah’s
Witnesses official site, The Watchtower, also provides a litany of free materials.74
Though the lack of copyright on U.S. federal materials primary purpose is to maintain an
informed citizenry, it also serves a secondary role of allowing broader distribution of
American ideology. While it would be foolish to suggest that ideological and religious
motives are not self-interested, they reflect that pecuniary incentives are not the only
stimuli for the production and distribution of intellectual goods.
Reputation and status are also important motivators for the production of intellectual
goods. Both Hobbes and Smith emphasized the importance of recognition and respect for
motivating human behaviour, with Smith arguing that it may be the strongest of human
desires.75 Academics publish not for the possibility being remunerated, but from an
interest in increasing their status.76 The massive volume of scholarly literature has been
produced almost entirely without pecuniary motives.77 Scholars and other aspiring
authors may be so motivated in being published that they pay to do so, rather than write
for any expected financial returns.78 The prominent open access publication Public
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Library of Science (PLoS) Biology charges authors $2,900 to have their articles
published,79 and has no shortage of articles as it also has the highest impact factor of any
journal in the discipline.80 Joseph Stiglitz recounts how he was “enthusiastic” to write a
new introduction for a pirated version of one of his textbooks in China, although his
publisher lacked such enthusiasm.81 The long history of academic publishing provides an
obvious case where intellectual goods are incented overwhelmingly by non-pecuniary
motives.
In addition to enhancing one’s reputation, intellectual goods may be produced and
distributed to garner recognition.82 While copyrighted works can improve the reputation
of individuals, firms will patent to improve their reputation.83 Small firms will patent to
establish a reputation within an industry that has large established firms.84 Reputational
motives have a long history of encouraging innovation from blast furnace engineers in
19th century England to 21st century computer programmers.85 The desire for recognition
and reputation are important incentives for the production of intellectual works, and in
many cases are the primary motivators for the production of such works. The range of
extant non-pecuniary incentives for the production and distribution of intellectual goods
undermine the argument that strong pecuniary incentives in the form of exclusionary
rights are necessary.
ii. Incentives for Strategic Behaviour, Litigation and Rent Seeking
Although IP rights create incentives for creation and distribution of intellectual works,
they also create a powerful set of stimuli for strategic behaviour, litigation and rent
seeking. Failure to consider these incentives when analyzing IP is particularly perilous
because in general the actions spawned by these incentives are less desirable. Strategic
use of patents and copyrights can undermine competition, consumer choice and
innovation. Litigation around such rights creates a hidden tax on artistic and inventive
behaviour, and rent seeking behaviour is particularly insidious as it shifts human activity
from productive endeavours to the chasing of economic rents.
The provision of exclusionary IP rights within the broader context of a competitive
market encourages IP holders to use such rights strategically.86 There are some economic
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benefits to such behaviour. In a British study global trade in IP licenses was estimated to
be worth £600 billion,87 and such trade does increase the flow of knowledge. Patents are
increasingly being used as mechanisms to attract venture capital which may allow
entrepreneurs to bring their ideas to market more easily or strengthen a start-up’s
financial position ahead of an initial public offering.88 Some firms even donate patents to
non-profit organizations and then use this donation as a tax write-off.89 While the
donation of patents is admirable, it is usually motivated by a desire to diminish patent
upkeep costs.90
However, strategic behaviour also results in several problematic outcomes. Another
example of strategic use of patents is patent blocking where patents are used to block
rival firms from patenting their own research.91 Patent blocking is particularly common in
the software industry where it has been fueled by low quality patents. Low quality patent
examinations by the USPTO create a vicious cycle where there is increased incentive to
patent increasingly marginal inventions resulting in a greater volume of patent
applications that ensures further low quality examinations by overworked examiners.92
The only disincentive for patenting peripheral inventions is the cost of application.93
Google has specifically claimed that patent blocking impedes innovation, and notes that
the best defense against patent blocking is acquiring more patents, which only
exacerbates the examination workload problem at patent offices.94 The dual threat of
litigation and patent blocking fuels defensive patent aggregation95 where companies
acquire as many patents as possible to insulate themselves from competitors’ threats.96
As the number of patents proliferates the potential for infringement and litigation increase
reinforcing the importance of amassing patents. Defensive patent aggregation is
analogous to the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, and rather than
nuclear brinkmanship rights holders engage in a strategic game of litigious threat and
counter threat.
The ability to litigate, though an important dimension of property rights, provides the
most powerful strategic use of IP. Infringement lawsuits not only carry the potential of
monetary awards for claimants, but also give claimants the power to leverage the threat
of injunction for a lucrative settlement. For example in 2006 Research in Motion (RIM),
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the makers of the popular BlackBerry mobile device, had to pay a settlement of $612.5
million to NTP to ensure that the production of BlackBerrys would not be halted due to
patent infringement litigation.97 In this case the threat of injunction allowed NTP to
extract a settlement far in excess of the underlying value of its patented technology. To
put the settlement figure in context, for the financial year ending February 2010 RIM
spent $964 million on R&D;98 thus a $612.5 million settlement represents nearly two
thirds of its annual R&D budget. As noted in chapter three, structural changes in the U.S.
administration of patents are a major factor in the expansionary regime. The pro-patent
decisions of the CAFC encourage patent holders to litigate.99 Ironically the danger of
litigation encourages lower quality patent applications. The increased penalties for
willful infringement100 in patent cases disincentivizes companies from reading others’
patents, which results in poorer assessments of prior art in patent applications.101 The
possibility that a research endeavor may result in costly litigation can disincentivize such
research.102 Strategic patenting and lower quality patents can disincentivize firms’
willingness to spend on R&D, significantly undermining the purpose of patents.103
A particularly problematic activity incentivized by patents is the activities of patent
holding companies (known benignly as non-practicing entities or pejoratively as patent
trolls).104 Patent holding companies do not manufacture the patents they have in their
portfolio. Instead, these patents are used as leverage to litigate against potential
infringers in the hopes of receiving damages or to threaten litigation to receive a
settlement. Sectors producing complex products with sequential innovations, such as the
information technology sector, are particularly vulnerable to the danger posed by patent
trolls.105 Open source software producers are also particularly susceptive to the threat of
litigation. The availability of source code in open source software products invites
litigation from both competitors and patent trolls.106 Though there has been increasing
concern about the problem of patent trolls, non-practicing entities are responsible for only
a small percentage of litigation.107 Depending on how broadly one defines a nonpracticing entity, trolls are involved in somewhere from 7% - 12% of all patent litigation,
but these cases tend to be cases where the patent(s) at issue are litigated multiple times.108
While they make up only a small percentage of total cases, it is notable that the volume of
non-practicing entity initiated lawsuits is rising rapidly with more the 2,600 cases in 2010
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up fivefold from 2004.109
Copyright holders have also pursued litigation strategies. In the 1980s the Association of
American Publishers used lawsuits to curb illegal usage of photocopiers.110 Though the
RIAA abandoned its practice of litigating against individuals in 2009, the approach was
effective at increasing awareness around copyright infringement and reduced the number
of individuals engaging in illegal downloads.111 Major cases against file sharing services
Napster112 and Grokster113 were successful in causing such services to cease facilitating
unauthorized file sharing.114 An amici curiae brief by Arrow, Becker, Landes (among
others) in support of the claimant in the Grokster case (MGM Studios) explicitly argued
that both copyright and the litigation strategy of seeking high damages against infringers
was informed by neoclassical economic theory.115 While the litigation strategy may have
been effective at reducing infringement, it is important to note that the funds received
were not being channeled back to artists, but instead going to fund more law suits.116
A further problem with litigation stems from the increasing number of courts and
tribunals that have jurisdiction on IP cases. The multitude of forums available to pursue
patent litigation gives rise to forum shopping.117 The U.S. International Trade
Commission’s (USITC) ability to block imports of goods containing infringing products
is a particularly attractive forum in comparison to district courts. Several high
technology companies including Broadcom, Qualcomm and Nokia have become
embroiled in USITC battles.118 Kodak has aggressively asserted its IP rights at the
USITC garnering settlements from Samsung and LG while a complaint against Apple and
RIM is ongoing.119 The USITC has seen its IP case load, known as Section 337
investigations,120 fluctuate over the nearly 40 years it has carried out such investigations,
although 2010 marked an all-time high with 58 investigations,121 and in 2011 there have
already been over 60 setting a new record.122 The variety of venues for IP holders to
assert their rights encourages strategic litigation and by extension the investment of
resources in legal battles rather than productive intellectual activity.
In addition to incentivizing strategic behaviour and litigation, IP mechanisms also
incentivize rent seeking activity.123 Rent seeking is an economic concept whereby groups
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or individuals seek out monopoly privileges that stem from government regulation in
markets. Rent seeking is problematic because it diverts resources form productive profit
maximizing endeavours and instead invests those resources in the search for rents, which
results in an economic deadweight loss.124 Rights holding organizations have spent
considerable amounts lobbying for stronger IP protection with a central focus being
placed on having the U.S. Congress expand the scope and duration of copyright
protection.125 At the same time Congress has historically facilitated and encouraged such
behaviour by allowing copyright industries to effectively draft their own copyright
legislation.126 A primary problem of IP is that even when expansionary demands are met
with legislative change, new expansionary demands emerge. Rent seeking behaviour only
abates when those seeking more expansive IP laws believe the value of future lobbying
exceeds the potential benefit of future changes.127 For companies with hundreds or
thousands of patents or copyrights rent-seeking may never appear as a money losing
option. The clearest example of rent seeking behaviour manifests itself in the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA). The act created a nugatory incentive for
creators, while at the same time making future creation more difficult.128 In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, a case contesting the constitutionality of the CTEA, the miniscule value of the
incentive provided was critiqued by a range of notable economists including five Nobel
Laureates (Akerlof (2001), Arrow (1972), Buchanan (1986), Coase (1991) and Friedman
(1976)) who argued that the act decreased consumer welfare and could produce anticommons problems.129 Despite the objection of such esteemed and diverse Nobel
Laureates, the Supreme Court upheld the law noting that even if it was bad policy it was
not the dominion of the courts to second guess Congress.130
Some quantitative measure of the amount of money spent on lobbying in the U.S. is
available from the Center for Responsive Politics. Based on data reported by the Senate
Office of Public Records, the Center for Responsive Politics indicates that the Intellectual
Property Owners Association spent $280,000 on lobbying in 2010, and a total of nearly
$4 million from 1998 to 2010.131 It is not only advocates for stronger rights who expend
money on lobbying; the Coalition for Patent Fairness, which is made up of an array of
companies primarily in the computer and software industry, has spent $9.3 million on
lobbying since 2006.132 Sums spent by these two groups are dwarfed by the lobbying
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expenses of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. Although the
group lobbies on a range of issues and not just IP, its lobbying expenses have ballooned
from just over $3 million in 1998 to nearly $ 22 million in 2010, with total spending in
that time span totaling $195 million.133 The seven industry organizations that form the
IIPA134 have collectively spent over $123 million on lobbying since 1998.135 These
prodigious sums spent on K Street are monies not invested supporting artists, creators,
researchers and inventors.
The importance of the incentives for strategic uses of IP, litigation and rent seeking
created by exclusionary rights cannot escape scrutiny. Although these efforts do produce
some benefits (such as the donation of patents) in the aggregate they encourage a range of
behaviours that significantly undermine the IP system and function as a hidden tax on
creative and inventive behaviour.
iii. Differing Incentives for Firms v. Individuals and Creators v. Their Heirs
Incentivization rhetoric frames itself in terms of incentives for individuals, primarily
individual inventors and authors. While individual activity is central to the production of
intellectual goods, a confounding factor is that a significant amount136 of IP ends up
being owned by organizations or the heirs of the originator whose incentives often differ.
A consideration of the incentive effects on these actors is necessary in determining the
total range of incentives produced by IP.
The rights for most commercialized or broadly distributed intellectual goods are held by
firms.137 Rhetoric around individual inventors and authors is appealing, but discordant
with the law which has always centered on providing incentives to rights holding content
industries.138 Copyright analyses have tended to ignore artist issues such as moral rights
and how much artists actually earn from copyright.139 The role of moral rights as an
incentive has been ignored because it appears non-economic in nature.140 In the case of
copyright the rights for works produced under the scope of employment default to the
employer unless there is an agreement otherwise.141 Thus for works produced by
employees it is wrong to assume that IP rights are the primary incentive.142
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A similar situation occurs in the case of patents. Though individuals must apply for
patents, employment agreements tend to require that such right be assigned to the
employer and in some cases these agreements extend to inventions produced by the
employee after their employment has ended.143 While Edison is exalted as archetypal
tinkering genius for receiving over 1000 patents in a lifetime, IBM received nearly 6,000
patents in 2010 alone.144 In the United States the Bayh-Dole Act has made universities
particularly interested in managing their IP portfolios. In 1983 U.S. universities were
issued a total of 434 patents,145 but by FY2009, U.S. universities received 3,417 patents
and a total of $2.3 billion in licensing revenue from their expanding patent portfolios.146
Thus, while the literature on IP tends to emphasize the role of pecuniary incentives in
motivating individual creators and artists, the reality is that most commercially significant
IP is held by profit maximizing organizations.
Although the discourse on copyright emphasizes the incentives of authors, in cases where
individuals do not transfer their copyrights to firms, the author’s heirs are the ultimate
owners of the copyright. TRIPS requires that copyright terms last at least fifty years after
the author’s death,147 yet the incentives of heirs are rarely discussed. Lord Macaulay
noted in 1841 that the additional incentive to authors created by extending copyright
protection beyond the scope of their natural life is negligible.148 Heirs are likely to act in
a more self-interested manner and may be less generous than the original author.149 There
is no reason to assume that heirs are likely to be effective managers of IP rights they did
not create.150 In the case where the heirs are not themselves artists or creators they are
more likely to be concerned with stringently enforcing copyright and maximizing
licensing revenue.151 Heirs also have a greater incentive to limit any derivative works
criticizing the original that fall outside the scope of parody.152 One example of heirs’
restrictive management of inherited copyrights is found in the case of the Gershwin heirs
who have not only hampered scholarly inquiry into Gershwin’s music, but also rigidly
controlled the racial make up of casts of Porgy and Bess.153 Because most artists have to
sign away their copyrights to rights holding organizations, arguments that a long
posthumous copyright term incentivizes authors as a means for providing for their heirs
are specious.154 The pecuniary incentive used to encourage creation of works does not
necessarily encourage preservation as heirs (or rights holding publishers) may choose to
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forgo the expenses involved in preserving a work.155
Framing IP rights in terms of incentives to individual creators helps to simplify the
discussion of the role of incentives, but also ignores that IP rights create incentives for
more than simply those who create. By incorporating employers/publishers and heirs in
the analysis of incentives one can better discern the actual incentive effects.
iv. Disincentives Produced by IP
Finally an analysis of the range of incentives created by IP would be incomplete without
the inclusion of the discinentives produced. The primary disincentive that is discussed,
particularly in economic and legal literature, is that IP rights disincentivize free-riding.156
Free-riding does have some positive benefits, and the concept of free-riding itself is a
rhetorical frame that depicts accessing intellectual goods in a negative light. Although IP
creates an exclusion mechanism that limits free riding, free riders can help increase
market share.157 Lucasfilm, which holds the IP rights for Star Wars, allows fans to create
their own user generated content provided that they do so for non-commercial
purposes;158 however, Lucasfilm is not the norm and several other popular cultural
franchises including Harry Potter and Star Trek have been less tolerant of fan use of their
IP.159 While exclusionary rights do limit free-riding, a degree of free-riding is still
tolerated and even encouraged.
There are a small handful of other disincentives created by IP. As mentioned earlier
firms are disincentivized from reading each other’s patents for fear that they will have to
pay increased damages for willful infringement, and may even be dissuaded from
engaging in R&D at all.160 The current copyright system disincentivizes licensing of
works for non-commercial uses because of the transaction costs involved.161 In a similar
vein the transactions costs involved with using orphan works can disincentivize their use.
When examined in totality the range of incentives and disincentives created by IP is not
only quite broad but also complex. The simple suggestion that greater pecuniary
incentives will result in greater production of intellectual goods is true, but not in all
cases. Incentives to engage in intellectual activity already exist. Exclusionary rights

107
create a powerful set of incentives for strategic behaviour that undermine the purpose of
the IP regime, and all too often analyses of IP fail to discuss how the pecuniary incentive
affects actors other than individual artists and inventors. The question then arises why is
the IP system focused so keenly on providing pecuniary incentives? The next section
examines this question by looking at how economic (and increasingly legal) literature has
constructed a simplified view of mankind and slowly diminished the discussion around
non-pecuniary incentives and the perils of such an approach.
II. Economics and the Pecuniary Incentive
Economics, like all other disciplines, is not without its own strengths and weaknesses.
Economists should be commended for so strongly highlighting that all choices have costs
and providing numerous insights into humans’ economic behavior. However, the value
in this approach is diminished when the totality of human action is viewed solely in
economic terms. One of the primary problems with viewing all human behaviour
through an economic lens is that it has been done so by reducing homo sapien and all his
complexities to ideal type of homo economicus. The next section examines the concept
of homo economicus and discusses the limitations the concept encounters based on its
evolutionary trajectory.
A. Homo Economicus and the Underpinning of Pecuniary Incentives
Although the IP system produces a variety of incentives for a diverse group of actors,
economic analysis focusing on the pecuniary motivations of the artist and inventor can be
explained by examining its microeconomic underpinnings. Self-interest lies at the origin
and center of the economic conception of human behaviour. Over time the maximizing
of self-interest by economic man or homo economicus has taken a variety of forms.
Examining the evolution of homo economicus reveals not only the model of
microeconomic human behaviour at the heart of neoclassical economics, but also the
inherent limitations of such a conception of human beings.
Economic concern with the underlying motives of human behaviour can be traced to the
earliest works in economics. Malthus conceived of mankind as dominated by a
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propensity to procreate at an unsustainable rate.162 Adam Smith declared that that selfinterest was the primary human motive in The Wealth of Nations;163 however, scholars
have noted that in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Smith presents a more nuanced view
of human beings.164 Though Smith placed emphasis on self-interest, it was John Stuart
Mill who argued that for economics to be considered a science it had to focus exclusively
on humans’ desire for wealth allowing for only two other motives (an aversion to labour
and a desire for luxuries).165 Mill never used the terms ‘economic man’ or ‘homo
economicus,’ but unlike Smith who wrote about the humans of individuals in general,
Mill focused specifically on the humans in the economic sphere.166 Mill was also aware
that the economic conception of mankind he presented was incomplete, and suggested
that exact science of human behaviour (ethology as Mill termed it) would examine the
range of motives of human activity.167 Although controversial, the idea of a wealth
maximizing individual had a powerful influence on economics. The idea resonated with
other economists in the late 19th century including Leslie,168 Bagehot,169 and John Neville
Keynes (father of the famous John Maynard Keynes),170 while his proposal for a more
holistic science of ethology went under appreciated.171 However, in examining how
Mill’s idea has influenced other economists one must come to the conclusion that
although Mill is the conceptual father, homo economicus is truly a bastard child.
Early economics was dominated by political economists (Smith, Malthus, Ricardo, Say,
Bastiat among others), but in the latter half of the 19th century the center of economic
thought shifted to works by a new approach in economics. Although emphasized by
Marx and Engels (and earlier by Ricardo), the labour theory of value lost favour with the
early marginalists (Gossen, Jevons, Walras, and Menger) who placed the concept of
marginal utility at the center of economic theory. Mill’s wealth maximizing economic
man became a utility maximizer. Gossen was the first to suggest that the primary motive
of mankind was enjoying life, and he sketched out a basic utility theory.172 William
Stanley Jevons,173 Leon Walras,174 and Carl Menger175 each expanded on the utility
maximizing approach pioneered by Gossen. The shift of homo economicus from a wealth
maximizer to a utility maximizer may appear subtle; however, it represents an important
shift in economic thought. Unlike a theory of humans as wealth maximizers that can be
empirically tested with some ease, utility maximization is much more difficult to
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scrutinize as each individual maximizes against their own unique utility function. Rather
than an empirically falsifiable view of human behaviour, the utility maximizing
assumption can never be falsified. Furthermore non-utility maximizing behaviour was
simply discounted as irrational. The marginalist revolution in economics along with
abandonment of the political economy methodology (resulting in an over-emphasizing of
the economic and a diminished focus on the non-economic) paved the way for the
emergence of neoclassical economics in the 20th century, with homo economicus still
playing a central role.
The final transformation of economic man comes from the writings of the Chicago school
of economics that pioneered neoclassical economic theory and included prominent
economists such as Knight, von Hayek, Coase, Friedman, Becker and Posner. Knight
and Friedman continued the marginalist tradition of viewing human behaviour as
dominated by a utility maximizing function.176 Knight also accentuated the importance
of rationality noting that economic man is completely rational while acknowledging that
homo economicus does not reflect the reality of human individuals.177 In Arrow and
Debreu’s 1954 economic proof of a competitive equilibrium, utility maximization is
assumed to be the primary economic motivation (though technology is assumed to be
fixed).178 The most complete view of the neoclassical model of homo economicus is
presented in Becker’s The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. According to
Becker homo economicus maximizes utility, has a stable set of preferences, and seeks out
an optimal amount of information.179 While specific individuals may behave irrationally,
in the aggregate, behaviour is rational, and self-interest is assumed to be the dominating
motive.180 Although this depiction of human beings seems absurd, even if it is confined
to only economic actions (as if these could be definitively separated from non-economic
interactions), the Chicago school is cognizant of the this fact. Friedman suggests that the
assumptions of a theory need not correspond to reality, so long as they are sufficiently
useful for making predictions.181 The concept of homo economicus has survived and
evolved not in spite of its simplicity but because of it. While the concept of utility
maximization comes from the marginalists, the Chicago school further evolved the
concept placing it at the centre of homo economicus’ rational behaviour.182 Thus, the
neoclassical approach realizes that its view of economic behaviour is distorted and
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simplistic, but justifies such distortion on the basis that it creates an effective model for
predicting human action.
Despite Friedman’s argument that the degree to which assumptions of human behaviour
correspond to reality is largely irrelevant, the homo economicus model is extremely
important. Given that self-interest lies at the heart of the model (a consistent theme from
Smith through to Becker) it suggests that policies should reflect this skewed conception
of human beings. As a result of the economic approach to human behaviour, economic
literature on intellectual property has been marked by an increased propensity to view
pecuniary incentives as the sole method for encouraging the production of intellectual
goods.
B. The Shift in Economic Literature and Legal Thought to an Increasingly
Exclusive Focus on Pecuniary Incentives
Economic literature on intellectual property and incentives has undergone a rhetorical
shift. Early literature discussed the importance of non-pecuniary incentives on creation;
however, more recent works focus nearly exclusively on the power of monetary
incentives.183 Taussig, writing in 1915, suggested that inventors were driven by a range
of motives including both self-interest and altruism; however, he suggested the primary
motive was contrivance (also known as Veblen’s instinct of workmanship).184 He also
warned that the capitalist system necessitated the pecuniary incentive as it gained greater
influence over individuals.185 In a 1934 article on copyright Arnold Plant examined a
range of motives for authors.186 Schumpeter, who argued that innovation was the driver
of economic growth, viewed the joy of inventing as one of several motives that drove
innovation, and believed the prospect of pecuniary gain was not required to incentivize
inventive activity.187
The role of other incentives has been increasingly downplayed in modern economic
analyses of IP. Although the idea that humans respond well to pecuniary incentives is an
ontological assumption, it is increasingly accepted unthinkingly with no explicit
discussion of these assumptions.188 Not only is it assumed that exclusionary rights and
pecuniary profit motivate creation, it is also dogmatically believed that by increasing the
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strength of the exclusionary rights there will be a greater incenting effect.189 Some
authors go even further suggesting “private producers have an incentive to invest in
innovation only if they receive an appropriate return,”190 and, “A patent is the way of
rewarding somebody for coming up with a worthy commercial idea.”191 Problematically
arguments about essentiality of pecuniary incentives ignore the empirical evidence,
which suggests other incentives are far more important.192 The increasingly sole focus on
pecuniary incentives for motivating intellectual behaviour and the diminished interest in
other incentives results in IP being construed as the sole policy mechanism to incent the
production and dissemination of informational goods.193
The economic conception of intellectual property has influenced legal scholarship, and
this influence is most profound in the law and economics approach, which is also (and
more accurately) known as the economic analysis of law. Law and economics literature
emphasizes the importance of strong property rights as mechanisms to internalize social
value.194 Property rights prevent Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons.”195 The law and
economics approach specifically rejects the idea that intellectual goods policy should be
based on the public good nature of information, and instead emphasizes the importance of
incentives.196 While it does make sense for judges and scholars of law to incorporate
some economic analyses into their arguments, the law and economics approach goes too
far by making economic questions and the search for allocatively efficient law its sole
focus.
Law and economics scholarship has had an influence on court decisions. There are
strong links between the law and economics oriented law department at the University of
Chicago and the judiciary. Two of the school’s professors (Easterbrook and Posner, both
law and economics scholars and writers on the subject of IP) have been judges on the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.197 The Chief Judge on the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is Alex Kozinski who argues that the Dr. Seusses of the
world should be able to extract the full market value for their intellectual property.198 It
is not only a handful of prominently placed judges that have facilitated the overly
economic approach to IP. Courts have tended to adopt the view that stronger incentives
are desirable without sufficiently considering the impact on access.199 The majority
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decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft upheld the CTEA as a “rational enactment” because of its
incentive effect.200
The economic treatment of IP has resulted in courts becoming increasingly concerned
with limiting free-riding.201 Such an approach undermines the importance of access to
intellectual goods. A narrow concentration on the economic aspects of IP is problematic
because the economic theory behind such analyses is premised on an overly simple view
of human nature. Though it is questionable whether homo economicus is well suited for
use in economic papers about copyright and patents, there should be no writ of habeas
corpus for him in the judicial system.
C. The Danger of an Exclusive Focus on Pecuniary Incentives
The increasingly singular focus on pecuniary incentives by economists and courts is
perilous. Focusing on pecuniary incentives results in an over-emphasis on intellectual
goods with a commercial value and a corresponding distortion of employment patterns.
More importantly it ignores the role that the non-pecuniary motives play, particularly
intrinsic motivations for creation. Without a consideration of these factors and how they
negatively impact the incentives for engaging in artistic and creative endeavours
intellectual policymakers will be unable to effectively ensure that a broad range of
intellectual goods are produced and disseminated.
i. Over-incentivization of Works with a Commercial Value
An exclusive emphasis on pecuniary incentives fails to reflect the fact that different
incentive structures lead to the production of different types of intellectual goods.
Scholarly publishing and open source software are both successful examples of
intellectual goods whose primary incentive is reputational.202 The copyright system,
however, over-emphasizes entertaining works.203 The current copyright system does not
provide enough protection for works of great creative merit and instead provides
incentives for producing “second-rate, but fortuitously favored activities.”204 In a similar
manner the availability of patents steers inventive activity towards those areas where
profitable returns are greatest, and not necessarily to innovations that will address major
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social problems.205 The patent system also fails to incentivize basic research as protection
(and by extension the incentive) is only available for practical inventions.206 Despite the
considerable suffering caused by malaria in Africa, there is little effort exerted by major
pharmaceutical companies to develop vaccines or therapies.207 The criticism of pecuniary
incentives distorting research trajectories is not new. In the mid-19th century it was
suggested that there would be more inventions if inventors spent less time trying to create
patentable inventions and more time working on non-patentable improvements.208 A
better system for encouraging the production and distribution of intellectual goods should
encourage a wide range of incentives, and not focus exclusively on pecuniary
motivators.209
ii. Pecuniary Incentives Distort Labour Markets
The focus on pecuniary incentives is further complicated by the problem of valuing
intellectual goods. IP creates a mechanism whereby its producer can capture the full
social value of their work.210 Although most individuals involved in the production of
creative works and inventions forfeit the right to collect the entire social value of their
work through conditions of employment or other contracts, the concept that an individual
(or his or her employer) should capture the entire social value of their work is foreign to
many fields. Governmental leaders, doctors and teachers all make considerable
contributions to society, yet are remunerated at levels below the total social value of their
work. Teachers in particular represent a field of workers who are compensated far below
the social value they produce.211 Findings from a recent study on kindergarten classes
and future earnings potential suggest that a skilled teacher can raise the income of a class
of 20 students by $170,000 USD per year over an average teacher. 212 Despite the
enormous contribution skilled kindergarten teachers make, they are remunerated at a
much lower level.213 IP allows rights holders to capture the full social value of their
creations by internalizing positive externalities; however, no such similar benefit exists
for owners of real property.214 Because of this anomaly, labour markets become distorted
by overvaluing artistic and inventive work.215 Individuals who may consider employment
in socially necessary fields such as health and education may ultimately be lured toward
the production of less socially valuable but more profitable artistic and inventive work.216
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Although artistic works and inventions are important it is wasteful from an economic
perspective to over-incentivize this kind of behaviour when labour by skilled individuals
in other fields can create a greater amount of social value. Thus over-incentivization can
result in a decrease in social value,217 and may upset the general economic equilibrium.218
While there is an economic argument for incentivizing socially valuable work, there is no
justification for over-incentivizing intellectual activity.219
iii. Overjustification and the Role of Intrinsic Motivation
An exclusive focus on pecuniary rewards to incentivize creative and inventive activity
ignores a substantial body of literature in the fields of psychology and education that
examine humans’ intrinsic motivations and the impact of rewards on task performance.
The most salient finding of this body of research is that financial rewards can undermine
creativity in tasks for which individuals have an intrinsic motivation.220 This
‘overjustification hypothesis’ as it is known applies even when the extrinsic incentive is
small, so long as there is an underlying intrinsic motivation.221 Human beings cannot
simply be instructed to be creative, and rewards can diminish creativity.222 Diminished
creativity will occur even if the payment for the activity is made in advance.223 Studies
of commissioned versus noncommissioned works of art have found that artists are more
creative when their works are noncommissioned than when they are paid in advance.224
There are specific situations where rewards can be used to enhance intrinsic motivation,
but empirical evidence cautions against making categorical statements on the importance
of rewards, which includes IP rights.225 There is some recognition in economics of the
limitations of outside motivators. Stiglitz argues that economic analyses need to
recognize that in many cases intrinsic rewards are more powerful than extrinsic ones.226
Over-emphasizing the pecuniary dimension of artistic and creative work devalues other
aspects of creativity, ultimately undermining the purpose of such incentives.227
It must be noted that there is no consensus on the influence of rewards on motivation with
not only hundreds of competing studies but contradictory conclusions drawn from metaanalyses.228 Studies from the education sector have tended to focus on primary and
secondary school children, but the negative influence of rewards has also been observed

115
to a lesser degree in college students.229 Intrinsic motivations are not reducible to a single
metric like pecuniary incentives and may also clash with each other. As a result the
balancing of incentives, both intrinsic and extrinsic, is not a simple optimization
problem.230 The key point here is that an exclusive focus on pecuniary gain to stimulate
creativity ignores not only the findings of a large body of scholarly research, but the
concept that human beings have intrinsic motivations.
The economic approach to human behaviour is useful for examining economic activities,
but is limited by the fact that for many activities it is difficult to isolate the economic
dimension from the social, political and cultural ones. This is particularly true in the case
of the production of intellectual goods. Homo economicus is an overly simple model, and
one that is particularly ill-suited for modeling the behaviour of artists and inventors.
Despite its limitations, it has become increasingly common for both economists and
courts to reduce complex human activity into an incentivization discourse. This
discourse not only has negative economic consequences, but more importantly ignores
human nature. The following section examines humans’ natural inclination to engage in
creative and inventive behaviour, before concluding by reframing the incentives problem
as one of creating incentives for distribution not production.
III. Intellectual Activity and Homo Sapiens
This section concludes the examination of incentives by focusing first on the human
species’ natural propensity to engage in creative and inventive behaviour and then by
concluding with a reframing of the incentives problem as a question of incentives for
distribution not production.
A. Humans as Naturally Inventive and Creative
The dominant utilitarian justification for IP places central emphasis on the use of
incentives. Before endorsing the idea that pecuniary incentives are the best way to
encourage the production of intellectual goods, it is necessary to ask whether incentives,
let alone financial ones, are required at all. Numerous scholars contend that the
motivation to engage in artistic and inventive activity exists without IP.231 IP clearly
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creates a set of incentives to create; however, one must question if incentivizing
intellectual goods production is a problem in need of a solution.232 Although the
incentives argument is frequently used to justify their role of intellectual property in
spurring creative and inventive behaviour, there is little scrutiny given to the idea that
incentives are required to produce such behaviour. Several areas of intellectual
endeavour have flourished without IP protection including fashion, language, jokes,
magic tricks, mathematics, and culinary techniques.233 Landes and Posner note:
Given the emphases of the existing scholarly and popular literature concerned with
intellectual property, it may come as a surprise to many readers that the economic arguments
that we make for intellectual property protection are not based primarily on a belief that
without legal protection the incentives to create such property would be inadequate. That
belief cannot be defended confidently on the basis of current knowledge. 234

Because the necessity of incentives question is unresolved, it is important to question
why such an emphasis on incentives. Posner argues that incentivization discourse is
ideologically conservative, stating:
It is the implicit modern liberal conception of the average person – good, but inept, and for
both reasons not very responsive to incentives, though perhaps rather plastic. The implicit
conservative of the average person, in contrast, is that he is competent but bad; hence
conservatives emphasize incentives and constraints. 235

The body of literature on intrinsic motivation and the flourishing of non-IP protected
categories of inventive and creative behaviour suggest that to some degree Posner’s
conservative view of the average person is flawed. Even if one accepts the premise that
incentives for intellectual activity are required, it does not necessarily follow that the best
incentives are exclusionary rights. The idea that individuals should be financially
compensated for being creative is euro-centric and not a common view across
mankind.236 For many activities pecuniary incentives are inversely related to other
intrinsic motivation.237 In her examination of why writers write, Margaret Atwood notes,
“writers too must eat,”238 but she also finds that the desire for money is only a minor
incentive with incentives such as revenge and attracting the attention of the opposite sex
being more common.239 Given the salience of other motives, policymakers must question
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how alternative incentive structures can be mobilized to encourage the production and
distribution of intellectual goods.240 Intellectual goods policy must not lose sight of the
fact that humans are naturally creative.241
An important stumbling block in intellectual goods policy is that human creativity is
poorly understood by policymakers and legal scholars.242 Creativity cannot be produced
simply by trying, and many individuals who have had previous success in creative fields
find that the harder they try to be creative the less likely they are to succeed. 243 While
necessity may be the mother of invention, serendipity is the accidental father.
Economic approaches to copyright tend to view creativity as something that can be
incentivized (and the IP system a whole as something that can be optimized for
efficiency).244 Optimization is a particularly problematic concept. Human creativity is
highly variable and not well suited to quantitative reductionism.245 The range of global
cultures implies there is no single, optimal incentive.246 While it is possible to optimize in
cases where there is a single common metric (time, money, etc.), creative and inventive
activity draws on a range of motivations including money, the desire for recognition and
reputation, and intrinsic motives that do not suit this calculus.
Returning to the tension between incentive and access provides a useful starting point for
reevaluating the role of incentives. Policies on intellectual goods including IP need to
confront a central question - are the policy objectives to simply stimulate the production
of intellectual creations or do they aim for the broader goal of encouraging the
distribution and access to such creations?247 Simply relying on IP because it is an
incentive for artistic and inventive behaviour is insufficient; the policy goal should be to
have the best incentives system to incent the most desirable activity.248 Because humans
are naturally inventive and creative, policy should focus then on maximizing the benefit
of this inherent trait. The economic framing of the incentive problem is insufficient and
distortionary. The proper frame for the role of incentives in intellectual goods policy
must be encouraging broad distribution without impairing the complex range of
incentives that exist to create. The concluding section of this chapter focuses on this
problem.

118
B. Incentives to Create versus Incentives to Share
The explicit goal of IP as evinced in the U.S. Constitution and a long line of AngloAmerican case law is progress.249 If the sole purpose of IP was to create incentives, then
IP rights should be perpetual and without limitation. The focus on incentives to create is
misplaced, and more attention must be placed on the way policy can be used to create
incentives to disseminate and minimize secrecy.250 Intellectual goods policy must be
mindful that the incentivization of new artistic works is not a policy problem; the low
wages and poor bargaining position of artists vis a vis publishers reflects the fact that
there is an excess supply of artistic works.251 Focusing on incentives for distribution
suggests that moral rights should be given a more prominent role. Artists have long
struggled to find avenues for expression, and publishers have taken on the important and
risk bearing role of facilitating such distribution. However, the increased focus on
pecuniary incentives in the form of IP is upsetting important and delicate balance
between incentives and access. The current focus on pecuniary incentives gives
publishers of creative works too much of an incentive to control their work as they
attempt to extract the maximum possible revenue the market will bear, and firms are
incented to amass patents and leverage them for their strategic value. Such an approach
ultimately undermines the goal of progress by limiting access, and does not reflect the
actual incentives that motivate many artists and creators.
The strongest argument for the existing intellectual property system is that it does create
incentives to disclose inventive findings or share creative works instead of keeping such
activity secret.252 The danger of perpetual secrecy of information is much worse than the
danger posed by IP rights.253 With respect to invention there are strong incentives for
corporations to keep knowledge secret.254 In this regard trade secrets are worse than
copyrights and patents as there is no disclosure of information;255 however, patent
applications have also faced increasing criticism for failing to clearly disclose meaningful
information on the subject matter being claimed.256
A holistic examination of the issue of incentives for intellectual goods production and
distribution elucidates the fact that the economic incentive is far from the only factor. No
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one can deny that authors and inventors require subsistence, but the conclusion that
stronger pecuniary incentives in the form of exclusionary rights are the only or best way
to encourage intellectual activity is fallacious. The primary problem is not incentives to
create, but developing policy to ensure that the fruits of creation can be widely enjoyed.
IP can have a role to play, but it is not the only mechanism to encourage the production
and distribution of intellectual goods. Alternative systems must be given a more
prominent role. The economic framing of the incentives problem suits the interest of
rights holding organizations that maximize returns from human creativity and
inventiveness, and reflects the increasing valorization of the self-interested single minded
pursuit of profit. However, the expansionary IP regime with its seemingly everexpanding pecuniary incentives has dynamic consequences. The diminution of access,
escalating litigation and wasteful rent seeking are threatening and in some cases even
impeding innovation.
Given the problems generated by an overreliance on pecuniary incentives, substantive
alternatives to IP must use a broader range of incentives structures to encourage the
production and distribution of intellectual goods. As demonstrated by the case of
academic scholarship, reputational incentives are not only powerful, but they can be
harnessed to incent activity that can produce an array of socially useful innovatory
outcomes. Pecuniary incentives premised on rhetoric of the romantic author/inventor do
encourage innovative activity; however, they are only one of a swath of incentives that
achieve this goal. Pecuniary incentives are themselves distortionary and condition
innovation in areas where authors and inventors can expect the greatest profits.
However, innovation is not simply an economic phenomenon, and if governments are
going to provide stimuli for innovation they should ensure that any resulting innovation
can address political, social and moral problems as well as economic ones. As such
policymakers must provide a broad range of incentive structures to ensure a flourishing
innovation ecosystem.
However, simply providing a wide spectrum of incentives is insufficient. Innovation
policy must also be theoretically informed and based on evidence. The next chapter
explores the subject of innovation by examining its theoretical and economic dimensions,
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and the empirical literature on IP and innovation and then concludes by discussing how
alternatives to IP can spur innovation while still ensuring access.
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Chapter Five – Innovation
Writing on the subject of innovation is not a new phenomenon. Francis Bacon wrote an
essay on the topic 500 years ago arguing that time was the greatest innovator.1 The early
political economists wrote on the subject of invention with its role being discussed within
the first dozen pages of both The Wealth of Nations and The Communist Manifesto.2 In
the 21st century the term has become increasingly ubiquitous appearing in everything
from television advertisements to corporate mission, vision and values statements, and
government policy objectives.
Although the concept of innovation is not complex, the term suffers from definitional
imprecision. One recent study involved interviews with over 50 business leaders, and
found that no two individuals approached the concept in the same way.3 Commonly a
reductionist view of innovation is adopted that defines it as simply a new product or new
process. Innovation should be treated as a far richer and nuanced concept. To be
innovative a product or processes must not simply be new, but an improvement over what
exists. Innovation should not just be limited to products and processes but should also
include new forms of organization. The most significant innovations of Henry Ford were
not the cars themselves, but the Taylorist assembly line production techniques, the $5 a
day wage and eight hour work day and the in general the idea of mass production and
corresponding mass consumption.4 Attention must also be paid to the difference between
the act of invention and the truly innovative step of seeing an invention through to
something that diffused throughout society. Edison did not invent the incandescent light
bulb, but he is the innovator who was able to push forward the development of
commercial systems of incandescent lighting.5 More importantly, innovation must not be
construed only in narrow economic terms. While innovation is all too often conflated
with technical advances, innovations in social relations, norms and values are more
important. Although the Industrial Revolution brought many new inventions, the most
important innovations were social and in particular the rise of individualism and
rationalism.6 The sub-thesis for this chapter posits that innovation is not simply the
production of new goods and services. Innovation is a far broader concept and must
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reflect that innovations should not simply be new but an improvement on what exists.
Innovation also includes organizational structures; it is a complex process that deals with
not only the production of new ideas but the diffusion of the ideas, and most importantly
also includes changes to values and social norms.
Rather than adopt a specific definition of innovation, this chapter proceeds by
recognizing the richness and complexity of the term, but also highlighting how it is
increasingly employed in a narrow and uncritical economic sense. The empirical
evidence provided in this chapter demonstrates that IP is at best a moderate incentive for
innovation. Empirical research also suggests that in some cases IP fetters innovation, and
encourages socially wasteful litigation. Such litigation is especially problematic because
it functions as a tax on innovative activity by diverting resources away from productive
innovation and towards legal battles. This chapter also provides the cases of open access
scholarly publishing and open source software that demonstrate that socially valuable
innovation occurs in the absence of exclusionary rights. These findings clearly evince
that the maximalist approach to IP found in the expansionary regime is not the best
approach to ensuring high levels of innovation. Crucially it should be noted that the
reliance on IP to engender innovation is particularly problematic because it uses powerful
exclusionary rights that limit access to intellectual works. The reliance on IP results in
not only dampened prospects for innovation, but creates a situation where the fruits of
innovation are only available to those who have the financial means to purchase or
license the resulting intellectual goods and services. Given that innovation is an
important policy objective (politically, socially and economically), policymakers must
provide support for substantive alternatives to IP to ensure a vibrant innovation
framework. Reliance on IP, which results in commodification and limits on access
should not be the sole or first approach; rather, it should only be employed as a last resort
where other mechanisms have failed.
This chapter begins with an examination of the theoretical models of innovation created
by Schumpeter and Arrow. The second section then examines the economics of
innovation looking in particular at some of the problems innovation poses for economic
analysis and economic insights on the potential limitations of innovation. The third
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section provides a detailed discussion of the connection between intellectual goods and
innovation examining the empirical evidence on IP, the connection between artistic and
creative work and innovation, potential dangers of too many IP rights and concluding
with a discussion of how alternatives to IP can facilitate innovation. In the next chapter
this discussion then leads into a review of the ideological aspects of innovation before
concluding with an analysis of the connection between IP, innovation and theories of the
information society.
I. Theoretical Approaches to Innovation
Theoretical models of innovation provide a critical starting point for the analysis of the
subject. In this regard the discourse is dominated by the debate between two models,
those of Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow. Schumpeter wrote on the subject of
innovation repeatedly and his work actually contains two contrasting models of
innovation based on how market structure influences innovation. Arrow also addresses
the relationship between market structure and innovation, yet he argues that the best
approach is government financing of innovation. The important aspect of the
Schumpeter-Arrow debate is not the influence of market structure, which has dominated
subsequent analyses, but the array of insightful points by both authors on the subject of
innovation that have been lost by a rigid focus on market structure. This section begins
with a detailed examination of Schumpeter’s writing on innovation examining both his
earlier and later writings on the subject as they present a markedly different model of
innovation. It examines Arrow’s work before concluding with a discussion of the
empirical literature that has arisen out of the Schumpeter-Arrow debate.
A. Schumpeter and Creative Destruction
Joseph Schumpeter is commonly viewed as the scholar who first gave the concept of
innovation a central role in economic analysis, and his work continues to have a strong
influence on innovation scholars.7 Though he wrote on the subject repeatedly his work is
inconsistent; however, throughout his writings there are numerous insightful claims on
the role of innovation in capitalism and the motives of the entrepreneur. Schumpeter first
approached the subject of innovation in his 19118 work The Theory of Economic
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Development.9 Schumpeter argues that innovation is the primary driver of economic
growth noting that the classical economists overemphasized the role of savings.10
Schumpeter’s focus on examining how economic development established new
equilibrium points in the economy builds on the work of Walras who first proposed the
idea of general economic equilibrium.11 Schumpeter takes a broad view of innovation
noting that it came in five different forms: new products, new methods of production for
existing products, new sources of supply of raw materials or other inputs, the opening of
new markets, or new organizations of industry.12 Innovations are not driven by consumer
demands, but arise from producers seeking entrepreneurial profit.13 Furthermore,
innovative firms are not established players in an industry, but new entrants seeking to
displace older firms.14 The availability of credit is central for financing innovation as it
allowed for means of production currently in use to be innovatively repurposed.15
In The Theory of Economic Development, Schumpeter also carefully considers the
motivation of innovators. He specifically suggests that innovation is the function of
entrepreneurs who are conceptually distinct from capitalists (owners of the means of
production).16 While capitalists are driven by profit, entrepreneurs are motivated by three
factors: a desire for wealth, a desire for success and social standing and intrinsic motives
such as, “exercising one’s energy and ingenuity.”17 In assessing these various motives he
specifically notes that pecuniary gain is only a necessary condition in the first of the three
motives, and argues that other, non-pecuniary motives for innovation have been
ignored.18 This observation remains true today. He also states that innovators, those who
execute new combinations of productive forces, are not necessarily inventors and that
invention and innovation should not be conflated.19 Schumpeter posits that innovative
behaviour is not rational in the traditional economic sense, and rejects using the model of
economic man to explain the action of innovators.20 He writes, “the choice of new
methods is not simply an element in the concept of rational economic action, nor a
matter of course, but a distinct process that stands in need of special explanation,”21 and
adds that innovation, “presupposes aptitudes different in kind and not only in degree from
those of mere rational economic behavior.”22 The theory of economic growth described
by Schumpeter, clearly celebrates the role of innovation; however, it also carefully
constructs a view of innovators distinct from homo economicus and the traditional
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capitalist.
Although Schumpeter placed specific emphasis on the importance of innovation to
growth in The Theory of Economic Development, in his later writing he significantly
revised his conception of innovation. In Business Cycles (originally published in 1939),
Schumpeter expands his definition of innovation as simply, “‘doing things differently’ in
the realm of economic life,”23 and reduces the motives for innovation to the search for
profit.24 The innovative dynamism of capitalism is still driven by producers seeking to
create new products and find cost saving ways of producing existing materials.25 In
1942’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy he further alters his theory of innovation as
the locus of innovation is no longer new entrants in competitive markets,26 but
established firms in monopoly positions.27 He introduces the idea of “creative
destruction” arguing that it was an essential feature of capitalism and the driver of
innovation.28 Schumpeter stresses that the primary benefits of innovation are in
improving the quality of existing items;29 however, he also noted that innovation is not
solely positive and almost always creates unemployment.30 Finally he also warned that
capitalism’s creation of new wants makes satiation a fleeting goal.31
Schumpeter also addresses the role played by patents. He argues that patents along with
trade secrecy and long term contracts act as mechanisms that inhibit the destabilizing
aspects of creative destruction and are used to secure entrepreneurial profits.32 Though
patents limit the effect of creative destruction, he explicitly posits that they are
economically beneficial and do not grant monopoly power.33 Schumpeter was also
cognizant of some of the strategic behaviour engendered by IP rights, noting that in
oligopolistic markets firms would buy up patents and not use them simply to encumber
competitors.34 Another observation from over 50 years ago that is perhaps more true than
when it was first written.
Schumpeter again returns to the subjects of motives and the entrepreneur. He is critical
of the fact that incentives are pecuniary in nature, often larger than they need be to incent
the activity and highly skewed in distribution to a “minority of winners.”35 Schumpeter
worries that under capitalism innovation would be reduced to routine and
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entrepreneurship would be automated.36 For Schumpeter such an evolution is dangerous
to the future success of capitalism as once entrepreneurial motives become limited, the
propelling force of the economy becomes undermined.37
There are several consistent themes throughout Schumpeter’s writing on innovation, and
a few marked inconsistencies. Throughout his work, Schumpeter depicts the role of the
entrepreneur as central, and clearly emphasizes that the entrepreneur is not the profitdriven homo economicus. He also forcefully argues that technological change is not
some exogenous feature of the capitalist system, but a central endogenous one. He does,
however, considerably alter his opinion on what type of market structure best engenders
innovation. The early Schumpeter posited that competitive markets were the source of
innovation, while in later years he argues that monopolists are the primary innovators.
Schumpeter’s contribution to the understanding of the role of innovation is threefold.
First, he is the first scholar to place technological change at the centre of economic
growth. Second, though he does not have a detailed account of how innovation actually
occurs, he does provide a careful and nuanced description of the innovator particularly in
his earlier writing. Third, though his opinion does change, he links innovation with
market structure. Most importantly though, Schumpeter’s approach to innovation
highlights that it is individuals (entrepreneurs), organizational forms (market structures)
and a range of incentives not just IP rights (or their alternatives) that are the propelling
force of innovation.
B. Arrow and the Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity
In 1962 Kenneth Arrow provided an alternative to Schumpeter’s creative destruction
view of innovation. Arrow’s analysis begins by highlighting a central aspect of
attempting to engage in innovative behavior – the undertaking of research and invention
is inherently risky because it is uncertain that the allocation of time and money to
inventive behavior will succeed.38 Contra Schumpeter, Arrow posits that for both
product and process innovations firms in a competitive market have a greater incentive to
invent than monopolists.39 Arrow goes further though by arguing that regardless of the
type of innovation or market structure, social welfare is not maximized because the
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realized social benefits of innovation always exceed firms’ incentive to innovate.40 Thus,
Arrow concludes, “for the optimal allocation to invention it would be necessary for the
government or some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to finance
research and invention.”41 He highlights two potential problems with a government
funded innovation; the difficulty in calculating the amount of resources to allocate to
innovative activity,42 and how to ensure that funds would be used efficiently, though he
does argue that these problems cannot be overcome.43 Arrow’s approach unequivocally
suggests that a market centric approach to innovation that relies on patents is sub-optimal
as it will underallocate resources to innovation.
Arrow’s essay includes several profound economic insights on the production and
distribution of information. A central problem in valuing information is that the purchaser
of information cannot know its value until he or she possesses it.44 He also stresses the
role of other non-pecuniary incentives in spurring research giving the example of
university researchers.45 Patents are viewed as a sub-optimal appropriation mechanism as
they do not provide full appropriability and therefore their incentive effect is reduced.46
Most importantly Arrow makes several critical comments on the distribution of
information. He notes that if the transmission of information could be made costless,
“then optimal allocation would obviously call for unlimited distribution of the
information without cost.”47 He warns that there exist numerous difficulties in creating a
market for information as the “optimal allocation [of information] calls for free
distribution.”48 Finally if there are limitations on the distribution of information (such as
intellectual property mechanisms) then not only will innovative activity become less
efficient, but the amount of innovation will also suffer.49
Arrow’s model of innovation is important on two levels. On one hand Arrow’s analysis
stands counter to older Schumpeter with the latter seeing monopolists having a superior
incentive to innovation, while the former considers competitive markets are more
conducive to innovation. On a broader level, Arrow provides numerous arguments
against the artificial creation of information markets through government intervention.
The realization of networked computing technologies which allow the transmission of
information at a cost approaching zero strengthens his arguments that the optimal
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solution is not a market based approach that relies on patents, but the incentivization of
innovative behavior through other channels.
C. Schumpeter, Arrow and the Empirical Literature on Innovation
The Schumpeter-Arrow debate has had a powerful influence on innovation scholarship;
however, both models have also been subject to a substantial degree of criticism. Even
amongst Schumpeterians there are disagreements as to how to interpret his writings in
Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy with the primary disagreement centering on
whether Schumpeter meant large firms are more innovative or monopolists are more
innovative.50 He has been critiqued for not actually having a theory of innovation
(instead focusing on innovation as part of a theory of economic development),51 and for
failing to account for the ability of monopoly power to be self-perpetuating.52
Conversely Arrow’s approach has been critiqued for overestimating the ability for
monopolists to shield themselves from competition.53 Both authors model innovation in
the aggregate failing to account for industry level factors that strongly influence the
relationship between firm size and innovativeness.54
Schumpeter’s theory that large firms would be the sources of innovation has not been
borne out by a number of empirical studies that demonstrate smaller firms tend to be
more innovative.55 Gilbert’s meta-analysis of 18 studies on R&D investment, industry
structure and firm size concludes that Schumpeter’s theory, that large monopolists or
oligopolists are more likely to engage in innovative activity, is correct in the case of small
process innovations but not in other cases.56 Arrow’s belief that competitive markets are
superior to monopolistic ones is also not supported by the empirical evidence that
provides no evidence of a single optimal market structure for producing innovation.57
One of the confounding factors in the Schumpeter-Arrow debate is that studies often fail
to fully account for the differences between product and process innovations, drastic and
non-drastic innovations, and technological opportunities and appropriability conditions
within and between various industries.58 The most robust empirical finding to emerge
from the study of firm size, market structure and innovativeness is the rather unsurprising
conclusion that R&D spending rises monotonically with firm size; however,
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innovativeness increases at a less than proportional rate to firm size.59
Ultimately the empirical evidence provides no clear winner in the Schumpeter-Arrow
debate. However, in one regard the debate itself is in many ways irrelevant. A
concentrated focus on the relationship between market structure and innovation is not the
only or even the most important argument raised by the two authors. Arrow’s primary
thesis was that given the particular characteristics of information, it is best treated as a
public good and supplied by the government. Schumpeter’s analysis of innovation raises
several illuminating points including the importance of non-pecuniary motives for
entrepreneurs. Finally it must be noted that neither of the two scholars place central
emphasis on IP rights with Schumpeter seeing them as an overall positive force, while
Arrow argues that the most economically efficient approach to information is free
distribution. Rather than relying on the simplistic argument that greater levels of
pecuniary incentives will encourage greater levels of innovation, policy should be
theoretically informed by work of Arrow and Schumpeter that demonstrates the
importance of market structure. In particular, Arrow’s insight that free distribution will
maximize innovative activity should be considered before further expanding IP
protection. Though analyses of IP place central emphasis on the relationship between
individual incentives and innovation, it is telling that the two primary economic theories
of innovation recast the debate in terms of market structures and innovation treating
intellectual property rights as a largely peripheral issue.
II. The Economics of Innovation
While innovation is a concept that has implications for a range of disciplines it has
attracted the highest degree of attention in the field of economics. Economic thought
posits that innovation is the primary source of economic growth; however, there is no
unified theory of innovation within the discipline. Furthermore, innovation is a
particularly difficult concept for economists because it is difficult to measure. Though
economic analyses often venerate innovation, the discipline also recognizes that the rate
and direction of innovation can be problematic. This section reviews the economics of
innovation by examining the arguments laid out above.

138
A. The Economic Importance of Innovation
Interest over the causes of economic growth can be traced to the 17th century; however,
an explicit focus on the role of technological change and innovation has only concerned
economists for slightly more than the last half century.60 Though Schumpeter was the
first author to give innovation a paramount function in economics, his work did not have
a large degree of influence on mainstream neoclassical economists mostly due to the fact
that he wrote in prose and not mathematics.61 Rather than Schumpeter, it is Robert
Solow who is credited with giving primary importance to the role of technological
change in economic growth. In a 1957 article Solow argued that 87.5 percent of the
growth in productivity in the U.S. from 1909-1949 was attributed to technological
change.62 Since Solow’s Nobel Prize winning work, innovation has continued to take on
a role of increasing importance both within economics directly and more broadly in
social theory.63
The primary connection between innovation and economic growth hinges on the
relationship between innovation and productivity. Innovations, specifically process
innovations, facilitate gains in productivity by allowing the production of more units of
output for a constant level of inputs. Increases in productivity free up capital and labour
for new economic uses, which drive economic growth. It is important to note that the
economic valorization of innovation is not premised on the idea that innovation will
result in increased living standards, but instead on increased wealth. However, the theory
of trickle down benefits of wealth creation first developed by Smith64 provides a
theoretical link between innovation and the economic improvement of the masses. The
economic significance of innovation is not without its own complications. The first
section below examines the theoretical and methodological problems innovation presents
for economic analyses, and the second section reviews how innovation can be
economically harmful.
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B. Difficulties in the Economic Analysis of Innovation
i. Theoretical Problems Posed by Innovation
Within the profession there is considerable disagreement over how to treat the
phenomenon of technological change. The neoclassical approach, including Solow’s
work, treats innovation as an exogenous factor (like manna from the heavens),65 while
heterodox analyses (including Schumpeter’s) treat innovation as endogenous and further
deviate from the neoclassical model by allowing increasing returns and the assumption of
monopolistic rather than competitive markets.66 These theoretical differences prevent the
discipline from developing a singular unified theory of innovation. Solow even
acknowledges that logic of the production of information and knowledge may be
orthogonal to the economic logic of input and outputs.67 From a welfare perspective, IP
mechanisms are a second best solution as the optimal system of knowledge production is
free distribution.68 The neoclassical approach does not have any detailed theory of
entrepreneurship, and unlike Schumpeter, treats the entrepreneurs as simply another
factor in production.69 Economic policy emphasizes R&D investment and innovation in
high technology sectors; however, this policy is disjunctive from the reality that most of
the world’s population does not have the means to make use of such technologies.70
Despite the importance of innovation in economic growth, economic theory remains
unable to unequivocally answer the central question of whether intellectual property
rights increase innovation or social welfare.71 Even WIPO acknowledges that it is
difficult to determine the exact nature of the role IP plays in economic growth.72 One of
the factors confounding economic analyses of innovation is the fact that innovation is
very difficult to measure.
ii. The Innovation Measurement Problem
Unlike GDP, employment, purchasing power parity, consumer confidence and a range of
other economic indicators innovation is difficult to quantify.73 Though interest in
innovation measurement has increased significantly, it is still in its infancy74 with the
most advanced measurement techniques being developed by the OECD.75 Inputs to
innovation such as R&D spending or employment of engineers, researchers and scientists
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are common but imprecise because they fail to focus on outputs.76 Because of the
connection between productivity and innovation some economists recommend using
productivity indicators as proxies for innovation.77 Two common measures are labour
productivity growth and total factor productivity growth; however, these are not direct
indicators of innovation. Patents are often seen as another proxy for innovation because
they facilitate quantitative analysis,78 but are limited because they only indicate
innovative activity that results in patentable outcomes. In 2010 the European
Commissioner for Research and Innovation released a report that included five indicators
of innovation only one of which dealt specifically with IP (patent applications weighted
by GDP).79 Trademarks, not copyrights, are also used as a measure of innovative
activity, but the OECD acknowledges that one of the primary reasons for looking at
trademarks is because the information is publicly available.80 IP forms only a small set of
the possible indicators, and the OECD’s recent policy document on innovation
measurement contains 46 classes of indicators only 10 of which involve IP.81 One
example of the problem of determining the appropriate metrics for measuring innovation
was the so called Productivity Paradox (also known as the Solow Paradox) that received a
considerable degree of attention in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The paradox seemed
to suggest that investments in IT failed to produce gains in productivity; however, a
major problem in many of the studies was the difficulty in measuring productivity.82
Crucially though there are a wide range of economic proxies for innovation, the most
important problem is the lack of mechanisms for examining the social impacts of
innovation.83
While economists keenly appreciate that innovation is central to economic growth, they
lack a clear understanding of the exact nature of the connection. This understanding is
further impaired by the fact that innovation is not necessarily economically beneficial.
The next section examines how the rate and direction of innovation can be economically
injurious.
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C. The Rate and Direction of Innovation
i. The Rate of Innovation
Although more innovation is generally viewed positively, too rapid a rate of innovation
creates several economic problems. As implied by the name, creative destruction does
have destructive elements which can outweigh any resulting benefits. Net reductions in
social wealth result if the cost of developing a new innovation and value of the existing
assets made obsolete exceed the value of the new innovation.84 Excessive innovation can
cause equipment to be obsolete too rapidly, and Plant, writing in 1933, posited that this
contributed to the Great Depression.85 Rapid rates of change lead to uncertainty and
unpredictability that undermines the ability of governments and corporations to plan
effectively.86 Achieving short term economic growth through innovation can produce
dynamic effects that undermine consumer confidence and ultimately diminish the long
term equilibrium point of the economy.87 For example if the rate of new product
development becomes too quick in an area, consumers may significantly delay purchases.
Quick changes in labour quality requirements can unsettle labour markets causing
workers to become unemployed and employers lacking qualified personnel.88
Excessive spending on innovation is also wasteful. There exists a level of spending on
innovation where social welfare suffers as resources devoted to artistic and inventive
activity could be better spent elsewhere.89 Socially wasteful patent races occur because
from the perspective of individual firms the potential windfall from winning the race
justifies the expenditures, but in the aggregate, R&D outlays by the race’s losers
outweigh the private and social gains from any resulting innovation.90 Problematically,
because of the inherent risk in innovative activity it is only possible to determine if
investments in innovation are wealth creating ex post not ex ante. If the costs of
developing and introducing an innovation are greater than the expected increase in social
welfare, then the innovation should be discouraged.91 Leapfrogging innovations can
prove highly disruptive as previous markets are destroyed and goods and services
rendered obsolete.92 In turn rates of innovation encourage the strategic use of intellectual
property to limit potential paths of innovation as in the case of patents on the electric
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car.93 Such strategic uses of IP clearly hamper innovation. Though it is easy to venerate
the benefits of rapid innovation, it is important to be mindful of the destructive elements
brought by Schumpeter’s perennial gale.
ii. The Direction of Innovation
In addition to the danger posed by too high a rate of innovation, spending on innovation
can also be misdirected. Attempting innovation is an inherently risky endeavour as it is
not clear what innovations will ultimately be successful. A notable example of
misdirected spending on innovation is supersonic civilian air transportation, which
resulted in billions of dollars being invested in development to only limited success.
Though England and France successfully developed the Concorde plane it was
abandoned in 2003, while both the Soviet ‘Concordski’ and U.S. Supersonic Transport
(SST) projects to create a similar plane failed.94 Though the billions invested did
contribute to advances in aerospace technology, from an ex post perspective (and only
from an ex post perspective) they could have been used more effectively elsewhere.
Furthermore, the uncertain nature of innovation paths and market development do not
ensure that superior technologies succeed in the long run.95 Due to self-reinforcing
mechanism and positive feedbacks inferior technologies can come to dominate superior
ones. The more efficient rotary internal combustion engine has failed to displace the
inferior reciprocating engine despite a significant investment in the technology by
General Motors in the 1970s.96 In a similar vein, JVC’s open licensing of the VHS
standard was critical to its success in the consumer market over Sony’s Betamax, which
offered superior picture quality (though VHS did offer greater tape length).97 Although
innovation tends to result in superior outputs, the uncertainty and complexity of market
forces fail to ensure that the market supplies the best of what is available.
Market-directed innovation also fails to ensure that resulting innovation is the most
socially beneficial. While there have been a substantial number of new technologies
produced in the past several decades, since the 1970s there has been little progress on
creating new areas of stable, well paid employment.98 In the case of pharmaceuticals
research has been directed away from illnesses facing the world’s poor and towards
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lifestyle drugs.99 IP distorts innovation paths as existing rights holders expend money on
attempting to strengthen their monopolies while competitors are forced to invent
around.100 Firms have a tendency to over-invest in R&D for product lines where there is
stiff competition and systematically under-invest for products and processes where
competition is weak, which ultimately leaves some fruitful technological paths
underdeveloped.101 It is important to note that the problem of misdirected innovation is
not unique to the IP system as there is no way of determining if the best innovation path
is chosen ex ante.102 However, the IP system’s intimate connection with the market
ensures that the direction of innovation is shaped by the pursuit of profit and self-interest
and not the common good.
Innovation plays a central role in economic growth and as such is often extolled as a key
economic policy. While celebrated, the discipline has no consistent theory on innovation.
It has ignored some of the crucial insights from early theorists, lacks the appropriate
metrics for measuring innovation and can only rely on ex post analysis to judge the
usefulness and value of innovation. At a minimum these considerable shortcomings
should cause concern when innovation is used to justify exclusionary rights. When
compounded with the limitations of IP to generate innovation, examined in the following
section, the economic justification for IP is seriously imperiled.
III. Intellectual Goods and Innovation
Given the problematic nature of innovation for economics it is unsurprising that the
connection between intellectual goods and innovation is poorly understood. This section
examines the connection between intellectual goods and innovation and reveals that the
assumed link between IP and innovation is greatly overstated. An expanding body of
empirical evidence, mostly concentrated on patents, provides at best weak support for IP.
The role of copyright and artistic endeavours in facilitating (or impeding) innovation is
often underemphasized. The dangers of too much IP have only recently begun to attract
significant attention. Finally, the increasing importance of alternatives to intellectual
property demonstrates that IP is not the only, or even the best way to encourage the
production and distribution of intellectual goods.
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A. Empirical Evidence on Intellectual Property and Innovation
This section examines the empirical literature on IP, which is mostly concentrated on
patents, in the following areas: the lack of causation between IP and innovation, the
dampening of innovation through the strategic use of IP, the patent application backlog
problem, the rising costs of litigation, the tenuous connection between IP and R&D, and
the limitations of empirical evidence in supporting claims about innovation.
i. Lack of Correlation/Causation between IP and Innovation
The central purpose of intellectual property is to foster innovation under the dominant
utilitarian framework;103 however, an examination of the empirical literature presents an
unconvincing case for IP as innovation stimulus. One of the most salient points from
empirical research on the patent system is that the easy availability of patents increases
patenting activity, although this does not necessarily imply an increase in innovation.104
Most inventions are not patented evincing that IP protection is clearly not central to
innovation.105 A study of European firms covering a wide range of economic sectors
revealed that only one third of product innovations and one fifth of process innovations
are ever patented.106 Several industries that have only recently been afforded intellectual
property protection (such as finance and software) have histories of innovation well
before being afforded intellectual property protection,107 and entire civilizations such as
China have a history of innovation without IP.108 Literary and dramatic works have been
produced throughout history without the expectation of monopoly profits.109 Even in
high technology sectors such as software and semiconductors IP protection does not
appear necessary to spur innovation. Although there has been a rapid uptake in software
patents in the 1994 to 1997 period, it was manufacturing firms not software companies
which obtained three quarters of such patents.110 The success of open source software
demonstrates that copyright is not required to produce innovation in the field,111 and the
industry was clearly innovative before business method patents allowed the patenting of
software functions.112 The constant rate of innovation in the semiconductor industry has
behaved as predicted by Moore’s Law since the mid-1960s,113 even though
semiconductor topologies only received sui generis IP protection in the 1980s. The surge
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of patenting activity in the semiconductor industry is not the result of improved
innovativeness, but a shift towards an increasingly strategic use of patents as bargaining
chips and as means for smaller design firms to enter the industry.114 The necessity for sui
generis protection for plant varieties is also suspect. Despite the relatively recent
protection provided by UPOV, innovation in plant breeding has a long historical record
and has played a critical role in both economics and agriculture since the Neolithic
Revolution.115
Historical studies also fail to demonstrate a strong or convincing link between IP and
innovation. For nearly half of the 19th century (1827 to 1873) the anti-patent movement
in Europe had considerable support including German chancellor Otto von Bismarck.116
Inventions displayed at 19th century World’s Fairs reveal that patents influence the
direction of innovative activity, but patent protection is not a prerequisite for
inventiveness.117 Lerner’s examination of 177 significant shifts in patent policy across
six nations over a 150 year period concluded that strengthening patent protection resulted
in reduced rather than increased patent applications.118 The strengthening of Japan’s
patent system in 1988 was found not to have created an additional innovative effect.119
For a wide range of intellectual endeavours there is strong historical evidence that IP is
not required to produce innovation.
A long line of surveys have demonstrated that IP mechanisms are not the preferred
mechanism for appropriating the returns from innovation, which undermines the
argument that exclusionary rights are a necessary incentive. Empirical analyses on the
most effective appropriation mechanisms are remarkably robust continually showing that
outside of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries lead-time (first mover advantage),
product complexity and secrecy are the preferred stimuli for innovation.120 There are
some differences between countries. Japanese firms tend to view the incentive to
innovate provided by patents comparable to other incentives (such as lead time and the
benefits of complementary manufacturing and complementary sales), while American
firms show a much stronger presence for trade secrecy and lead time.121 Overall though,
the finding that non-IP appropriation mechanisms are preferred has been found in a range
of countries including the United States,122 Canada,123 the United Kingdom,124 Spain,125
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Germany,126 and Japan.127 For firms, the ease of inventing around128 is the main reason
they choose not to patent.129 Even corporations that rely on IP often find it lacking as an
appropriation mechanism. A 1997 Statistics Canada study found only 22% of firms using
copyrights and 34% of firms using patents found the respective IP rights “very” or
“extremely effective.”130 While the pharmaceutical sector is typically found to be the
industry that benefits the most from patent protection, cross country comparisons reveal
that beyond a certain threshold IP protection diminishes the innovativeness of drug
companies.131 Though there is a considerable body of empirical literature on patents it is
important to be mindful that these studies tend to examine large, well established firms
not new entrants who may rely on patents to gain entry into a market; 132 however, recent
data from the United Kingdom demonstrates that small and medium size enterprises
(SMEs) also prefer non-IP appropriation mechanisms (though for U.S. SMEs preference
for patents is on par with lead-time, secrecy, complexity of design and confidentiality
agreements).133 These findings are supported by a survey of early stage biotechnology
and information technology companies in the U.S., which found patents provided only a
slight to moderate incentive for innovative activity.134 The effectiveness of various
appropriability mechanisms is further complicated by spillovers, which tend to serve as a
disincentive to innovate, but may also be a positive incentive when products are
complementary.135 The increasing number of empirical studies on appropriability and IP
demonstrate that non-IP incentives play a much more significant role in inducing
innovation than IP.
The body of literature on empirical studies of non-patent IP devices is considerably
smaller. The EU’s first review of the sui generis protection for databases created in
Directive 96/9/EC concluded that the mechanism, “has had no proven impact on the
production of databases.”136 Several studies have examined the change in the volume of
copyright registrations to see how statutory changes and legal decisions influence the
volume of registered works with a particular focus on the U.S., where important
incentives existed for registering copyrights until 1991.137 However, copyright
registrations are only a limited indicator of innovative activity as the Berne Convention
precludes mandatory registration mechanisms.138 Landes and Posner’s examination of
five statutory changes to copyright law in the U.S. revealed that only two changes, the
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1976 Copyright Act and the 1988 Berne Convention Implementation Act, had a
significant impact on the number of copyright registrations with the former actually
producing a decrease in registrations.139 An analysis of the CTEA determined that it did
not provide any incentives for the creation of new movies in the U.S.140 However, a
larger study of movie production in 26 OECD countries covering 1991-2002, a time
when 19 of the 26 countries extended copyright terms, found that term extensions were
associated with a statistically significant increase in movie production.141 A study of
changes to U.S. and Canadian copyright laws found that copyright registrations were
significantly affected by the cost of registration, but found no compelling evidence that
statutory changes had such an effect.142 The authors conclude by positing that a low cost
registration is the best mechanism to encourage creative innovation.143 The most
significant empirical examination of copyright is the 2009 study by Ku, Sun and Fan
which examined the influence of 56 significant changes in copyright law (both statutory
and case law) on copyright registrations.144 They conclude that the primary driver behind
the increased number of copyright registrations was population growth and suggest that
the evidence does not support the argument that stronger copyright law incents greater
creativity.145 Ku et al. find that laws that weakened copyright protection were more
likely to result in a greater number of works than those that increased protection.146
While some legal changes did have a significant impact on registrations for certain types
of works, the results of change did not evince a uniform or predictable pattern and no
single change had a statistically significant impact on all types of works.147 Expanding
subject matter was found to have a greater likelihood of decreasing registrations rather
than increasing them, while weakening copyright was found to have the opposite
effect.148 In their analysis of their results Ku et al. concluded that the uncertainty of
success in creative markets undermines the incentive argument and argue that homo
economicus is a poorly suited model for predicting creative behaviour.149
Historical evidence, survey data and econometric analysis all demonstrate that though IP
has some role in innovation, it is clearly not the sole and primary drive of innovative
activity. The empirical evidence also reveals that IP is often sought for strategic purposes
with results that undermine the goal of innovation.
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ii. Dampened Innovation through Strategic Use of IP
As noted in chapter four exclusionary IP rights create a powerful set of strategic
incentives, which negatively affect innovative activity. Strengthening patent protection
results in increased strategic use of patents.150 Strategic use of patenting is common in
the U.S., though even more pronounced in Japan.151 A key strategic use of IP is limiting
or facilitating entry into an industry. While some have argued that patents function as
effective barriers to entry in industries producing complex products as entrants are likely
to fear litigation from established players with large patent portfolios,152 this claim does
not have definitive empirical support.153 Yet there are some prominent historical
examples of patents being used to limit entry into an industry. AT&T used its patent
portfolio to dominate the telephone market and General Electric and Westinghouse did
the same for light bulbs.154 For industries producing complex products, large patent
portfolios help to secure a firm’s position as part of an oligopoly.155 Defensive patenting
is used increasingly in the genomics industry as a means of securing freedom to
operate.156 However, there is evidence that expensive genomic databases, which can
have access fees in excess of $100 million, do create a barrier for small firms to use
specific research tools.157 The IP system provides powerful strategic incentives, and
empirical analyses suggest that these strategic uses do occur with innovation limiting
results.
iii. Patent Backlog Problem
As the volume of patent applications increases the patent system is showing increasing
signs of strain. There are concerns that too many low quality patents are being issued.
Though a variety of seemingly absurd patents (such as a method for exercising a cat,158 a
method for swinging on a swing,159 and a method of cutting hair with scissors in both
hands160) are often highlighted in critical literature on the U.S. patent system, the simple
presence of frivolous patents is neither new nor problematic.161 However, a 2003 survey
of members of the Intellectual Property Owners Association revealed that a majority of
respondents favoured raising the bar for patentability.162 As part of an effort to improve
patent quality the USPTO has partnered with the New York Law School to create the
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Peer to Patent program that allows citizens to review applications and submit information
that will assist examiners in determining the state of prior art.163 Japan, South Korea, the
U.K., and Australia have all followed the USPTO lead and established their own Peer to
Patent projects; however, Canada has yet to follow suit.164
The surging volume of patent applications is also resulting in major delays in approvals.
In some cases the EPO may take up to 10 years to process a patent application,165 and the
typical patent application in the U.S. takes nearly three years to process.166 With more
patents being granted in China and Korea there is increasing linguistic diversity in patent
applications making effective searches for prior art more difficult.167 The backlog
problem is most acute in the United States. As of January 2011, the USPTO was faced
with a backlog of over 715,000 patent applications, and although this is down from a high
in January 2009 of over 764,000 applications it still represents a backlog of over 100
patents per patent examiner.168 The USPTO has been forced to respond to the backlog by
introducing Project Exchange. Project Exchange allows applicants with multiple
applications to withdraw those they no longer feel necessary in exchange for more rapid
examination of their other applications.169 The EPO and the Japanese Patent Office (JPO)
also face large backlogs – 490,000 and 870,000 patent applications respectively.170 A
2010 study commissioned by the U.K. Intellectual Property Office determined that
backlogs at the USPTO, EPO and JPO result in over £6 billion in foregone innovation
investment.171 Alison Brimelow, President of the EPO, has suggested that the global
backlog of patent applications does not result from increased R&D activity and threatens
innovation.172 She goes on to argue that the current patent environment creates a great
deal of uncertainty that can be exploited for economic gain, but does not fulfill the
primary policy of patents to encourage innovation and invention.173
iv. The Rising Cost of IP Related Litigation
Increases in patenting activity have also resulted in increased patent infringement cases
(though the rate of law suits to patents has remained steady).174 In the U.S. patent
ligation volumes have tripled since 1980,175 though it should be noted that only 1.5% of
patents are litigated and only 0.1% of patents granted ever go to trial.176 One factor
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exacerbating the tendency towards increased litigation is the lucrative rewards available
in patent infringement cases. Polaroid’s successful suit against Kodak for patent
infringement in the 1980s resulted in a $909 million payday.177 The finding of
infringement was despite the fact that Kodak had retained an independent expert who
reviewed Kodak’s work to ensure it was not infringing.178 The time and monies involved
in litigation represent a social cost with several sources suggesting the average patent
litigation lasts two years and costs $3 million (USD) with even greater costs if there is an
appeal.179 Estimates from the U.K. show that this is not a uniquely American problem,
with the estimated legal cost to challenge a patent in a simple case totaling £750,000 (and
an equally large amount to defend the validity of a patent).180 A legal battle between
pharmaceutical companies Baxter and CellPro resulted in attorney’s fees of $8 million,181
and computer memory maker Infineon spent $8 million defending itself from a frivolous
lawsuit by rival Rambus.182 Bristol-Myeres Squibb spent $26 million defending itself
from a patent infringement case which fortunately it was able to recover from claimant
Rhone-Poulenc.183 In 2001 the cost of legal fees in patent litigation cases exceeded $7
billion in the U.S. alone.184 Because of the 38 patent regimes within Europe, it has been
estimated that duplicate litigation costs result in between €120 and €240 million of
additional costs.185 Bessen and Meurer’s comparison of litigation costs and returns from
patents suggests that outside of the chemical and pharmaceutical sectors, patents, and
litigation costs in particular, provide a net disincentive for innovative activity.186 The
disincentive effect is most acute for large, publicly traded firms who from 1996 to 1999
spent four times the amount in ligation costs than were generated by patent profits.187
Increasing legal fees are reflective of the escalating dollar amounts involved in
infringement cases. The problem of increasing legal costs driven by skyrocketing
infringement damages shows no signs of abating. In 2009 Abbott Laboratories was
ordered to pay Johnson & Johnson $1.67 billion for patent infringement only to have the
verdict overturned in 2011 by CAFC that ruled Johnson & Johnson’s patent invalid.188
While some companies do benefit form jackpot infringement findings, a majority of
companies find patent infringement cases too slow, uncertain and too costly compared to
the benefits.189
The increasing legal costs, along with application costs have resulted in a curious
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empirical finding – with the exception of patents in the medical instruments sector,
patenting a typical invention is a net revenue loser.190 Most patents fail to generate value
for the patent holder, and a study by the JPO concluded that 60% of Japanese patents
were not being used at all.191 The high cost of potential patent litigation disincentivizes
patenting for small firms.192 Even simple legal counsel on applying for a patent can be
costly with estimates putting the average lawyers’ costs in the U.S. and U.K. at
$13,000193 and £13,800 respectively.194 Although expensive, lawyers’ opinions on
validity are highly uncertain.195 Litigation is also symptomatic of low quality patents.
Half of the patents litigated are found to be invalid.196 In the U.S., business method
patents are seven times more likely to be ligated than other patents.197 In addition to the
direct costs of legal fees, litigation has been found to reduce the stock market value of
alleged infringers by 2 percent, which can result in a loss of market value that greatly
exceeds legal fees.198 Litigation from non-practicing entities has also caused substantial
transfers of wealth – primarily to lawyers – with one estimate suggesting that in the past
20 years patent troll litigation has caused an aggregate wealth loss of over half a trillion
dollars in the United States alone.199 While ballooning legal fees are a blessing for the
patent bar, the costs involved represent monies diverted from innovative activity.
v. The Tenuous Connection between IP and R&D
R&D is central to innovation. Investment in research and development not only leads to
innovation, but firms that engage in R&D are more likely to benefit from spillovers when
other firms make technological advances.200 However, the nature of the connection
between IP and R&D is less evident. There is a clear correlation between patents and
R&D; however, the direction of causality is not clear.201 A study of Canadian
manufacturing firms found that of all variables studied (such as firm size, nationality,
technological strategy), R&D expenditure had the most significant impact on innovative
activity.202 However, it also noted that patenting firms are no more likely to be
innovative companies that use other appropriation mechanisms.203 The authors
concluded, “the causal relationship is much stronger going from innovation to the
decision to use patents than from the use of patents to innovation.”204 A Japanese study
on the effects of increased patent scope revealed that for the majority of companies
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expanding patent protection to new fields did not increase research investment.205
Increased R&D spending is also correlated with a higher likelihood of being litigated
against, which may serves as a disincentive to undertaking R&D.206 While studies have
found that patents do induce R&D spending, there is no clear evidence that the
availability of patents increases social welfare.207 The cost of managing IP portfolios and
litigating claims of infringement does consume funds that could be spent on research and
also delays research.208 In industries where there is significant strategic patenting firms
have tended to decrease R&D spending.209 Thus while R&D is central to driving
innovation, IP mechanisms are not, and in some cases may undermine the goal of
innovation.
vi. The Limitations of Empirical Evidence
While extremely useful for evaluating many aspects of the patent system, empirical
evidence is ultimately of little use for determining the degree to which patents spur
innovation or the effects of innovation if the patent system was abolished.210 Although
the amount of empirical evidence on the connection between IP and innovation has been
increased, there is still not enough evidence to make any unequivocal statements as to
whether IP encourages innovation,211 or to conclude which alternatives would best
incentivize the production of intellectual goods.212 Even WIPO acknowledges that,
“inconclusive empirical evidence on patent strength and innovation relationship makes it
difficult to draw any conclusion about the effectiveness of patent system to encourage
R&D investments.”213
Ultimately the ambiguity of the empirical evidence on IP and innovation does not allow
the conclusion that IP always or even predominately undermines innovation. However, it
also does not justify the conclusion that IP is the best system for encouraging innovation.
Although there is increasing empirical evidence, it is remarkable that Penrose’s 60 year
old conclusion holds up today:
The deliberate adoption of this [patent] economic policy can be justified on economic
grounds only if the gains that accrue to society from it exceed the costs incurred because
of it. It is indeed awkward that the costs cannot be measured nor the gains counted. As a
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result the optimum limits of the patent system, whether with respect to time, space,
patentability or restrictions on the use of the grant, must always remain a subject of
controversy. There is no doubt, however, that the costs have been underestimated. 214

Machlup’s assessment on the U.S. patent system in 1958 reached a similar conclusion,
and his argument that no economist can declare with certainty whether patents (or IP in
general) confers a net benefit or net loss to society still holds true.215 Even after 60 years
the exact nature of the relationship between IP and innovation is not fully appreciable.
Further complicating analyses is the problem that the empirical literature is
overwhelmingly concentrated on the subject of patents due to the fact that they are much
more easily quantified than copyrights. The next section examines the important role of
artistic and creative work in spurring innovation.
B. Artistic and Creative Work and Innovation
The literature on innovation tends to ignore the importance of copyright, its alternatives
and artistic creativity to innovation. Because the Berne Convention precludes mandatory
copyright registration mechanisms,216 there are no readily available statistics on the
volume of creative works. Though data on registered copyrights is available,217 not all
copyrights are registered. Crucial empirical data is not readily available because it is
privately held.218 While it is simple to examine the increasing volume of patents, patent
applications, industrial designs and other IP indicators, copyright’s lack of a mandatory
registration system precludes one from calculating the number of newly produced works.
The importance of artistic and creative labour has not gone completely unappreciated.
The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that artistic works are important to
innovation and in the CCH decision it specifically emphasized, “society’s interest in
maintaining a robust public domain that could help foster future creative innovation.”219
The CCH decision has resonated beyond Canada’s borders with both the India Supreme
Court and Australian High Court citing the case as a dominant precedent.220 Despite the
statement by the Canadian high court, all too often the relationship between artistic and
creative work is underappreciated by policymakers, courts and scholars who view
innovation as solely an outcome of inventive behaviour.
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Although there are the complications in measuring the volume of copyrights, artistic and
creative endeavour has a clear impact on innovation in several areas. The software
industry relies on copyright protection (and in some jurisdictions patent law as well), and
dual use technologies – technologies that can be used for multiple purposes including
copyright infringement, such as the VCR, photocopier and peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing
technologies – can be regulated through copyright.221 Existing firms have tended to view
innovative, dual use technologies as dangerous and focused on stifling such technologies
with little regard to the future benefits the technology might provide. Though the movie
studios fought vehemently against Sony, the manufacturer of the Betamax in the 1980s,
20 years later 80% of the studios’ revenues came from sales of videocassettes and
DVDs.222 One of the major barriers to a more nuanced understanding of the connection
between creativity and innovation is the problem of information asymmetry. Established
rights holders can easily calculate the actual or potential costs of a new dual use
technology; however, the benefits for creativity may not be immediately clear or may be
spread across such a large and diverse group of actors making it difficult to develop
effective counter arguments against rights holding oligopolies.223 Copyright’s reach into
the area of new technology has a clear ability to limit innovation, particularly when such
innovation threatens the interests of established firms.
Finally it is important to note that the relationship between artistic and creative work and
copyright is not unidirectional. New innovations open up new avenues for creative
expression.224 Though user-generated content (UGC) is not a new phenomenon –
individuals have always engaged in artistic and creative behaviour – the low cost
distribution brought about by the internet and other ICTs has given rise to a remarkable
phenomenon and important set of tools for user to express themselves.225 From creating
video mash-ups to collaboratively authoring wikis, the ascendency of UGC demonstrates
the dynamic relationship between creativity and innovation. Furthermore, the flourishing
of UGC does not come simply by destroying the markets for existing copyrighted works.
UGC offers not only new avenues for creative expression, but also expands markets and
generates new business models.226 It serves the dual purpose of economic growth and
expanded creative expression; however, expansive protection for existing rights holders
may stifle UGC production thereby limiting creativity and innovation.227
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Analyses of innovation that only examine patents or inventions are incomplete. While
inventive behaviour is clearly critical to innovation, artistic and creative work are also
important. They too facilitate innovation, and more importantly it is the human element
of what we do with technological innovations that makes them important. While
discourse on innovation is dominated by a focus on patents shaped largely because of
their easy measurability, the crucial role of copyright and its alternatives should not be
underappreciated.
In much the same way that examinations of IP overemphasize the patent-innovation link
to the detriment of the role played by creative work, analyses of innovation must also be
cognizant of the problem of how too many IP rights impede innovation. The following
section examines how too much IP undermines innovation focusing on the danger of
patent thickets and the potential for anticommons tragedies.
C. Anticommons and Patent Thickets
While proponents of IP rights argue that such rights are necessary to facilitate innovation,
a recent and increasing body of scholarship has suggested that beyond a certain point too
many exclusionary rights dampen innovation. This section examines the two primary
approaches in this regard, Michael Heller’s tragedy of the anticommons thesis and Carl
Shapiro’s work on patent thickets and holdup problems. The section concludes with an
examination of the empirical evidence and posits that while existing empirical evidence
to support these frameworks is limited, it is still important to be cognizant that there
exists a potential for too many IP rights to be harmful to innovation.
i. Tragedy of the Anticommons
The tragedy of the commons thesis developed by Hardin is often viewed as a useful
critique of the problems that befall common pool resources;228 however, with respect to
the management of resources through property rights (or the lack of such rights) it depicts
only half of the problem. Based on an analysis of commercial property in post-Soviet
Russia, Michael Heller has identified that a similar problem occurs at the opposite end of
the spectrum – a tragedy of the anticommons where too many exclusionary property
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rights lead to the inefficient underuse of resources.229 Heller’s anticommons thesis has
direct relevance to the situation caused by excessive and fragmented IP rights.230 He and
Eisenberg quickly applied his anticommons thesis to the subject of biomedical research
tools suggesting that patents and reach-through licensing agreements had the potential to
create an anticommons,231 and Heller later identified anticommons in the cases of rap
music,232 pharmaceuticals,233 documentary filmmaking,234 agricultural research,235 and
mobile phone technology.236 Heller’s thesis has resonated with critics of the
expansionary IP regime who argue that both patents and copyrights are leading to the
emergence of anticommons particularly in areas where research is cumulative, easy, or a
large number of inputs are needed to produce a new intellectual good.237 Buchanan and
Yoon’s economic modeling of the anticommons thesis revealed that the tragedies of the
commons and anticommons produced symmetric effects, i.e. that the problems of
underuse from too many excluders were equal to the problems of overuse by too many
users.238 Eisenberg, however, has revised the anticommons thesis in light of empirical
evidence from the biotechnology sector. She posits that the burden of detecting
infringement and the costs of suing for infringement limit the emergence of
anticommons, but in situations where there is ‘practical excludability’ over research
materials and data that are not necessarily protected by IP the risk of anticommons may
be greater.239
Anticommons situations are particularly problematic because unlike tragedies of the
commons which are easily detectable, underuse is much more difficult to detect. For
example, in the case of pharmaceuticals it is difficult for there to be outrage over drugs
that did not come to market because they were abandoned by their researchers.240
Interestingly it is the same shortsighted, rational self-interested behaviour that leads to
both commons and anticommons tragedies.241 However, the classical and neoclassical
economic logic that argues the solution to the tragedy of the commons is privatization
exacerbates anticommons problems because it fails to recognize that too many
exclusionary rights give rise to anticommons.242 There are solutions to anticommons
problems. Anticommons can be overcome through a variety of means from patent pools
and blanket licensing agreements to defensive publication or engaging in intellectual
work overseas where such rights may not be protected.243 While solutions do exist the
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ability for IP rights holders to strategically leverage their rights often incentivizes the
creation of anticommons.
There is emerging empirical evidence to support Heller’s anticommons thesis in the area
of electronics. An examination over the spate of legal battles between electronics
manufacturers demonstrates that anticommons do emerge to the detriment of the public.
In February of 2011 LG won a preliminary injunction against Sony that allowed
European customs officials to seize imports of the Japanese firm’s PlayStation 3
videogame console,244 and Apple has recently received a temporary injunction (that did
not even last a full week245) against Samsung which prevents the latter from selling its
Galaxy tablet computers in the EU.246 Apple and Samsung are currently fighting a series
of 30 legal cases in 10 different countries.247 At issue are a range of patents including
design patents covering the iPad shape, Apple patents on touch screen gesture technology
and 3G wireless technology patents.248 Samsung even announced that it would seek legal
action to ban Apple’s latest iPhone before it was even officially announced.249 The
USITC’s ballooning case load reflects the increasing hostility, with Apple, Samsung,
HTC and Nokia among others involved in a spate of investigations. Apple alone is
involved in 15 pending Section 337 investigations,250 and the table below provides a
snapshot of USITC cases involving prominent smartphone and electronic manufacturers.
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Table 1: Pending USITC Section 337 Investigations Involving Prominent Smart
Phone and Electronics Manufacturers
Investigation
Number of Patents at
Number
Complainant Respondent(s) Issue
337-TA-701
Nokia
Apple
7
337-TA-703
Kodak
RIM, Apple
1
337-TA-704
Apple
Nokia
4
337-TA-710
Apple
HTC, Nokia
5
337-TA-717
Apple
Kodak
1
337-TA-721
HTC
Apple
5
337-TA-745
Motorola
Apple
6
337-TA-750
Apple
Motorola
3
337-TA-771
Nokia
Apple
7
337-TA-794
Samsung
Apple
5
337-TA-796
Apple
Samsung
4
337-TA-797
Apple
HTC
5
337-TA-808
HTC
Apple
8
251
Source: USITC (n.d.)
The rancorous battle between smartphone makers, and Samsung and Apple in particular,
not only generates an anticommons – Samsung products have been temporarily banned in
Germany, the Netherlands and Australia to the detriment of consumers252 – it has also
attracted the attention of the European Commission that is investigating both firms for
violating antitrust laws.253 The legal battles between Samsung and Apple have descended
into absurdity. The Apple design patent covering the shape of the iPad has led to
Samsung citing 2001: A Space Odyssey as prior art.254 While European consumers suffer
from injunctions that deprive them of goods, American taxpayers are faced with
financing the cost of additional courtroom space at the ITC so it can handle its
burgeoning Section 337 case load.255 Heller’s anticommons thesis provides a useful
counterbalance to the orthodox economic logic that IP rights encourage efficient use and
innovation
ii. Patent Thicket
A second, related approach to examining the problem of too many exclusionary rights is
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advanced by Carl Shapiro who argues that the complex web of exclusionary rights has
created a patent thicket. He defines a patent thicket as, “an overlapping set of patent
rights requiring that those seeking to commercialize new technology obtain licenses from
multiple patentees.”256 Though similar to Heller’s anticommons thesis, Shapiro’s patent
thicket is not completely analogous. For Heller a single patent cannot on its own create
an anticommons,257 but Shapiro places specific emphasis on the holdup problem whereby
a single patent holder can strategically impede another’s research.258 In industries that
produce complex products where innovation is cumulative, patent thickets dampen
innovation.259 Although firms may be able to license IP rights, transaction costs decrease
the effectiveness of licensing and act as a tax on innovation.260 Early in their history the
automobile and aviation were both subject to patent thicket problems.261 Shapiro argues
that business solutions such as cross licensing and patent pools are effective means for
cutting through the thicket and may be welfare enhancing, but in turn these solutions
raise antitrust concerns.262 Shapiro’s patent thicket approach not only highlights the
dangers of too many property rights and the potential for holdup, but also the important,
though often forgotten, role played by antitrust law in both advancing and inhibiting
innovation. Influenced by the work of Shapiro and a growing recognition of the role
antitrust law plays in innovation the U.S. Federal Trade Commission has committed to
ensure its antitrust investigations are cognizant of innovation concerns.263
iii. Empirical Findings and Role of Anticommons and Patent Thickets Arguments
While anticommons and patent thicket arguments highlight the dangers of an
expansionary IP regime, there are many practical considerations that impede the
realization of anticommons situations. Several empirical studies have found limited
incidents of anticommons emerging.264 Walsh, Arora and Cohen’s empirical study of the
biomedical sector revealed that although the preconditions for an anticommons exist,
there are no major breakdowns in the industry’s ability to continue research.265
Laboratory researchers frequently unknowingly infringe upon patents or believe that any
infringement is covered by an exception for research.266 Interviews with lawyers,
scientists and managers in the biomedical field reveal that although initial searches may
suggest that a particular project may involve many overlapping IP rights, the number of
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patents that actually have to be licensed is low if not zero.267 In some cases research
may be done offshore as a method to avoid IP restrictions.268 Cross licensing of patents is
a strategy often employed to quickly clear patent thickets; however, cross licensing can
also be used to limit competition and the incentive to innovate.269 Patent owners tend to
tolerate a degree of infringement based on the belief that such infringement may result in
research that can add value to the patent and will generate goodwill with other
researchers.270 A study comparing licensing conditions in Japan, Germany, the U.K. and
the U.S. revealed that while some difficulties do exist and overly complex negotiations
cause some research paths to be abandoned, overall there is little evidence of
anticommons problems.271 These findings mirror those of an Australian study that found
inconclusive evidence that an anticommons exists and its authors could not even
determine if the preconditions for an anticommons existed in the Australian
biotechnology sector.272 One OECD study noted that while the potential for
anticommons exists, such breakdowns are rare and not a threat to innovation.273 In the
case of copyright user created remixes and mash-ups of music and video continue to
proliferate because the high costs of enforcement prevents rights holders for having
complete control over their IP.274
While several studies have found weak support for Heller and Shapiro’s arguments, there
is empirical, experimental and anecdotal evidence to support their claims. A survey for
the American Association for the Advancement of Science found 40 percent of survey
researchers reported difficulties in obtaining rights to use patented technologies. Complex
licensing negotiations were found to result in the abandonment of research projects, and
anticommons problems were found to affect a range of disciplines as well as both
academic and industry scientists.275 A survey of agricultural biology researchers in the
south-west United States revealed that these academics felt that the protection of research
tools through IP negatively impacts their ability to conduct research.276 A behavioral
experiment that tested the anticommons thesis concluded that welfare losses from
anticommons situations may be worse than situations where the tragedy of the commons
existed and also found that cross licensing and patent pools (solutions to patent thickets
proposed by Shapiro) were welfare enhancing.277 A second experimental test of the
anticommons thesis revealed that in anticommons situations sellers base their prices not

161
on the value of the underlying good but on the expected surplus of the purchaser and
found that sellers’ prices were inversely related to the value of their contribution.278 In
the case of copyright fair use/dealing provisions do help mitigate the problem, but
anticommons and holdup still occur. Chuck D of the rap group Public Enemy has stated
that the style of music on its early hit album It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold Us
Back, which incorporated thousands of samples, cannot be reproduced because of the fact
that it would be too costly to license all the sampled music. This change has forced
Public Enemy and other rappers to alter their sound and style.279 There also numerous
instances where copyright holders have used their rights to block the distribution of UGC
and works of fan fiction as documented by the website Chilling Effects
(http://www.chillingeffects.org/index.cgi).280
Although the empirical evidence on anticommons and patent thickets suggests that such
concerns should not be overblown, it is critical that policymakers be mindful of how too
many IP rights can impede innovation and creativity particularly in an expansionary era.
Furthermore, it also demonstrates the danger in basing intellectual goods policy on
neoliberal economic logic that celebrates rational self-interested behaviour and private
property rights as the sole mechanism for driving innovation. The danger posed by the
anticommons and patent thicket requires policymakers to consider how alternatives to IP
can be used to facilitate innovation and raise social welfare.
D. Openness, Access, the Commons and Innovation
The limited effectiveness of IP rights as incentives for innovation and the problem of too
many rights necessitate an examination of alternative mechanisms for facilitating the
production and distribution of intellectual goods. Advocates for alternatives to IP rights
frequently connect their arguments to ideas of openness, access and a shared knowledge
commons that should not be circumscribed by exclusionary rights. The relative success
of a number of ‘open’ alternatives to IP demonstrates the effectiveness of these
substitutes. Finally, proponents of alternatives to IP have also examined the unique
economic characteristics of information that underscore why intellectual goods should be
treated as a special case. While these approaches are not without their limitations, the
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invocation of the commons, open alternatives and economic arguments demonstrate the
multiplicity of mechanisms through which innovation can be achieved and how IP rights
can limit innovation.
i. The Intellectual/Knowledge Commons
The idea of an intellectual or knowledge commons has been adopted by a number of
prominent scholars critical of the expansionary trend including James Boyle, Yochai
Benkler, Peter Drahos, and Lawrence Lessig, among others. The commons concept is
rooted in historical examples of natural and environmental commons such as fish stocks
and grazing land.281 Although proponents of IP frequently invoke Hardin’s thesis on the
tragedy of the commons, intellectual goods are non-rival in consumption and nonexcludable, and when intellectual goods are rendered in a digital format they can be
reproduced with virtually no marginal cost.282 The commons should not be interpreted as
a system for resource allocation that is ideologically opposed to the market (like
communism), but a framework that can complement market structures.283 For example,
not only is the internet a commons, which itself is underpinned by a second commons (a
commons of code),284 it is also the most important platform for commerce. Lessig argues
that the commons approach does not necessarily mean that things are free suggesting
instead that the primary principle behind commons is that access is not limited by an
exclusionary right.285 The commons approach adopts a view of a positive community
where resources are held in common and access is permitted, unlike the Lockean
approach that merely conceives of the commons as something without value to be
appropriated from.286 The commons model also draws on Marx’s concept of alienability
and specifically questions what the limits of private property should be challenging the
dominant neoliberal discourse.287 The knowledge commons concept is not only an
intellectually fruitful idea for encouraging debate, it crucially emphasizes the social
dimension of property relations and the relationship between individuals and the
community.
The commons approach has had significant practical applications. The Creative
Commons licensing system that underpins many of the open alternatives is, as suggested
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by the name, premised on the idea of a digital commons.288 The Creative Commons
licensing schemes can be used to protect a range of intellectual works and provides
creators with the ability to determine how they want their intellectual creations to be
used.289 Commons oriented approaches have also been adopted by industry. The Patent
Commons Project, a commons of software patents, includes patents from several large,
high-tech companies such as IBM, HP, Nokia, Sun Microsystems, Microsoft and Oracle
among others.290 Using a scheme of different types of commitments, patent holders agree
to not assert their IP rights in various circumstances allowing these firms to overcome
some of the problems of expansionary IP rights.291
The idea of an intellectual commons provides a useful framing mechanism for ways of
thinking about intellectual goods. However, a framing mechanism is insufficient on its
own. The next section examines how the commons frame has been used to create
alternatives to IP which not only facilitate innovation, but also allow access to the
knowledge commons.
ii. ‘Open’ Alternatives
There exist a range of alternatives to IP many of which have achieved a moderate degree
of success in facilitating innovation and enabling the production and distribution of
intellectual goods. Several alternatives to IP indicate their status by use of the term
‘open’ (open source software, open access scholarly publishing, open educational
resources, open data), although there is not uniformity with regard to how the term open
is applied,292 and in some cases an ‘open x’ title can have considerably different
meanings for different users.293 Open innovation is a particularly problematic ‘open.’
Though Henry Chesbrough, author of Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating
and Profiting from Technology, is considered the leading proponent of open
innovation,294 he gives IP rights a central role in his conception of open innovation.295
While several open alternatives exist, this section will briefly explore the successes and
limitations of two of the most prominent alternatives – open source software and open
access scholarly publishing - as they provide a great deal of insight on how these
alternatives can facilitate innovation and their limitations.
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Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) is arguably the most well-known and successful
of the open alternatives, even drawing praise from WIPO as a successful alternative to
copyright.296 Labeling FOSS an alternative to proprietary software is an anachronism as
FOSS predates proprietary software; thus from a historical perspective closed source
software should be considered an alternative FOSS.297 The primary distinguishing factor
between FOSS and proprietary software is not cost,298 but access to the source code.299
While traditional proprietary software is copyrighted, FOSS uses a variety of different
licenses, such as the GNU General Public License (GNU GPL) to maintain access and
limit the ability of others to appropriate the code – a technique that is often referred to as
‘copyleft.’300 The fundamental difference between free software and open source is the
normative outlook. Proponents of open source adopt a utilitarian approach to code
believing that access to source code is necessary for better code, while free software
developers see access to source code as an ethical obligation.301 An important factor in
the success of open source software has been the utilization of a diverse range of
incentives and reputational motivations in particular.302 Schweik and Semenov identify
28 discrete motives for participation fitting within three broad categories (technological,
socio-political, and economic).303 The harnessing of alternative motives evinces that
pecuniary incentives are not the only means for encouraging innovation.
Although even WIPO acknowledges the success of open source as an alternative to IP, it
is not without its shortcomings. While FOSS is often discussed as a model that is
strengthened because of large numbers of people working on a project, several
researchers have suggested that FOSS projects tend to be produced by relatively few
individuals.304 Project governance is critical to ensure success, but must avoid restricting
freedom and becoming too hierarchical.305 There is a significant degree of elitism within
FOSS projects, which may discourage those with lower levels of status/reputation within
the FOSS community from participating.306 Despite the increasing prominence of open
source software and high profile software such as Linux and Mozilla Firefox,307 it is only
in the HTTP web server market where an open source platform, the Apache web server,
has a majority market share.308 While FOSS has its limitations, it is an exemplary
alternative because it demonstrates that highly innovative intellectual goods such as
computer operating systems and web servers can flourish without IP protection.
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Open Access Scholarly Publishing (OA) shares several similarities to FOSS. Both have
roots in academic culture of the free exchange and circulation of information and both are
facilitated by new technologies. OA addresses a number of issues in scholarly publishing
including exorbitant subscription fees paid by libraries, greater control for authors over
their works (as opposed to signing over their copyrights to publishers) and it makes
scholarly work available to a broader audience by removing many of the barriers of
copyright and cost.309 Though the articles are costless to the end-user, there is still a cost
to produce, host and peer-review the articles, and a wide variety of OA publishing models
have emerged.310 Even the definition of ‘Open Access’ is contested between various
proponents of OA.311
While OA efforts receive considerable support from scholars, other users and libraries,
institutional policies and mandates particularly those from government funding agencies
are also a major factor contributing to the growth of OA. The most significant of these is
the U.S. National Institutes of Health’s (NIH) Public Access Policy which was first
adopted in 2005.312 In 2008 the NIH policy was strengthened from recommending
deposit in the NIH’s repository (PubMed Central) to mandating deposit, resulting in a
surge of articles being added.313 Though only in operation for a decade, the repository
already has over 2 million articles with half of those articles being added in the past three
years.314 Increasingly various national funding agencies and universities are adopting OA
mandates and policies,315 and both the OECD and UNESCO have come out in support of
OA with latter specifically noting that open access benefits scientific discovery,
innovation and socio-economic development.316
Although OA is gaining traction with both bottom-up and top-down support, there are
still several complicating factors. Several studies have revealed that OA articles have a
larger impact factor and/or receive more citations;317 however, much reluctance to OA
still exists in the minds of academics who view traditional journals as having a superior
reputation and being better for career advancement.318 Though academics generally
support OA when they are aware of it, awareness is low (but growing).319 While the
Directory of Open Access Journals has over 7000 different OA titles listed,320 it
represents only a small minority (roughly 15 percent) of the current number of titles
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published.321 OA discourse is overly focused on scientific, technical and medical
journals, and more consideration and application of OA principles to the core mechanism
for scholarly communication in the humanities, monographs, is needed.322 Authority and
legitimacy issues need careful consideration in the context of digitization, and major OA
scholars typically do not pay enough attention to these.323 Most critically, both OA and
FOSS can be viewed as advancing the neoliberal, knowledge economy ideology. By
having individuals circulate and create amounts of freely accessible information and
emphasizing efficiency and innovation, the amount of training that needs to be done by
private corporations and governments is reduced. In turn these knowledge workers can
be more effectively pressed into the service of capital.324 While this final shortcoming of
FOSS and OA requires careful consideration,325 the relative success of these alternatives
in a landscape dominated by IP rights demonstrates that alternatives to IP are not only
viable, but also useful means for facilitating both innovation and access while drawing on
a range of incentives beyond simply pecuniary ones.
iii. Positive Feedback Effects, and Transaction Costs
Although the commons framework and open alternatives provide important, practical
examples of how innovative intellectual goods can be produced without IP, there are also
strong economic arguments for treating intellectual goods differently than scarce tangible
property. Critics of IP in this vein point to the presence of positive feedback effects for
many intellectual goods, while also highlighting that commons approaches may more
effectively reduce transactions costs than property rights. Positive feedbacks effects are
manifested in several ways from geographic clustering (such as that which occurs in the
high tech sector in Silicon Valley and Waterloo (Canada)), to technological standards that
contribute to lock-in.326 With respect to intellectual goods and innovation, two related
positive feedbacks are particularly important: increasing returns to scale in production
and economies of scale in consumption (also known as network effects). Proponents of
the network effects approach to information suggest that the more individuals that have
access to it the greater it benefits each individual.327 Two simple examples of network
effects are the telephone network and the internet – where the greater the number of users
the more valuable the network is to each user. Almost all kinds of information also
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possess a network effect characteristic,328 and not only does increased access to
knowledge enhance its value, but it also raises the likelihood that such knowledge can be
used to generate more innovation. Unlike traditional common resources that are subject
to rivalry in consumption and overuse, the network effects properties of information
suggest that it is best treated as a common good.329 Because IP mechanisms artificially
limit access to information they decrease the value of innovation while dampening the
prospects for innovation.
In the same way that information is subject to network effects, knowledge based products
and services are also subject to increasing returns to scale with regards to production.330
Increasing returns to scale occur when a change in the factors of production increases
output in a proportion greater than the change in the production factors.331 In situations
where one of the input factors for production is non-rival, such as information taken from
the commons, increasing returns result.332 For sectors where increasing returns and
network effects are present, IP rights create a barrier to entry ultimately limiting
innovation.333 The availability of IP rights in such situations facilitates the development
of non-competitive oligopolistic and monopolistic market structures.334 The presence of
increasing returns presents an even more fundamental problem than barrier to entry.
Neoclassical economic theory is premised on diminishing returns to scale in
production,335 and as such its application to intellectual goods, which are commonly
subject to increasing returns, appears to violate a fundamental assumption. Thus the
neoclassical economic logic that extolls the benefits of exclusionary property rights is
fundamentally at odds with the economic character of intellectual goods.
A second line of economic arguments against IP are centered on the idea that such rights
necessarily impose costs, particularly transaction costs, which are a barrier to innovation.
There are no efficiency based economic arguments for limiting access to intellectual
goods.336 IP rights create an inefficient transaction cost. While the hierarchical firm was
the dominant organizational structure in the 20th century due to its ability to reduce
transaction costs, peer production methods based on collaboration and drawing on the
intellectual commons allow for projects of a greater scale.337 Furthermore, peer based
production methods eliminate socially wasteful duplication of effort that occurs within
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competitive markets.338 Given the presence of positive feedbacks and the high transaction
costs IP can impose, a strong economic case for not treating information like scarce
property can be made.
iv. Limitations of the Commons and Open Approaches
Although the commons framework and open approaches have provided both theoretical
and practical alternatives to the expansionary IP regime, there are limitations.
Analogizing the expansionary IP regime to the enclosure movement in England is
problematic because the historical case resulted in increased productivity and growth.339
Though a useful approach for many IP problems, a commons framework would not be a
suitable mechanism to ensure the protection of traditional knowledge as it would fail to
provide indigenous populations sufficient control.340 Although an alternative to
copyright, commons oriented peer production models are not well suited to produce some
kinds of intellectual goods such as novels, which involve high coordination costs,341 or
open editorial blogs that degrade into a series of hate-filled rants.342
Critics suggest that there is little coherency in the analytical frameworks used by
proponents of the commons, and argue that the appeal of the “information commons” is
rhetorical.343 Commons rhetoric does reify the concept of the commons as the crumbs
leftover by the IP regime.344 However, it serves as an important rhetorical counterweight
to author-centric approaches that attempt to minimize the value of the public domain.345
It also allows for the exploration of alternatives outside of an IP discourse dominated by
the concepts of incentives, innovation and just rewards.346 The commons frame reminds
us that private property is not the only or necessarily the best mechanism for allocating
goods and services.
The open alternatives to IP are not without their own shortcomings. Open alternatives
are usually reliant on the copyright system, and the licensing schemes used to distribute
such intellectual goods may still contain restrictions on usage.347 For example
restrictions in open source licenses can range from the relatively benign requirement that
credit be given to the originator of the code to terms that prevent the mixing of code
produced under differing licenses.348 Creating an open vs. IP dichotomy is problematic
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as openness should be conceived of as a continuum reflecting that there are varying
degrees and types of openness.349 Though the Creative Commons licensing scheme is
central to a series of alternatives to IP, it fails to articulate a comprehensive view of
access. Furthermore, to a degree it reinforces the rhetoric of private property350 and the
necessity and usefulness of the underlying copyright system.351 Although reliant on the
IP system, open alternatives demonstrate that not only do alternatives to IP exist, but that
alternatives premised on access can exist and flourish.
Finally it is important to remember that commons and open alternative approaches are
not simply resource management techniques, but rather social relations. Failure to
appreciate the fact that property relations whether common or private are social relations
will lead to ineffective analysis and policy recommendations.352 Approaches that stress
the collective benefits of information sharing should not underappreciate the importance
of individual effort to the production of intellectual goods.353
Despite the limitations in the commons approach and open alternatives they, along with
the economic arguments against exclusionary rights, serve as a powerful counterbalance
to the neoclassical economic logic that extols the benefits of IP. Furthermore, the success
of commons based open alternatives such as open source software and open access
scholarly publishing demonstrate that IP is not a necessary mechanism for encouraging
and facilitating innovation.
IV. Innovation and Ideology
Innovation is an important social and economic goal; however, as this chapter has
demonstrated IP is not the sole means of encouraging innovation and in many cases may
ultimately hamper innovative activity. More importantly, this chapter has also revealed
the seriousness of the dynamic problems produced by IP, specifically the socially
wasteful litigation that is produced by exclusionary rights. While this chapter has
focused on the relationship between intellectual goods and innovation, it is now crucial to
scrutinize the concept of innovation itself.
The theoretical and empirical literature examined within this chapter raises several
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serious concerns about the usefulness of IP as a means of encouraging innovation, and it
has demonstrated the potential dangers of excessive exclusionary rights and the success
of two alternatives to IP. However, the theoretical and empirical examinations of IP are
incomplete without an examination of the ideological aspects of innovation. These
ideological dimensions, which include governmental policies on innovation, innovation
discourse, and the linkages between innovation and theories of the information society,
must be assessed as part of a holistic examination of intellectual goods. Furthermore,
scrutiny of the ideological characteristics of innovation is particularly important because
different types of innovation discourse are used in advancing various ideologies and
normative viewpoints. It is insufficient for policymakers to support alternatives to IP that
are substantively different only in terms of incentives and the type of innovation they
produce. Only alternatives with a substantively different ideological character to IP can
mitigate the problems of commodification, the diminution of access and the valourizing
of individual self-interest.
The following chapter examines the ideological dimensions of innovation by assessing
U.S. and Canadian national policies on innovation, the rhetoric of innovation and its
connection with the idea of progress before finally turning to the role innovation plays in
discourse on the information society.
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Chapter Six – Ideology
Building on the analysis in the previous chapter, this chapter critically scrutinizes the
ideological dimensions of innovation. Scrutiny of the ideological aspects of innovation is
particularly important because innovation is not a neutral, value free concept. The
promotion of innovation by nations, organizations and individuals, is also the promotion
of embedded ideological principles and normative viewpoints. When proponents of IP
extol innovation they advance an ideological position which posits the commodification
of intellectual work is not only tolerable but what ought to be. When information society
proponents celebrate the emergence of a new era of innovation and fail to appreciate the
role of IP they advance a similar ideological position. However, there are other ideologies
and normative stances that can underpin one’s promotion of innovation. Innovation is an
important social goal that should be advanced, but not for its economic attributes, though
they are important. Instead innovation should be pursued as a means to promote
progressive social change and address a range of political, social, moral and
environmental problems. For alternatives to IP to truly be substantive they advance must
innovation for more than solely instrumentalist economic purposes. Innovation policy
requires not only theoretical and empirical insights on incentives and innovation, but also
a keen appreciation of the ideological and normative dimensions of innovation.
The key argument of this chapter is that neoliberal political ideology and neoclassical
economic thought have narrowly framed innovation as a means for generating wealth and
gains in productivity. This orientation has undermined other important dimensions of
innovation – namely, the role of innovation in facilitating political, moral, and social
progress. Information society proponents also often promote a limited conception of
innovation without considering the full effects of exclusionary rights (which are usually
associated with and underpin innovative activity). The failure to fully examine the role
of IP, while at the same time lauding innovation, facilitates an overly optimistic account
of the information society. In turn this positive information age rhetoric is then easily
employed by neoliberal thinkers, policymakers and corporations to justify a vision of a
society that extols efficiency, wealth production and self-interest with a significantly
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lessened concern for moral, social, political and environmental progress.
The first section of this chapter examines the connection between innovation and
ideology by first reviewing the current innovation policies of the American and Canadian
federal governments. It then proceeds to explore the rhetorical uses of innovation
describing how the concept is used in an increasingly instrumentalist, economic sense.
The final part of the first section examines the connection between innovation and
progress, arguing that innovation should be used for more than simply economic means.
Specifically it is argued that the goal of innovation should be social, political, moral and
economic advancement. The second and final section of this chapter explores the
connection between information society discourses, neoliberalism, and the concept of
innovation. It begins by examining the writings of Daniel Bell, Manuel Castells and
David Harvey on the concept of the information society. This analysis reveals that
proponents of the information age (Bell and Castells) extol the importance of innovation;
however, crucially missing from this discourse is an appreciation of the role of IP (and its
alternatives) in incentivizing innovative activity. The writings of Bell and Castells
contrast sharply with that of Harvey who contends that the so called information age does
not represent a fundamental break from industrial capitalism. Furthermore, Harvey,
unlike the others, more fully appreciates the role of IP as a mechanism for not only
encouraging innovation, but also as a means of capital accumulation. The chapter
concludes by examining the connection between information society discourse and
neoliberalism, noting that often the two are intimately linked through their shared
veneration of naked self-interest and an instrumentalist focus on innovation.
I. Innovation and Ideology
Innovation is a rich concept and an important social goal with many facets. However, it
is also a concept that can be exploited for a variety of ideological purposes and through
the advancement of various political agendas. The first part of this section examines how
national governments encourage innovative activity looking first at the range of policy
levers that can be used to stimulate innovation. The U.S. and Canadian federal policies on
innovation are scrutinized with special attention paid to the role each government affords
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IP and its alternatives in incenting innovative activity. The second part of this section
investigates innovation discourse, noting that the inherent positive connotation of
innovation is often used to obscure its function within capitalism as a mechanism for
wealth production. This section concludes by focusing on the Enlightenment idea of
progress, and argues that the increasingly economic and instrumentalist conceptions of
innovation are detached from the historical idea of progress that celebrated not only
economic improvement but also political, social and moral advancement.
A. National Policies on Innovation
The importance of innovation is not lost on policymakers and almost every country has
some sort of national innovation program.1 However, creating the conditions for a
flourishing national innovation ecosystem is a complex problem as there are numerous
policy mechanisms national governments can use to stimulate innovation besides IP.
However, each approach has its own strengths and weaknesses. Governments can
conduct research through their own laboratories or fund university researchers, but such
research tends to focus on basic and theoretical research, and is not often aimed at
diffusing innovations through society. Primary and secondary education curricula and
teacher quality can influence the potential of young people to innovate in the future;
however, any resulting innovatory benefits are not immediately realized and the
education system must be attuned to the present needs of students and society at large.2
Governments can also encourage research in the business sector through direct funding of
R&D or indirect funding of R&D through tax breaks. Yet general tax breaks for
corporate R&D cannot be targeted to address social problems.3 In certain sectors such as
telecommunications and software, government regulation and standards can both propel
and retard innovation.4 At a more general level innovation policies too often focus on
increasing the supply of innovation inputs (e.g. increasing R&D expenditures, training of
more scientists and engineers), while demand-side innovation policies (such as
government procurement contracts and standard setting) are less accentuated in national
innovation policies.5 Furthermore, while incenting R&D is a key piece of innovation
policy, it is not the only piece, and policymakers must also strive to ensure a highly
skilled workforce and knowledge flows between the public and private sector.6 Finally, a
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problems is not unique to the Obama administration. George W. Bush’s innovation
strategy specifically emphasized harnessing innovation to improve health care and
advance hydrogen fuel cell technology.15 While U.S. policymakers should be credited for
underscoring the importance of innovation to address social and economic problems, at
the time of writing Congress has demonstrated little initiative in following through on
President Obama’s strategy.16
In a February 2011 follow up to the Strategy for American Innovation, the White House
further elaborates on and reaffirms its innovation priorities outlined in 2009.17 The
document adopts a broader definition of innovation, and specifically stresses that the
social gains from innovation outweigh private gains.18 In this regard it emphasizes that
prizes should play an important incentive role and highlights the establishment of
challenge.gov, a federal website that allows government agencies to create monetary and
non-monetary prizes with the aim of allowing the public to contribute its talent and ideas
to problems facing the nation (although the website fails to provide information on how
many of these challenges have been solved).19 Notably, the 2011 update to the American
innovation strategy prioritizes patent reform to deal with the backlog of applications, and
it states that the USPTO plans to hire 1000 new examiners within the next two fiscal
years.20 Stemming from the 2009 Open Government Directive, the USPTO is also
making more information about patent applications available without cost in an effort to
improve the effectiveness of the patent system.21 While the strategy outlines several
initiatives with regard to patent reform and the use of non-IP incentive systems,
discussion of copyright is much more muted. The only substantive copyright policy is
the continued pursuance of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement that would further
strengthen international IP enforcement and evince the continuing expansionist
tendencies with respect to copyright.22
In addition to support for prizes the U.S. has demonstrated considerable federal backing
for several other alternatives to IP. As noted in chapter 5, the NIH’s open access policy
has ensured that millions of research articles are freely accessible.23 In its 2011 financial
year (FY) the NIH funded $30.9 billion in health research.24 The Obama administration
has also been a leader with respect to the development of its federal open data initiative,
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data.gov. Data.gov not only provides access to federal data sets, but encourages
individuals to use such data to create innovative web applications.25 While federal
assistance for alternatives to IP in the U.S. is laudable, there are reasons for concern
including budgetary pressures and potential legislative changes. The NIH budget in FY
2011 is $300 million less than in the previous financial year.26 The Electronic
Government Fund, which funds data.gov, has had its budget slashed from $35 million in
2010 to a measly $8 million in 2011.27 Attempts to expand the NIH OA policy have
failed twice. First proposed in 2006 the Federal Research Public Access Act (FRPAA)
would require all federal agencies that fund more than $100,000,000 on outside
(academic) research to make materials openly accessible and maintain a repository. 28 10
departments and agencies would have been covered by FRPAA – the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Education, Energy, Health and Human Services, and
Transportation along with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the National Science Foundation
(NSF).29 Although promising, the bill never moved beyond the Senate Subcommittee on
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security.30 In
the 111th Congressional session (2009-10) the FRPAA was reintroduced in both Senate
(Bill 1373) and the House of Representatives (Bills 5037 and 5253), but as in 2006 these
bills never moved past their respective Congressional committees/subcommittees.31
Unfortunately, no version of FRPAA has been introduced in the current Congressional
session. A cause for even greater concern is the currently proposed Research Works Act
which would not only reverse the NIH’s OA policy but prohibit all other federal agencies
from doing so.32 However, it should also be noted that two previous bills with a similar
intent to the Research Works Act failed to be passed through Congress.33
On the whole the U.S. approach demonstrates a degree of balance particularly with
respect to IP and its alternatives for incenting innovation. Though some expansionist
tendencies remain, the focus on alternatives such as prizes and open data is encouraging.
ii. Canada
In Canada the federal government has developed a wide array of initiatives to encourage
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innovative activity; however, unlike the Obama administration which has a single,
unified innovation strategy document, the Canadian approach is comprised of a series of
discrete governmental plans and programs. There has been no shortage of major reports34
and editorials on Canada’s ailing innovation system.35 One of Canada’s primary
supporters of innovative activity is the National Research Council (NRC) Canada, an
agency of the federal government. NRC both undertakes its own research and supports
corporate research through programs such as the Industrial Research Assistance Program
that provides financing for SMEs engaged in innovative research.36 NRC also has
developed a series of technology clusters across the country, but with few exceptions
(such as pharmaceuticals and aerospace in Montreal or fuel cell technology in
Vancouver) many of the clusters are not world-renowned.37 Thriving video game
development and digital media clusters in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver have been
generated through targeted tax initiatives;38 however, the formation of such clusters stems
largely from the actions of provincial governments, and the lucrative incentives provided
to video game makers have been subject to the criticism that such monies could be used
for more socially worthwhile research endeavours.39 In a similar vein to NRC there is
Canada Foundation for Innovation (CFI), a non-governmental organization (NGO)
created by the Government of Canada in 1997 to help fund research infrastructure.40
Canada does have a significant and generous R&D tax credit program (known officially
as the Scientific Research and Experimental Design (SR&ED) Tax Incentive Program) ,41
and leads the world in terms of percentage of GDP spent on R&D tax incentives for
businesses.42 However, the program, which cost the government $4.5 billion (CAD) in
2010, has recently been subject to a number of dubious claims about its ability to spur
innovation.43 Notable problems include a large number of unsubstantiated claims and a
burgeoning industry of consultants encouraging spurious claims from companies that do
little to no R&D.44 While the SR&ED program should be enabling cutting edge research,
the tax credit has also gone to low-tech innovations such as a technique for growing
potted roses.45 Canada’s generous business tax credits for R&D are illustrative of the
government’s belief that the private sector, not government (either through direct support
or research such as that conducted by NRC or through support of academic institutions
(which are under provincial jurisdiction)46) should take the lead role in innovative
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activity. This policy approach can be traced back to the Trudeau government in 1983
when it implemented the current business R&D tax break.47 This corporate-focused
strategy for promoting innovation is evinced in two of Canada’s most recent innovation
policy documents.
In 2007 the government unveiled it science and technology strategy entitled Mobilizing
Science and Technology to Canada’s Advantage, which continues to emphasize the
centrality of corporations in undertaking innovative activity.48 The document notes that
modern IP laws are required to provide researchers and creators an opportunity to
commercialize their work.49 It also states that Canada strives for a patent policy that
balances incentives for innovation and Canadian values (which are not defined).
However, it also claims:
Similarly, Canada is committed to ensuring that its copyright framework provides the legal
protection necessary to give copyright-based industries the confidence to invest in and roll
out new business models that make full use of leading-edge technologies, while promoting
the use of these technologies by researchers to gain access to the knowledge and information
needed for innovation and competitiveness. 50

It is telling that the government emphasizes balance in patent policy, but stresses the
importance of incentives for the copyright industry (not individual artists and creators)
and fails to underscore the importance of a thriving public domain and fair dealing
exceptions that facilitate artistic expression and creativity. While Canada’s science and
technology strategy does acknowledge that innovation serves some purposes beyond
wealth creation, the introductory remarks from both Prime Minister Harper and Industry
Minister Bernier make it clear that the primary role of the government is to create a
framework for private sector, profit driven innovation.51
The government’s belief that the private sector serves as the locus for innovation is also
evident in its attempts to develop a digital economy strategy. Though the Canadian
government has undertaken a consultation process in this regard, a finalized strategy has
yet to be unveiled.52 The 2010 digital economy consultation paper, Improving Canada’s
Digital Advantage, clearly prioritizes the economic benefits of digital technology over
social gains.53 Just as in the 2007 science and technology strategy described above, this
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more recent consultation paper demonstrates the government’s continued conviction that
the private sector should take the lead in advancing the digital economy.54 While the
document does note that the government plans to increase access to government
information (a pledge which it followed through on with the creation of an open data
portal (data.gc.ca)55), it clearly suggests that IP mechanisms are the government’s
preferred stimulus for innovation. As Heritage Minister James Moore notes in his
opening remarks, “The Government of Canada’s role is to put in place a marketplace
framework in which creators, inventors and entrepreneurs have the incentives to
innovate, the confidence to take risks and the tools to succeed.”56 The document does
note that the government will entertain suggestions for fair and appropriate remuneration
schemes for creators,57 but it does so while extolling the virtues of the copyright system,
stating:
Canada’s copyright regime is the mechanism by which much of the economic value flows
through the networks of creation-production-distribution-consumption. The Copyright Act is
an important marketplace framework law and cultural policy instrument that must give
Canadian creators, citizens, and consumers the tools they need to compete in the global
digital economy. Innovation and creativity will grow where investments of time, energy and
money are secure and fairly rewarded.58

The government continually repeats the narrow view that new copyright legislation (with
expanded power for rights holders, particularly with respect to technological protection
measures) is central to its digital economy strategy.59 The government should be credited
with launching an open data portal that has now grown to include over 5300 general data
sets,60 but it has not displayed any enthusiasm for other alternatives to IP such as OA and
prizes. Although the 2010 consultation document has not resulted in a formal digital
economy strategy being unveiled, it appears likely that the Government of Canada will
continue to view its role as one of simply expanding IP incentives, particularly in the
realm of copyright, while providing tepid support for alternative mechanisms for
encouraging the production and distribution of intellectual goods.
While the policy mechanisms employed by the U.S. and Canadian governments differ in
many regards, the most important difference is ideological. The Obama administration
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has carved out a clear role for government in encouraging innovation, while the Canadian
government seeks only to create an environment for business to innovate. Furthermore
there is a stronger tendency in the U.S. to link innovation with broader social goals, while
Canadian policy is overwhelmingly concerned with supporting innovation to increase
productivity and economic growth. Although governments attach great importance to the
goal of innovation, it is crucial these policies are met with critical examination. Because
innovation can be incentivized through a variety of mechanisms, a governmental
preference for access-limiting exclusionary rights must be justified with evidence that it
produces a greater amount of innovative activity. Furthermore, it is crucial that the
mechanisms used to encourage innovation be capable of directing innovative activity for
broader social purposes than simply improvements to productivity and economic
performance. In this regard the next section examines the danger of an increasingly
hollow innovation discourse, which is the case for both countries.
B. The Danger of Empty Rhetoric on Innovation
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Advisory Committee on Measuring
Innovation in the 21st Century Economy, innovation has become “a word of our times.”61
However, the excessive invocation by governments and corporations of innovation as a
panacea for all problems is troublesome in several regards. As the word is used with
increased frequency by corporate and governmental leaders as well as a blossoming
industry of consultants, lobbyists and pundits, its meaning is lost; it becomes simply a
descriptor for something new even if it is not better than what existed previously.
Rhetorically, the term functions as something that is both simultaneously inevitable (on
the descriptive level) and imperative (on the prescriptive level).62 Translated into
corporate rhetoric it becomes exemplified in the slogan “Innovate or Die”63 – a dogmatic
mantra that suggests firms must innovate or be eliminated by Schumpeter’s perennial
gale. The focus on the prescriptive imperative for innovation in such corporate rhetoric
ignores the fact that innovative activity is inherently risky and can be socially wasteful. 64
A second and more troublesome aspect of innovation is its strong positive connotation.
Because so many innovations can be beneficial, a pro-innovation bias has emerged that
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implies innovations should be diffused rapidly, broadly adopted, and not rejected.65 The
pro-innovation bias is strengthened by the fact that successful innovations are often well
researched and studied, while failed innovations are often less well known and may not
have left enough empirical traces to allow researchers to substantively study them. 66 The
pro-innovation bias is also reinforced by the concept of the romantic author/inventor.67 In
innovation discourses the individual is extolled as a creative genius, while the
contributions of the public domain are minimized.68 George Gershwin, for example,
borrowed heavily from African-American culture in composing Rhapsody in Blue and
Porgy and Bess. Despite this obvious indebtedness to African-American culture, nonAfrican-American audiences and critics lauded his work as innovative and the result of
individual genius.69 In addition, the marginalization of the public domain’s contributions
to innovation has been particularly acute in the area of traditional knowledge, where
firms have succeeded in patenting non-novel applications of various foreign plant
properties. For example, the agrochemical company W.G. Grace successfully patented
the fungicidal properties of the Indian neem tree,70 although it should be noted that W.G
Grace’s European patent was revoked by the EPO in 2005.71
The positive connotation of innovation can also be so strong that negative aspects of
innovation can become hardly conceivable. To illustrate this point, let us consider the
cases of both illegal and legal drug trading and manufacturing. Crack cocaine, for
example, provides only marginal benefits (it is potentially quite lucrative for its nonusing dealers), while on the whole it is an innovation that has created considerable social
and health problems.72 While the impact of crack cocaine is almost wholly negative, even
innovative pharmaceuticals can result in undesirable outcomes. New opioid pain
relievers such as oxycodone (sold under the brand names of OxyContin and Percocet),
which were introduced as alternatives to morphine for pain relief, now result in more
lethal overdoses than heroin and cocaine combined in the U.S.73 While these drugs do
offer innovative forms of pain relief, they have also produced considerable hardships.
It is therefore crucial to focus on how innovations can alter social relations depending on
how, by whom and to what ends they may be used, rather than focusing solely on the
technological features of the innovation itself. As well, some technologies that are
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beneficial in the aggregate have detrimental effects in specific contexts. For example, the
introduction of technology to determine the sex of fetuses in rural India and China has
had unintended, yet pernicious consequences. In both of these countries, a culturally and
economically influenced preference for sons has led to widespread abortions of female
fetuses, which has contributed to a growing and significant gender gap. In another
example, the introduction of the snowmobile in the Lapp regions of Finland has reduced
travel times for Skolt reindeer herders, but it has also fueled inequality and
unemployment in Skolt communities.74 In addition, innovation has a tendency to increase
existing socioeconomic inequalities as early adopters are better suited to exploit a new
technology to their benefit.75 As noted by Rogers in his review of innovation studies,
“when the issue of equality has been investigated, it has been shown that the diffusion of
innovations often widens the socioeconomic gap between the higher- and lowersocioeconomic status segments in a system,” adding that this phenomenon occurs in both
advanced and developing nations.76
The strong positive connotation of innovation and its dualistic imperative and inevitable
qualities have made the word not simply “a word of our times” as suggested by the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Advisory Committee, but the word of our times. Roszak has
argued that ‘information’ has become a godword of our time – a seemingly neutral term
that acts a guise for the underlying technocratic political agenda.77 Roszak’s concept of a
godword is particularly useful; however, it is innovation not information that has become
the godword of the 21st century. While information appears to be a seemingly neutral
term, innovation is even more appealing, and is “heavily laden with positive value.”78
The positive connotation of innovation and the pro-innovation bias have obscured how
innovation is employed within capitalism. The term is a useful guise for capitalist
accumulation driven by wealth maximizing self-interest. It has become reified and is
celebrated as the key to both national and corporate salvation.79 It obfuscates the
relentless capitalist tendency to carve out new markets, stimulate previously unknown
wants and restructure social relationships under the principles of efficiency and profit
maximization. The term has become increasingly conceptualized on an overly economic
and instrumentalist basis as means for increasing productivity and wealth. However,
innovation can serve broader purposes than a narrow, instrumentalist self-interest. The
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next section explores how the conception of innovation as a means to achieve moral,
social and political progress has shifted to an increasingly narrow mechanism for
advancing self-interest.
C. Progress, Innovation and IP
This section examines the connection between the ideas of progress and innovation. It
begins by examining the Enlightenment conception that progress should be sought for its
ability to result in political, economic, social and moral improvement. The second part of
this section explores the idea of progress as found in the IP clause in the U.S.
Constitution. After reviewing the historical approaches to the concept of progress, this
section analyzes how in current discourse innovation is often constructed in a narrow,
instrumentalist, economic manner as simply a mechanism to increase productivity and
wealth, as the concern for moral and social improvement has declined. The section
concludes that self-interest is poorly suited as a means for achieving progress,
highlighting the limitations of innovation itself to achieve progress.
i. Enlightenment View of Progress
The Enlightenment view of progress was a belief that technological improvement and
expanding knowledge of the forces of nature should lead not only to material but also to
political, social and moral improvement.80 This conception of progress was in large part
generated by the scientific advances of the Enlightenment and the successful American
and French Revolutions.81 However, the guillotining of 1100 Parisians in the Jacobin
Terror partially tempered such optimism.82 Condorcet, one of the leading proponents of
the idea of progress, placed central emphasis on social and moral progress. He stressed
that advances in the arts and sciences as a means to increase welfare and prosperity were
only one avenue of progress and they should be complemented by improvements in
intellectual, moral and physical faculties.83 His enthusiasm for scientific and artistic
progress to solve human problems led him to the conclusion that moral progress and
advances in human reasoning would be necessary to prevent the world from becoming
overpopulated.84 Condorcet’s conviction in the idea of progress was so strong that he
wrote his seminal treatise on the topic, Sketch for an Historical Picture of the Progress of
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the Human Mind, while hiding from Robespierre’s Committee for Public Safety.85
Condorcet’s general attitude was shared by many other thinkers at that time including
Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot in France, as well as Joseph Priestley and William Godwin
in England.86 For these Enlightenment thinkers political, social, moral and economic
improvement together were each necessary elements of progress.
The importance of moral and social progress resonated in discussions on innovation and
patenting, particularly during the anti-patent debate that occurred in 19th century
Europe.87 An 1851 editorial in The Economist noted, “The progress of knowledge, and
the progress of invention and discovery, like the progress of population and the progress
of society, have their ordained that settled course, which cannot be hastened, though
perhaps it may be retarded, by Patent Laws.”88 The Enlightenment view of progress also
had a strong influence on America’s Founding Fathers.89 In his observations on America,
de Tocqueville even suggested that faith in progress was so strong in the U.S. that it
seemed to defy reason.90 As in Europe the Enlightenment idea of progress influenced
thinking on innovation and ownership of knowledge. For example, Franklin rejected a
patent on the Franklin Stove that he invented on a principled decision that inventions
should be for the benefit of all.91 In a famous 1813 letter Jefferson suggests that of all
kinds of property, ownership of ideas is the least amenable to exclusive property rights
because the same idea can be possessed by numerous individuals at one time. Jefferson
also likens knowledge to a flame in that sharing it with others does not diminish the
original owner’s utility of it.92 However, in the same letter he also endorsed the idea that
society could grant inventors the exclusive right to profit off of their inventions.93
Although Franklin and Jefferson were not specifically involved in the drafting of the U.S.
IP clause, the idea of progress and the word ‘progress’ specifically appear in the clause.94
The next sub-section examines the use of the term ‘progress’ in the U.S. Constitution and
its lasting effect on American jurisprudence.
ii. Progress and the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution
Progress appears explicitly in the U.S. Constitution’s IP clause. Although the IP clause in
the U.S. Constitution appears relatively straight forward, over the last 10 years there has

197
been a considerable amount of scholarly research addressing the meaning of progress in
the context of the U.S. constitution.95 Although there is limited historical evidence to
glean exactly what ‘progress’ means in the IP clause, the promotion of progress is the
foundational purpose of U.S. IP law.
While the term ‘progress’ is central to U.S. IP legislation, it has never been defined by
the Supreme Court, and the high court has never used it to limit any expansionary
legislation.96 In Eldred v. Ashcroft for example the Supreme Court endorsed the
argument of the Court of Appeals District of Columbia Circuit that the preambular
statement “To promote the progress of science,” is not a substantive limit on Congress’
power.97 Despite the decision that the preamble does not limit Congress’ power to create
IP rights, the Supreme Court has consistently upheld the notion that encouraging
innovative activity is the primary purpose the IP clause. In the 1829 case Pennock v.
Dialogue the Supreme Court stated:
While one great object [of the clause] was, by holding out a reasonable
reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for
a limited period, to stimulate the efforts of genius; the main object was "to
promote the progress of science and useful arts;" and this could be done best,
by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the
thing invented, at as early a period as possible, having a due regard to the
rights of the inventor.98
This view has been consistently echoed in Supreme Court decisions since.99 It should be
noted that the Canadian Patent Act and Copyright Act make no such specific reference to
the goal of progress.100
Although scholars have been unable to determine the exact meaning of ‘progress’ as used
in the U.S. Constitution, what is clear is that progress is the primary purpose of IP law.
While progress and innovation are not exact synonyms the two terms are related, and the
string of decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court reveal that the ideas of progress,
innovation and the public good should lie at the heart of IP law. Despite the historical
conception of progress, there has been a recent tendency to conflate economic growth as
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the sole measure of progress and to neglect the need for political, social and moral
progress.
iii. The Modern Conflation of Economic Growth with Progress
By the middle of the 19th century American sentiment was increasingly prone to viewing
improved technology as an indicator of progress in and of itself without consideration of
how such technology could bring about moral, social and political improvement.101 There
are several reasons for this changing conception of progress. At the broadest level the
Industrial Revolution and its seemingly endless stream of new machines has helped give
rise to an increasingly technological conception of progress. However, viewing the
Industrial Revolution as a series of positive technological developments also requires
ignoring the numerous social problems it produced including the exploitation of both
adult and child workers and high rates of injury and death.102 In the U.S. the success of
the revolution and passage of the Bill of Rights suggested that a large degree of political,
social and moral improvement had already been achieved.103 As the 19th century
progressed industrial capitalists began to take on an increasingly prominent role in
American society. Unlike the Founding Fathers who viewed progress through their
experiences in the revolution, these new captains of industry placed greater faith in
technological progress as it had been the source of their wealth.104 The focus on the
benefits of technological progress by American magnates gained currency within the
larger population as the nation emerged as a global leader in several fields of 19th century
technologies, from steel and oil to electricity.105 By the end of the 19th century the
American attitudes towards progress had become increasingly technocratic and focused
on the idea of efficiency driven in part by the successes of Edison, Carnegie and Taylor
in particular.106 In the 20th century skepticism about the ability of technology to deliver
social improvement was reinforced by the two World Wars, the industrial extermination
apparatus of Nazis, the specter of nuclear annihilation and the spread of technocratic
thought.107 Although economic growth and material improvement have been an aspect of
the idea of progress from the Enlightenment onward,108 increasingly technocratic thought
and Solow’s work on innovation and growth in the middle of the 20th century109 have
given rise to a narrow, economic, instrumentalist conception of innovation as the only
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means to achieve gains in wealth and productivity.
The instrumentalist view of progress is problematic in several regards. The succession of
successful technological innovations has created the illusion that new devices are the
indicator of progress, and provided fertile ground for a technological fetishism that
suggests problems can always be overcome by some sort of technological or
organizational innovation.110 This fetish leads to a belief that technological progress is an
end in itself,111 minimizing the other and equally if not more important role of changes in
norms, values and social relations.112 Furthermore, such technological fetishism ignores
the fact that new innovations create new problems, from the danger of industrial pollution
to the abuse of opioid painkillers.113 Technological fetishism and the pro-innovation bias
have given rise to new conceptions of morality. Technologically determinist information
society theories that celebrate advances in technology have also conflated technical and
moral progress.114 This ethic has advanced an amoral calculus of progress conflating
instrumental rationality with morality and technical improvement as social progress.115
While the innovations of the Industrial Revolution gave rise to the view that improved
technology was an indicator of progress in and of itself, this view has been reinforced
with more modern inventions, despite the problems such innovations create. Advances in
ICTs that facilitate exchanges of a range of media at high speeds across the globe have
convinced many segments of the population that ICT innovation itself is progress.116
However, the constant connectivity provided by such technologies can lead to a
diminution of time for reflection and critical thought.117 Technologies such as cellphones
and email have also increased expectations of workers, particularly those who must be on
call at all hours.118 Though new technologies have provided vastly expanded consumer
goods markets, there has been a concomitant narrowing of the labour market with work
becoming increasingly specialized and repetitive.119 Labour saving innovations, which
are highly valued by the owners of the means of production, are used not to increase the
leisure time of workers, but to ensure a large industrial (and informational) reserve army
and cheapen the value of labour.120 While rapid advances in ICTs appear to suggest a
steadily increasing rate of innovation little attention is paid to how such technologies are
promoted to stimulate previously unknown wants. Despite the narrow-sightedness of the
instrumentalist view of progress, literature on IP has become acutely affected by the
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tendency to ignore innovation’s ability to address political, social and moral problems.
Recent literature on IP tends to narrowly overemphasize the economic aspect of
innovation. For example consider the following passage from a recent editorial in The
Globe and Mail on the importance of innovation for those outside of the corporate world:
In our increasingly competitive and integrated global economy, innovation is another word
that carries significant weight and meaning – but not just for the for-profit element of our
society.
Policy makers, academic and research institutions, industry and trade associations, and
think tanks -- across Canada and around the world -- are also investing considerable time
and resources to better understand, develop, employ, or manage innovation in order to
facilitate competitive advantage, productivity growth and/or economic expansion either for
themselves or their respective communities.121

Nowhere are the non-economic benefits of innovation considered in this typical account
of the importance of innovation. More worrisome is the rise of the instrumentalist
conception of innovation in policy documents on IP. The USPTO appears to have
forgotten the Constitutional clause linking IP with progress, instead focusing on rights
maximization.122 The USPTO is beholden to the reductionist view that strong IP
incentives are necessary to drive innovation for the purposes of economic growth,123 and
its most recent strategic plan has only two primary goals – improve workforce excellence
and facilitate economic growth – neither of which seem intimately attached to the idea of
progress in science and the arts.124 The shortsightedness of the USPTO is not unique.
The mission of the Canadian Intellectual Property Office is to “accelerate Canada’s
economic development,” and while one of its goals includes fostering innovation, its
vision, mission and values statement makes no reference to actually improving the lives
of Canadians.125 WIPO describes its purpose as, “dedicated to developing a balanced and
accessible international intellectual property (IP) system, which rewards creativity,
stimulates innovation and contributes to economic development while safeguarding the
public interest.”126 However, the organization’s governing document, the WIPO
Convention, clearly states that the objectives of WIPO are promoting the protection of IP
and is silent on the issue of innovation or promotion of the public good.127 Even critical
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analyses of IP can become trapped in the view that the purpose of IP rights is to facilitate
growth. For instance, a recent review of the U.K.’s IP system by Ian Hargreaves
commissioned by the Prime Minister’s Office identified several of the shortcomings of
the expansionary trend; however, the report failed to examine the benefits of innovation
beyond economic growth.128 The tendency by organizations and offices responsible for
IP protection to view such rights in an overly economic and instrumentalist view is
particularly troubling given how innovation is crucial to addressing political, social,
environmental, moral and economic problems.
Although the instrumentalist conception of progress and innovation is becoming
increasingly common, there are still proponents of the Enlightenment view of progress.
Groups such as the Center for American Progress clearly view innovation as crucial to
addressing more than just economic problems.129 Several notable international
organizations still emphasize the connection between progress and innovation. The
OECD notes that innovation should be used to make peoples’ lives better. 130 The
organisation also suggests that innovation can combat major problems facing the globe
such as climate change and food security.131 The World Health Organization (WHO)
clearly notes that access to medical innovations is not simply a scientific, medicinal and
economic problem, but also a moral issue.132 The WTO’s Doha Round Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health acknowledges that IP rights should not be a barrier
to protecting public health.133 Even WIPO, despite its rather instrumentalist governing
document, suggests that alternative innovation mechanisms have a role to play in
advancing public interest oriented innovation.134
Although there is some recognition of the role innovation should play for improving
moral, social, political and economic conditions, innovation is all too often simply
celebrated for its ability to effect the latter of these changes. However, a greater problem
exists in discourse on innovation – the overemphasis on the role of self-interest as the
mechanism to drive innovation and progress.
iv. Shortcomings of Self-Interest as a Mechanism to Achieve Progress
The primary problem with the economic view that conflates growth with progress is that
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it overestimates the ability of self-interested individuals and the invisible hand to achieve
progress. Smith’s veneration of self-interested motives in The Wealth of Nations must be
read along with his discussion about the importance of non-self-interested motives such
as sympathy and benevolence in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Yet over the last 200
years his simplified framework for economic analysis has pushed aside his more nuanced
view of human nature. 135 The rise of utilitarianism and the 19th century emphasis on the
importance of personal liberty further reinforced the view that self-interest should be
celebrated.136 In the case of IP, the role of self-interest and discourse on incentivization
has taken on specific significance. It is clear that today’s IP system produces selfinterested incentives for innovation; however, this situation does not reflect the empirical
evidence that non-IP incentives are often more powerful motivators for innovation than
patents and copyrights.137 At a minimum, if IP is going to be used to maximize an
economic value it should be consumer welfare and not private wealth.138 Even when
consumer welfare is prioritized over private wealth maximization the capitalist market
structure and its pecuniary incentives are poorly suited for directing innovation to address
social, political and environmental problems,139 though they excel in creating an
insatiable demand for an apparently never ending array of consumer goods.140
Schumpeter’s famous passage noting that capitalism’s success had been its ability to take
a good once enjoyed only by the rich such as stockings and make them available to
factory girls141 has given rise to arguments that economic growth (‘growing the
(economic) pie’) is always preferable to redistributive mechanisms.142 It serves the
neoliberal argument that the benefits of innovation and wealth creation will trickle down,
and casts aside the questions of in which directions and for what purposes should we
engage in innovative activity. Corporations will necessarily direct innovative activity
towards the areas of greatest potential profit. DuPont, the same company that developed
rayon which was then used to put stockings within the reach of the masses, has produced
an array of harmful innovations including ozone depleting chlorofluorocarbons
(CFCs),143 and participated in the Manhattan Project.144 Ultimately the neoliberal
glorification of self-interest, the single minded pursuit of profit and deregulation are not a
supportive framework for achieving progress writ large.145 In the same way Roszak
argued that information provided an innocent guise for its technocratic political
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agenda,146 innovation’s positive connotation and historical connection with moral and
social improvement provide an excellent pretense for activity that is increasingly
motivated by the narrowly self-interested pursuit of profit. However, such innovation is
not well suited to achieve meaningful progress.
v. Limitations of Innovation as a Means to Achieve Progress
In the same way that one must be critical of focusing on innovation for solely economic
purposes, emphasizing innovation for its ability to bring about progress also requires
careful scrutiny. Accentuating progressive social change must avoid the danger of
naively celebrating modernity and viewing history as having a linear trajectory. 147
Innovative technologies satisfy some material needs, but they can also bring about new
mechanisms for domination, exploitation and alienation.148 One must always be critical
of how an innovation can alter the existing social, political and economic orders.149
While innovation can improve lives and facilitate progress it can also increase the
possibility of catastrophe (for example nuclear annihilation).150 Most importantly, a belief
that future innovations will generate progress should not be used as an excuse to overlook
current problems.151
There should be no doubt that innovation can generate meaningful improvements in the
quality of life, and such progress must be the goal of innovative activity. However
innovation has become an increasingly hollow rhetorical trope used to legitimize highly
self-interested behaviour. Such usage undermines the important role innovation plays.
The final section in this chapter examines information society discourse and the central
role afforded to innovation (often accompanied by an unsatisfactory examination of the
role of IP rights) with a specific focus on the work of Bell, Castells and Harvey. It
concludes by examining the connection between information age rhetoric, innovation, IP,
neoliberalism and self-interest.
II. Innovation and the Information Society
Over the past 40 years there has been an increasing interest in the concept of the
emergence of an information society or information age. Although the topic has been

204
approached by a wide variety of scholars and theorists, approaches to analyzing the idea
of an information society are quite diverse. For instance, there are no fewer than a dozen
different terms used to describe the information age.152 Unsurprisingly, innovation plays
a key role in various theories of the information society. Proponents of the information
society and futurists often use celebratory, uncritical rhetoric when discussing the subject
of innovation. For example, it is Alvin Toffler who suggests that second wave industrial
society is giving way to third wave post-industrial society, and who argues that the
current “flood of innovation is unlike any seen before in human history.”153 In addition,
information society proponents such as Bell and Castells often fail to fully appreciate the
role played by IP rights in their glorifications of innovation. Conversely, critics of the
information society such as Harvey, Herbert Schiller and Dan Schiller tend to have a
much keener appreciation of the role played by IP. This section does not provide an
exhaustive review of all the various conceptions of the information society,154 but it
begins with an examination of Bell’s treatment of IP and innovation. The second part of
the section will examine Castells’ treatment of IP and innovation before contrasting his
and Bell’s approach with that of Harvey. Based on these examinations the concluding
section examines the connections between IP, innovation, neoliberalism and the extolling
of self-interest.
A. Bell’s Post-Industrial Society, IP and Innovation
Although Bell was not the first to broach the subject of the emergence of a new society
and a break with industrialism, his work represented a substantive break with previous
efforts due to its size and systematic nature, and has had considerable influence on
policymakers.155 While he has accumulated numerous critics over the past 40 years, Bell
continues to remain relevant and was one of the top ten most cited living social science
authors in the past decade.156 Bell claims that post-industrial society is characterized by a
fundamental shift in the treatment of knowledge. Unlike the industrial era where
knowledge is used to coordinate the production of goods, he argues that society will
move towards a system where codified theoretical knowledge is used to determine and
direct change, noting that in modern science-based industries such as computers and
electronics, production of goods is dependent on theoretical advances in scientific
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knowledge.157 According to Bell, theoretical knowledge becomes instrumental in
determining the direction of innovative activity.158 While Bell emphasizes the
importance of theoretical knowledge as the driver of R&D, he fails to appreciate the
lasting importance of entrepreneurial profit as a motive for directing innovative activity.
This omission occurs despite the fact that Bell himself acknowledges the influence of
Schumpeter on his own work.159
Bell is aware that intellectual property rights are an issue in the information society,
though he describes them as mundane.160 For Bell patents and copyrights provide an
incentive function, but these rights are weak given the relative ease with which they are
infringed upon or circumvented.161 Bell is cognizant of the public good nature of
information, but underappreciates how easily this public good becomes commodified or
of the role played by governments in facilitating such commodification. He correctly
predicts the rise of new knowledge-based industries, but crucially does not account for
the role of IP in the production and distribution of intellectual goods.162 While he views
information as a source of power, his analysis is weakened by failing to see that
informational power is greatly influenced by IP.163 Bell’s information exceptionalism
and uncritical treatment of the role of IP serve a specific ideological purpose. They allow
him to claim that the information society is disjunctive from its industrial predecessor
even though commodification remains a salient feature of both.164 Furthermore, because
he accords information a special role he fails to appreciate how interconnected
knowledge workers and the service industry are to the production and distribution of
industrial era, tangible goods.165 As Webster bluntly and definitively states, “There is no
novel, ‘post-industrial’ society: the growth of service occupations and associated
developments highlight continuities of the present with the past.”166 Rather than view the
rise of service based occupations as an extension of an increasingly complex industrial
economy, Bell conceives of such changes as indicators of a radical change with the past.
Although Bell’s work contains many insightful passages it is marred by two primary
flaws – a technologically determinist viewpoint and a naïve optimism.167 Bell vehemently
rejects the suggestion that he is a technological determinist;168 however, his claim is
undermined by his own writing: for example, “technology has created a new class,”169
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and “technology has created a new definition of rationality.”170 Even innovation is
technologically determined as he posits “economic innovation and change directly
depend on new technology,”171 eliminating the human element in innovation. Bell’s
technological determinist framework precludes critical questions from scrutiny such as
who selects the new technologies to be developed and who benefits from their diffusion.
In turn his determinism facilitates a naïve optimism. He rejects Schumpeter’s pessimistic
assessment of the future of capitalism, as he believes that increased planning and greater
innovation will allow for the fulfillment of needs.172 In so doing, he does not account for
the continuing strength of the capitalist logic of accumulation. Bell is naïve to believe
that the primacy of economic growth would be displaced by the codification of
theoretical knowledge as the axial principle of society.173 He also underappreciates the
role of self-interest in governing human action. Bell states that the rising class of
knowledge workers will place greater emphasis on professionalism and respect from
peers resulting in a decline of emphasis on self-interest.174 His assertion that knowledge
workers would rise in prominence has not been borne out, and in many cases the reverse
is true as such workers are increasingly subordinated to capital.175 Despite the continued
primacy of capital, Bell’s optimistic assessment of the role of the knowledge elite has
proven a powerful mechanism at garnering adherents.176 Harris et al. note, “Another
major source of Bell’s success surely lies in his subtle privileging of the new class of
‘information professionals’… intellectuals, businessmen, government officials, teachers,
librarians and all others who immediately recognize the potential for personal growth in
status and wealth in the new information society.”177 In claiming that the social,
economic and cultural spheres are separate and distinct entities Bell is able to focus on
the technological changes while ignoring the pervasiveness of capital across all areas of
life.178
However it is specifically because of these shortcomings that Bell’s analysis has proven
so palatable for policymakers. His optimism and technocratic vision have allowed his
adherents to suggest that any new problems in post-industrial society will be remedied by
social planners and their increased use of theoretical knowledge.179 Bell’s general
optimism and his technological determinism appear to suggest that for whatever
problems post-industrial society may engender, some technological innovation exists to
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solve such problems. Most importantly, he dismisses IP as a mundane issue, and fails to
appreciate the increasing importance of economically self-interested behaviour.
B. Innovation and IP in Castells’ Network Society
Although Manuel Castells’ writings on the network society and informational capitalism
are different from Bell’s conception of a post-industrial society, the two share much in
common, despite Castells’ clear rejection of Bell’s thesis.180 Castells’ writing has a
commanding scope, with The Information Age trilogy spanning nearly 1500 pages. Of all
authors on the topic, his work is the most encyclopedic and to the uncritical eye it appears
the most persuasive.181 Castells places technological innovation and information at the
centre of his theory of the emergence of a network society stating that innovation is the
“primordial function” of the new economy.182 Though Bell contends that theoretical
knowledge is displacing capital and labour in post-industrial society as the axial principle
in society, Castells adopts a slightly different approach arguing that entrepreneurial
innovation, not capital, is driving the internet economy.183 His argument is based on the
analysis of Silicon Valley where successful entrepreneurs capitalized (literally) on new
ideas, while established firms that failed to innovate ended up losing out financially.184
There is an even greater degree of Schumpeterian influence in Castells’ work, and he
specifically places the idea of creative destruction at the centre of his ideas noting, “the
‘spirit of informationalism’ is the culture of ‘creative destruction’ accelerated to the speed
of the optoelectronic circuits that process its signals.”185 This passage is crucial in two
regards. First, it evinces that Castells believes the “gale of creative destruction”186 has
picked up speed (perhaps it is now a tempest or tornado of creative destruction), but more
importantly it suggests that the same phenomenon Schumpeter identified as an essential
fact about capitalism remains in the information age.
Castells provides several critical and valuable insights. He recognizes the importance of
the pursuit of profit in driving innovation, arguing that it is the primary motive in the
internet economy.187 He is also critical of this facet of the information age, arguing that it
is accompanied with a focus on immediate gratification, workaholism, superfluous
consumption and a diminished emphasis on family and personal relationships.188 He
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notes:
Individualism is the rule; so, left alone to themselves, entrepreneurs use their extra dose of
adrenalin to speed up their drive of creative destruction that ultimately leads to destructive
creation. That is, to a creation of wealth in money and technology that thrives on the ruins of
the social and personal lives consumed in the process. 189

He highlights the dangers of growing inequality and most importantly the limitations of a
culture of excess centered on individual self-interest.190 He also acknowledges the
ideological hegemony of neoliberalism in the 1990s.191 While Castells offers some
important insights and his work is admirable for attempting to provide a theoretical
connection between seemingly discrete phenomena, it is not without serious
shortcomings.
Castells’ failure to include a substantive discussion of IP in his Information Age trilogy
has been described as a fundamental flaw.192 This omission is particularly troubling
because innovation is a central topic in Castells’ work. In The Rise of the Network
Society he argues that the two factors driving innovation are research potential, the ability
to engage in research, and specification ability, the application of research to a specific
problem.193 He does not address the role of IP or its alternatives in incenting innovative
activity. In The Internet Galaxy he stresses that entrepreneurs are key factors in
innovation, but there is no substantive discussion of IP and its role in either facilitating or
impeding innovation.194 When he does address IP his treatment is more passing than
substantive. In The Information Age trilogy he notes that “intellectual property rights are
a key factor in the development of the knowledge economy,”195 yet besides this reference
to how they inhibit wealth distribution he makes only two other passing references to the
subject.196 His argument that society is switching from one dominated by hierarchies to
one shaped by the increasing importance of networks is undermined by the fact that
shareholder ownership and hierarchical management structures continue to dominate
corporate practices.197 He claims that innovation depends on access to knowledge that is
openly available, seemingly discounting both the role of IP as an incentive and its
restrictions on the flow of knowledge.198 Castells stresses that the primary issue around
innovation is how to harness it without limiting creativity and research,199 which is a
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critical issue, but he fails to see through this analysis by including a discussion of IP.
Castells’ later writings contain a few direct references to the role of IP. He notes that IP
is central to profit making in the economy, and that the balance between users’ and
creators’ rights is being lost.200 He describes the debate over the role of IP as a key
battle, and also concludes that business models based around IP cannot succeed as they
will be supplanted by some sort of alternative.201 However, he fails to complete this
analysis by demonstrating how alternatives will triumph. Castells’ 2005 essay “The
Network Society: From Knowledge to Policy,” contains a seminal paragraph on IP. He
writes:
Creativity and innovation are the key drivers of value creation and social change in our
societies—in fact in all societies. In a world of digital networks, the process of interactive
creativity is contradicted by the legislation of property rights inherited from the industrial
era. Moreover, because large corporations have built their wealth and power on the control of
these property rights, regardless of the new conditions of innovation, companies and
governments are making the communication of innovation even more difficult than in the
past. The capture of innovation by an intellectually conservative business world may well
stall the new waves of innovation on which the creative economy and a redistributive
network society depend. Even more so at the global level, as intellectual property rights
become the key issue for latecomers in the global competition. International agreements on
the redefinition of intellectual property rights, starting with the well rooted practice of open
source software, is a must for the preservation on [sic] innovation and the fostering of
creativity on which depends human progress now and then. 202

This paragraph includes the important recognition that innovation and creativity should
serve the goal of human progress and it is also his strongest criticism of the danger of
expansive IP rights. However, Castells’ analysis is impaired by the fact that he stresses
that it is innovation not innovators (i.e. humans) that are the driving force behind
creativity. Furthermore, his suggestion that IP rights be redefined on the basis of open
source software is insufficient in two regards. First, he does not address the fact that
open source is ultimately underpinned by the copyright system; and second, he does not
show how such an alternative would work given the existing global IP framework and
limited degree of flexibility within TRIPS. While Castells’ more recent writings
demonstrate an increased awareness of the connection between IP and innovation, he still
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needs to present a more refined and thoughtful treatment of IP and its alternatives,
especially given the length at which he emphasizes innovation in his work.
Castells’ work is also without some problematic inconsistencies. He argues that the
entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley are not Schumpeterian, but then confuses his analysis by
noting that some are.203 He claims that entrepreneurial innovation, not capital, is central
the internet economy, but then notes that such entrepreneurialism would not be possible
without venture capital.204 Though he argues that “innovation is the driver of the new
economy,” this claim is immediately followed by the statement, “finance is the source of
everything.”205 This shortcoming frustrates his analysis as it becomes difficult to
determine what Castells believes is more important - innovation or capital.
Like Bell, Castells’ work has been subject to a fair deal of criticism and in many respects
lacks substantive differences with that of Bell’s analysis.206 Although he is less prone to
overstating the case for an information age than other information society proponents, his
work suffers from a degree of technological determinism, though lesser in degree than
that of Bell. He claims that information technology largely determines innovative
capacity.207 He even attempts to downplay the dilemma of technological determinism,
arguing that it is a “false problem.”208 His conception of informational labour is overly
broad, rendering it weak analytically. This broadness is such that even some traditionally
blue-collar positions can be considered as informational work.209 Castells claims that the
new economy exists on the basis of enhanced labour productivity and increased
competitiveness, both of which stem from innovation.210 While this argument contains
not only a degree of technological determinism, it is a general description of a capitalist
tendency and not one specific to the information age. The same argument could be used
to describe the Fordist era, Ford’s introduction of the assembly line, and Taylorist work
practices in particular. Enhanced labour productivity and increased competitiveness are
not indicators of a new economy as Castells views them, but historical tendencies of
capitalism. Furthermore, there is little empirical evidence to support Castells’ claim that
labour productivity has markedly increased in recent times. Although there was a period
of higher productivity growth in the U.S. under Reagan from 1982-86, it has largely
remained within the two to three percent range since the Civil War.211 His simplistic
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view of innovation is also a weakness. Even Bell is critical of Castells for failing to
differentiate between invention, innovation and the diffusion of innovation.212
Castells goes further than any other information society theorist in not only analyzing the
idea of a network/information society,213 but also extolling the benefits of innovation.
While he addresses the subject of innovation extensively it is only in his more recent
writings that he begins to reflect critically on the role of IP. His failure to engage the
topic at greater length, particularly given his relentless focus on innovation and
entrepreneurialism, is a major shortcoming. Castells draws on Schumpeter’s work,
although he does so selectively. Schumpeter initially believed that multiple motives were
behind entrepreneurialism, specifically discussed the role of IP, and most importantly
was not a technological determinist placing clear emphasis on the individuals
(entrepreneurs) rather than the innovations. Castells also claims that the primary change
in the nature of innovation from industrial creative destruction to informationalism is the
speed at which it occurs.214 This claim suggests that the network society represents only a
different degree of industrial capitalism rather than a different kind of capitalism. It also
obscures the importance of the changes in social relations, particularly the increased
emphasis on private property, market based solutions, and deregulation that has occurred
under neoliberalism. Castells provides some useful insights on the negative trends that
have occurred since the 1970s; however, like Bell, his overemphasis on the positive
elements of innovation, and lack of rigor in accounting for the role of exclusionary IP
rights limit the usefulness of his network society thesis.
C. Innovation and IP in Harvey’s Critique of Capitalism
David Harvey’s analysis of the changes taking place in society is antithetical to the work
of Castells and Bell. Juxtaposing Harvey’s work with that of Bell and Castells is
illuminating, because though he deals with the same subject matter as the others his
conclusions are significantly different. Furthermore, Harvey’s analysis has been
particularly insightful with regard to its ability to foresee recent crises in capitalism.
Notably, in 2006 Harvey foretold the 2007-08 property market crash,215 and he warned of
the dangers of burgeoning U.S. foreign debt well in advance of the August 2011 U.S.
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sovereign debt crisis.216 Harvey’s position differs from Castells’, who by contrast is
critical of the idea that the new economy will suffer from speculative bubbles.217
Like Castells and Bell, Harvey acknowledges the crucial role played by innovation;
however, drawing on Marx he views innovation as an essential and historical feature of
capitalism and not a new phenomenon.218 Furthermore, unlike proponents of the
information society, he is highly critical of certain kinds of innovation. While he
acknowledges that innovation is a historical element of capitalism, he argues the Cold
War arms race made innovation paramount because of the impending Soviet military
threat.219 He is critical of how social inequality is used to encourage entrepreneurial risk
taking.220 While Harvey acknowledges that innovation has produced new goods and
services, he is critical of how it can alter social relations in a destabilizing manner.221
Drawing on Marx, Harvey contends that the primary purpose of innovation is to speed
the money-commodity-money cycle and improve transport of commodities.222 The
stimulation of new wants and desires for the outputs of innovation introduces uncertainty
to labour markets and can wipe out whole economic sectors.223 Entrepreneurialism and
innovation are central elements of capitalism that not only facilitate economic action, but
more importantly create an environment where social relations are construed along
instrumentalist purposes.224 For capitalists, innovation is a necessary mechanism to
ensure profitability and labour surpluses that weaken the position of workers and lower
wages.225 Harvey argues that innovation accounts for the majority of U.S. job losses and
twice as many losses as caused by firms relocating production sites to locales outside of
the U.S.226 He is critical of Schumpeter for overemphasizing the benefits of creative
destruction while not sufficiently appreciating its necessarily destructive elements,227 and
romanticizing the role of entrepreneurs as the sole source of innovation.228 For Harvey
the increased spending on information technology is not evidence of a new economy, but
the result of technological change being shaped by financialization. He further argues that
such technology is given a privileged status in neoliberalism for its ability to facilitate
speculative activity.229
Harvey places primary emphasis on the role of innovation in facilitating the growth of
capitalism, with financial innovations playing a particularly important role since 1973
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due to the collapse of the international financial system developed at the end of World
War II at the Bretton Woods conference.230 Harvey pays special attention to financial
innovations including the development of electronic banking, plastic money, the creation
of futures and equity futures markets, currency and interest rate swaps, collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs), and credit default swaps, among others.231 The result is a trade in
these financial products that went from an insignificant value in 1990 to over $600
trillion annually by 2008232 - a value roughly 10 times global GDP for that year.233 The
purpose of these financial innovations is to absorb the massive sums of capital produced
in an effort to maintain economic growth.234 Ballooning capital surplus requires faster
rates of innovation, which also become more speculative in nature.235
While Harvey provides a pervasive critique of capitalist innovation, his view of
capitalism is not entirely negative. He does argue that capitalism on its own cannot be
blamed for things like urban sprawl and increased meat consumption that arise from
changes in socio-cultural preferences.236 Furthermore, he also notes that without
capitalism there may not have been a way to support the world’s expanding population
over the past three centuries unless alternative methods of providing goods had been
developed.237
Harvey is also much more attuned to the role of IP than most information society
advocates. He is critical of monopoly rent seeking that results from capitalist interest in
cultural activities, which can take forms as diverse as the production of sporting
spectacles like the Olympics and the commodification of tourism, but notes that IP rights
represent a particularly sinister form of rent seeking and monopoly rights.238 Rather than
viewing patents as a stimulant for innovation, he argues that monopoly rights help to
limit the pace of innovation and lessen the ability of innovation to destabilize
capitalism239 - a similar view to that of Schumpeter who saw patents as a mechanism for
stabilizing the economy in light of creative destruction. IP rights and the undermining of
common property rights are seen as one mechanism through which neoliberal
governments have facilitated a transfer of wealth to elites.240 He argues the
commodification of information is not a generative wealth creating process, but instead a
redistribution from the dispossessed (ranging from the holders of traditional knowledge
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to artistic labourers) to powerful rights holders.241 He is critical of how commodification
takes properties of things such as originality, uniqueness and creativity and transforms
them into commodities.242 Harvey warns that increasing IP rights may lead to the
eventual patenting of human life.243 IP is part of a broader pattern of commodification
that has occurred under neoliberalism where a range of common property rights have
been converted into private property against the broad will of the general public.244
Although he is highly critical of IP and capitalist innovation, Harvey is not opposed to
innovation per se; rather, he advocates for technological innovations that support the
common good and not private gain.245
Harvey’s criticism of the expanding neoliberal regime stands in sharp contrast to the
work of information society theorists such as Bell and Castells. His analysis
demonstrates that the changes occurring in society represent an exacerbation of the
destructive elements in capitalism. While others celebrate innovation, Harvey is highly
critical of the tendency for innovation to be used within a broader neoliberal capitalist
logic that promotes increased commodification and a strengthening of the power of elites.
More importantly, Harvey is mindful that there are a multitude of dynamic forces shaping
capitalism of which innovation is only a single but important factor.246 He demonstrates
a much clearer appreciation of the role of IP and its connection with innovation and
neoliberalism. Finally his analysis is greatly strengthened by his ability to foresee the
2007-08 economic crisis. Most importantly, while Bell celebrates the increasing
codification of theoretical knowledge and Castells emphasizes the spirit of
informationalism, Harvey directs attention toward neoliberalism and its centrality in
shaping changing social relations. Harvey’s critical examination of capitalism and
neoliberalism provide an extremely useful framework for analyzing the connection
between neoliberalism and innovation. This chapter concludes by further exploring the
connection between neoliberalism, innovation, IP and theories of the information society
with a particular emphasis on their connecting ideological commonalities.
D. Innovation, IP, and Neoliberalism
An examination of the connection between theories of the information society and

215
innovation on its own is insufficient. Theories of the information society are just that –
theories; without an inquiry into the actual political and economic changes that have
occurred over the past 40 years (roughly since the first edition of Bell’s postindustrial
thesis) such an analysis would fail to account for the ways in which information society
discourse has influenced policymakers. As discussed in chapter 3, there has been a
markedly expansionary IP policy centered in the U.S., but also manifested in other
advanced economies and perpetrated on a global scale through TRIPS. A second change
that requires scrutiny is the flourishing of neoliberalism and its relation to information
society discourse.
Information society discourse and neoliberalism are intimately linked. At first glance the
neoliberal approach which favours deregulation and celebrates the virtues of competition
unfettered by government interference would be at odds with monopoly IP rights;247
however, the fundamental principle behind neoliberalism is not the complete diminution
of the state but the use of state power to maximize the business climate for capital
accumulation.248 Both are premised on liberalism and the respect for property rights, and
emphasize the free market as the ideal allocative mechanism.249 Although information
society theorists often downplay the central role of IP rights, information age discourse
and neoliberal economic logic combine and mutually reinforce the notion that IP is
necessary to advance innovation.250 The promise of innovation and the potential for a
larger slice of an ever expanding economic pie are used to justify exclusionary rights that
limit access to knowledge.251 Information society rhetoric was used by Thatcher and
Reagan in the 1980s as part of their neoliberal policies that transferred increased power
from the state to private enterprise through deregulation and privatization.252 Bell’s work
had a direct influence on the Reagan administration253 and also provided a conceptual
underpinning to information society policies in Europe and the Clinton administration.254
Bell’s optimistic vision of a post-industrial future has not only influenced policymakers at
the highest level; it has also provided conceptual and rhetorical mechanisms that have
been used to deploy neoliberal policies.
Neoliberals have been adept at employing the idea of an information age to mask policies
where the greatest benefits accrue to those in the most privileged positions. For example,
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the Clinton administration’s National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action
begins with a series of promises including, “the vast resources of art, literature, and
science… [will be] available everywhere,” through networked computers and, “you could
see the latest movie, play the hottest video games… whenever you chose.”255 However,
the document goes on to detail how a major policy goal is the strengthening of IP rights
both domestically and internationally noting that while the public interest may lie in
broad dissemination, protection of IP is crucial.256 This approach is not uniquely
American; it is used in the recent Canadian government consultation paper on the digital
economy, and at an international level as the United Nation’s World Summit on the
Information Society which depicted, “a wholly utopian picture of an ‘Information
Society’ that grossly oversimplifies and generalizes a complex issue and social
phenomenon.”257 The allure of an information age with a never ending array of new
technologies to consume is the perfect guise for a neoliberal political agenda underpinned
by neoclassical economic logic.
The common ideological principle that unifies neoliberalism, information society
discourse, IP and innovation is the valorization of individual self-interest. Neoliberalism
is premised on promoting self-interest,258 but disguises this trait by employing rhetoric on
entrepreneurialism, freedom and empowerment.259 Information society proponents have
tended to underestimate the negative implications of the glorification of self-interest.
Even though Castells is critical of expanding individualism he still celebrates the Silicon
Valley entrepreneur.260 While Bell was aware of the primacy of self-interest and rampant
individualism in capitalism, he incorrectly assumed that such tendencies would weaken
rather than strengthen in post-industrial society.261 Bell and Castells’ failure to appreciate
the perils of individualism are particularly problematic given Schumpeter’s views on the
subject in which he correlates the rise of capitalism with the spirit of rationalist
individualism.262 Yet he goes further arguing that capitalism’s gift to the peasant is the
“individualist rope he needed in order to hang himself.”263 The perils of self-interest were
not lost on other prominent sociologists. Weber was aware that early 20th century
capitalism’s emphasis on individualism and self-interest limited the potential for selfless
entrepreneurs such as Franklin.264 Veblen was highly critical of the invidious nature of
self-interest and the dangers of pecuniary emulation – the desire to rival and surpass
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others in wealth or status.265 More recent critical scholarship from a range of voices has
identified numerous dangers in rampant individualism. Dan Schiller notes that
individualism facilitates capital accumulation by promoting consumption.266 Harvey
argues the focus on individualism creates an effective barrier to forming meaningful
social solidarities,267 while Giddens claims neoliberalism’s continued focus on
marketization and individualism undermines traditional values and institutions.268 The
accentuation of individualism and personal rights creates a powerful though not
insurmountable ideological shield for neoliberalism as many oppositional forces often
emphasize the value of individualism.269 Because of the strong positive connotation of
innovation, it is employed in information society discourse as a guise to hide the
underlying neoliberal policies, with expansionary IP policy being a central policy plank.
Extolling IP as an incentive of “outstanding significance” 270 occurs not because it is (a
claim that the empirical evidence does not support), but rather because it serves the
neoliberal logic of increased commodification and exclusionary property rights.
Alternatives are all too often marginalized not because they are ineffective – the success
of FOSS and OA demonstrate that they can be effective – but because they oppose the
logic of privatization and individualism. While innovation possesses great potential to
improve the human condition and generate real progress, through the confluence of
neoliberalism, information age rhetoric, and neoclassical economic logic it has been
pressed into the service of the relentlessly self-interested society.
The coopting of innovation rhetoric to serve the neoliberal policy agenda does not
diminish the potential of innovation. It is crucial to note that the neoliberal mindset and
its focus on efficiency, individualism, entrepreneurialism and limited government is itself
an innovation in social norms. In the same way that Schumpeter’s perennial gale can
relegate giant corporations to the dustbin of history, innovation in social norms can
resuscitate the Enlightenment ideal of encouraging innovation to advance political, social,
moral and economic progress. It is in this regard that substantive alternatives to IP have
their greatest potential. Substantive alternatives can and should be promoted because
they rely on a range of incentive structures and encourage innovation without limiting
access, but their most important contribution is advancing an ideological and normative
viewpoint that values progressive social change, inclusion and cooperation rather than
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commodification, exclusion and the self-interested pursuit of profit.
With the three facets of the framework for analyzing alternatives to IP complete, this
study now examines its two case studies. The first case is the SAC’s proposal for a
monthly fee on internet access to license non-commercial file sharing, and the second
case is defensive publishing. Each case study will be examined through the three facets incentives structures, innovatory outcomes and ideological characteristics. Following the
analysis of the case studies the dissertation concludes with an assessment of alternatives
to IP and policy recommendations.
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Chapter Seven – Case Studies: The Songwriters Association of
Canada ISP Proposal and Defensive Publishing as Alternatives
to Intellectual Property
This chapter examines two case studies – the Songwriters Association of Canada’s
proposal for a monthly ISP fee to allow music file sharing as an alternative to copyright
and defensive publishing as an alternative to patenting. The analysis of each case study
follows the framework set out in the previous chapters and scrutinizes each alternative on
the role of incentives, the prospects for innovative activity and the ideological elements.
The final section of the chapter briefly contrasts the findings of the two case studies.
Building on the discussion in the three previous chapters, it is important to note that
substantive alternatives should employ a range of incentive structures as a narrow
reliance on direct pecuniary incentives is likely to engender a limited range of innovation.
Substantive alternatives must also facilitate access to the resulting intellectual good or
service or its informational content, unlike IP which relies on exclusionary rights.
Finally, substantive alternatives should not embody the same ideological characteristics
and normative viewpoints as IP. In this regard substantive alternatives must value
innovation for more than narrow economic reasons. It is crucial that alternatives differ
from IP in each of these three facets if they are to be substantive alternatives capable of
addressing the problems of the expansionary IP regime.
I. The Songwriters Association of Canada ISP Levy Proposal
This case study examines the Songwriters Association of Canada proposal for a monthly
fee on internet service providers (ISPs) that would license and monetize all forms of
music file sharing. It begins by providing some context around the issue of online file
sharing and a summary of the SAC’s proposal before examining the incentive structures
employed under the proposal, its ability to generate innovation, and the ideological
dimensions of the proposal.
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A. Overview
i. Historical Context
The SAC proposal to monetize file sharing occurs alongside a series of social, legal and
technological changes stretching back slightly more than a decade that have dramatically
altered the music industry both domestically and internationally. From a high point in the
late 1990s the music industry has severely contracted losing nearly half of its total global
value.1 Most significant has been the decline in CD sales. In Canada in 1999, the
industry shipped 58,353 CDs for a total sale value of $699,971 (CAD) representing
nearly 92% of the industry’s total sales.2 Ten years later the volume of CDs shipped fell
by more than 50% to 28,685 units worth only $289,604 (CAD). Although digital sales
added another $89,398 to the industry in 2009 – a revenue source that did not exist ten
years earlier – the overall sales of the industry totaled just 53% of their 1999 numbers.3
The decline of the recording industry has occurred concurrently with the rise of the
internet and file sharing. While illegal file sharing and other unauthorized forms of
copyright infringement have affected all content industries, the music industry has been
acutely impacted with the OECD identifying it as the content industry with the highest
scope of unauthorized online downloading.4 Because of their small file size, typically
about 4MB per song in MP3 format, file sharing of songs has historically been much
more popular than films and TV shows which are considerably larger.5 Estimates suggest
that up to 95% of online music downloads are done via unauthorized services or
networks.6 While the digital music market has expanded considerably totaling over 400
licensed download or streaming services globally and is now worth $4.6 billion, it has not
been able to compensate for the decline in CD sales.7 The sharp decline of fortunes in the
recording industry has resulted in a range of business models and legal tactics that have
attempted to stem the tide of illegal file sharing including the SAC’s proposal.
ii. The Rise of File Sharing, the Success of Firm-Level Litigation and the Failure of John
Doe Lawsuits
Since the 1950s a series of new and disruptive copying technologies have affected
various intellectual goods producers and distributers. Publishers were initially fearful of
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the danger posed by the photocopier, cassette tapes alarmed the music industry, and the
movie industry attempted to quash the videocassette market in its infancy. However,
these disruptive technologies were markedly different than the advent of peer-to-peer
(P2P) file sharing. Photocopying and audio/video cassette recording produces imperfect
copies, and often requires equipment that has traditionally been prohibitively expensive.8
With P2P software, a computer and an internet connection individuals can gain access to
extensive catalogues of content that can be downloaded with relative ease. Large scale
P2P file sharing began in mid-1999 with launching of Napster.9 Though the recording
industry was successful in getting Napster shut down,10 new services such as Grokster
(which stopped offering file sharing services after a 2005 U.S. Supreme Court decision
that held it was liable for third party infringement11), LimeWire (eventually ordered to
stop facilitating file sharing in 201012) and later BitTorrent have emerged to facilitate file
sharing.13
Despite the increase in file sharing there is a lack of unequivocal empirical evidence that
file sharing is actually to blame for the decline in the fortunes of the recording industry.14
While some see file sharing as a substitute for purchasing music, others have argued that
rather than a substitution effect file sharing produces a sampling effect whereby those
downloading find out about new music that they may go on to purchase.15 A 2007 study
for Industry Canada revealed that persons engaged in file sharing tend to purchase more
CDs than those who do not file share, and concluded that at the aggregate level there was
no relationship between file sharing and CD sales.16 Despite the lack of clear evidence
on causation, the temporal correlation between file sharing and the decline of the
recording industry has caused the content industries in general to take an extremely
negative stance toward P2P technology.
The explosion of file sharing services did not go unnoticed by the recording industry. In
2001 the RIAA adopted a new approach to tackling the problem of online file sharing and
it began litigating against firms that facilitated infringement. In 2003 the RIAA expanded
its tactic with the controversial approach of suing individual file sharers,17 a policy
abandoned by the RIAA at the end of 2008.18 In Canada the approach of litigating
against individuals proved to be futile.19 Ultimately the litigious approach to dealing with
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online file sharing must be viewed as a failure. The RIAA only used the practice for five
years, and such a strategy was never successful in Canada. The lack of success generated
by individual law suits in stemming file sharing has underscored the importance of
adopting alternative approaches. One of these alternatives is the SAC’s proposal to
monetize file sharing.
iii. Key Points of the SAC Proposal
The SAC’s proposal has evolved since October 2007 when they first proposed a levy
system to monetize file sharing.20 The first SAC proposal from October 2007 would
have compelled rights holders to participate. The initial proposal faced criticism that it
would contravene the Berne Convention and TRIPS Agreement three step tests limiting
exceptions to copyright. As a result the SAC revised its proposal in March 2009 to make
rights holder and internet subscriber participation optional.21 In April of 2010 Eddie
Schwartz, President of the SAC, first proposed the idea of a voluntary licensing fee, as
opposed to a levy, for ISPs in the range of $4-5 (CAD) per month.22 In January 2011 the
SAC altered their proposal changing it from a system designed around levies to a private
ordering scheme whereby ISPs would partner with collective licensing agencies to allow
file sharing, regardless of the specific platform used, in exchange for a monthly fee.23
According to the SAC, because the current proposal is optional for rights holders, it is
compliant with international copyright treaties.24 The SAC is not the only group
representing artist and creators that has proposed an ISP levy. In 2009, the Alliance of
Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA), the Directors Guild of Canada
and the Writers Guild of Canada (WGC) proposed an ISP levy at the rate of 2.5% of
broadband subscription revenues to help fund Canadian content.25 Later in 2009 the
WGC proposed a 1.5% ISP revenue levy to fund Canadian content.26 In June of 2010
L’AGAMM (L’Accès Gratuit à la Musique est un Mythe), a coalition of music rights
holders, proposed an ISP levy to compensate rights holders for file sharing losses.27
Although the SAC proposal has substantively changed from a levy scheme to a private
ordering mechanism, the core of the proposal remains monetizing the sharing of music,
though they are not proposing to add such a right to the economic rights of copyright set
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out in section 3 of the Copyright Act.28 The SAC proposal would allow ISPs that have
partnered with rights holding record labels and music publishers to charge a monthly fee
which in exchange would authorize the sharing of music in any manner so long as it was
done for non-commercial purposes. Internet subscribers who wish to not pay the monthly
fee could opt out if they declare that they do not share music, and rights holders would
also be able to choose to participate or not. ISPs would be entitled to collect some
percentage (which at this point has not been identified) and the remaining revenues
would be split between performers, songwriters and rights holders.29 At this point the
SAC has still not identified the exact monthly fee, though they do suggest that a $10
(CAD) monthly fee would generate revenues roughly equal to the revenues earned by
major record labels in Canada in 2000.30 The proposal is technologically neutral
allowing not only peer-to-peer file sharing, but also the copying of CDs for friends,
emailing songs as attachments and even drive cloning.31 The SAC also argues that rights
holders are likely to participate as very few opt out of collective licensing schemes for
fear of lost revenue.32 In support of their proposal the SAC cites a study by the
University of Hertfordshire that suggests that nearly three quarters of unauthorized file
sharers are interested in having a legal file sharing service.33
The SAC proposal is comprised of seven key components which are:
1) Private individuals and households who wish to music file-share would be licensed to
do so in conjunction with an agreement to pay a reasonable monthly license fee. The
license would cover the private, noncommercial sharing of music, between two or more
parties, using any Internet-based file-sharing client. A license fee differs fundamentally
from a levy or tax in that consumers may opt out if they self-declare not to music fileshare.
2) Only those who wish to share copies of musical works without motive of financial
gain would be covered by this license. Parties who receive, or seek to receive financial
compensation for file-sharing, or other commercial purpose, would not be covered, and
would be required to obtain the appropriate licenses and/or approvals from those bodies
who license commercial music use.
3) Any Internet-based technology could be used for music file-sharing, including current
technologies such as torrents, social networking sites, etc., as well as new technologies as
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they become available. No behavior modification whatsoever is required on the part
of the consumer.
4) Existing collectives would license consumers. License fees would be pooled and pro
rata distributions based on non-intrusive data collection would be made to
performers, songwriters, and rights holders. Such data is already being accurately
collected in regard to P2P file-sharing in a manner that ensures consumer privacy by
companies such as Big Champagne based in California, and is currently used by both
major record labels and movie distributors for marketing purposes.
5) ISPs would partner with collectives in order to facilitate the licensing process. Access
and content could be bundled. The proposed license fee would appear as a line item on
monthly Internet access statements sent to consumers by ISPs.
6) ISPs may deduct a reasonable collection fee before forwarding net revenue to
collectives for distribution to music creators and rights-holders.
7) Net revenues would be split between performers, songwriters, and rights-holders.
Any particular musical work would attract a pro rata share of the entire revenue pool
based on the number of times that work was file-shared. Once that pro rata share was
determined, the performer, songwriter, record label and music publisher would split that
amount based on an agreed upon formula and contractual obligations. 34

iv. SAC Proposal Criticisms and Shortcomings
The SAC’s original proposal met with a fair degree of criticism. The Canadian
Recording Industry Association (CRIA) declared the proposal a “pipe dream.”35 While
the CRIA supports the private copying levy, they opposed extending Canada’s existing
levy system beyond private copying.36 Unsurprisingly the original proposal was also
dismissed by paid music download services as a threat to their new business models.37
Prominent Canadian digital media scholar Michael Geist labeled the original SAC
proposal “seriously flawed,”38 though he described the 2009 revised levy proposal as an
innovative new alternative.39
While the new proposal attempts to mitigate some of the problems with the previous levy
based approach some issues still remain. The proposal is still incomplete, and key
information such as the exact size of the monthly fee or the share of revenue the ISPs will
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garner is still not clear. Despite the change in the SAC proposal the CRIA has remained
critical noting that it has not been part of any discussions between the SAC and ISPs.40
CRIA President Graham Henderson also notes that there are already services such as
Rdio.com and Slacker Radio that allow people to listen to unlimited volumes of music for
$5 (CAD) a month.41 It should be noted that such services are streaming based and do
not allow users to accumulate the music they listen to.42 There are also concerns that the
current plan, where consumers must opt out of the fee, may run afoul of consumer
protection legislation that limits negative option billing.43
v. Arrangements Involving ISPs in Other Jurisdictions
The SAC’s proposal for monetizing file sharing differs sharply from the agreements ISPs
in other countries have formed with rights holding organizations. Increasingly ISPs are
partnering with copyright holders in introducing ‘graduated response’ systems whereby
individuals engaging in suspected infringing activities are given a series of educational
notifications and warnings that eventually culminate in some sort of sanction.44 France
first initiated such a system in 2007, and since then countries including South Korea,
Ireland, New Zealand and the U.K. have implemented or are nearing implementation of
such systems.45 In July 2011 ISPs AT&T, Cablevision Systems, Comcast, Time Warner
Cable and Verizon announced that they were partnering with the MPAA, RIAA,
Independent Film and Television Alliance (IFTA), and the American Association of
Independent Music (A2IM) and these organizations constituent members to introduce a
copyright alert system in the U.S.46 Starting in late 2011 the system uses a six stage alert
system that warns subscribers who are suspected of infringing activity with progressively
more serious notifications. ISPs have at their discretion the ability to implement some
sort of penalty on users for their fifth and sixth warnings. The alert system does not
include a mechanism through which ISPs are entitled or obliged to terminate suspected
infringers of copyright internet service; however, such a mechanism is provided by
section 512 of the DMCA. The U.S. copyright alert system does not include any measure
whereby ISPs provide a subscriber’s personal information to rights holders.47 Although
no such system exists in Canada, the Creators’ Copyright Coalition, of which the SAC is
a member, is pushing for a graduated response system for ISPs.48 In addition to graduated
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alert systems there have been numerous deals struck between ISPs and rights holding
organizations whereby ISPs either develop their own music streaming or downloading
services or partner with existing services.49
Given the relative innovativeness of the SAC’s proposal, it merits further examination as
to what degree the proposal, if implemented, would represent an effective alternative to
copyright. This examination begins with an investigation of the incentives used in the
SAC proposal.
B. Incentives
The SAC proposal recognizes the diversity of motives and interests involved in music
distribution and exchange, yet it also places primary emphasis on remuneration and
pecuniary motives. The SAC suggests that their proposal is better suited to artists than
more adversarial approaches (such as litigation) and claims that for aspiring and niche
artists it offers an unprecedented distribution tool.50 The SAC also contends that once
file sharing is monetized artists will have new opportunities available to them but
provides no specifics.51
For both ISPs and rights holders the proposal’s primary incentive is pecuniary –
additional revenue streams. It also argues that ISPs would have the ability to establish
their own proprietary music sharing services that would decrease bandwidth costs and be
a source of new value added services.52
Incenting ISP participation is a particularly important piece of the SAC proposal. While
it is not yet clear what percentage of the monthly fee would go to ISPs, providing them
with some of the revenue appears necessary to ensure their participation. In 2007 the
Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) held hearings
on a new media regulation and part of the discussion was a possible 3% ISP levy to fund
Canadian content. The possibility of a levy on internet service, regardless if the final cost
was born by the ISPs or passed onto consumers, was vociferously opposed by the
industry.53 The lure of additional revenue and the ability for subscribers to opt out of the
monthly fee should assuage ISPs’ fears that increased internet bills will negatively affect
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their subscriber base and income.
The SAC proposal is enticing to consumers because it offers unlimited access to a
considerably larger catalogue of music than available through conventional download
services. While cost is often viewed as the single most important motive incenting file
sharing, another factor is the large discrepancy between the number of tracks available on
legal services versus file sharing. Empirical studies reveal that while cost (or the lack of
it) is the dominant motive for file sharing, the ability to acquire music not available on
legal services is also a significant motive.54 For example, iTunes offers 18 million
different tracks;55 however, this represents a fraction of the 100 million plus recordings
on unauthorized file sharing networks.56 Ease of use, convince and the ability to try
music before one buys are also factors that incent file sharing.57 The SAC also suggests
that by licensing file sharing, the files themselves will be safer and contain fewer viruses
(although it is not clear how the licensing of file sharing will eliminate viruses other than
if ISPs or other intermediaries launch their own services to facilitate sharing).58
Notably while the SAC proposal would license file sharing, it provides users with no
incentive or legal ability to use shared content to create new creative works. The
proposal would only license file sharing – specifically the right to communicate works to
the public by telecommunication and the right to copy works.59 Rights holders would
still retain a broad swath of rights including public performance rights, translation and
adaptation rights, and rental rights. As rights holders retain these rights, there is limited
ability for individuals to create new intellectual goods using the music they would obtain
legally through file sharing. The SAC, as a member of the Creators’ Copyright Coalition
has expressed opposition to attempts by the Canadian government to create a substantive
UGC exception.60 Furthermore the proposal is silent on the issue of TPMs. Under
pending revisions to the Canadian Copyright Act circumventing a TPM for commercial
purposes would be criminal and could result in a five year jail term and a fine as high as
$1 million (CAD).61 The failure of the SAC proposal to address the issue of TPMs is a
serious shortcoming, and the lack of new incentives to encourage the production and
distribution of intellectual goods undermines the proposal’s ability to function as an
effective alternative to copyright.
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The SAC proposal is laudable for recognizing that pecuniary self-interest is not the only
motive for file sharing. By licensing access to tens of millions of songs, essentially all
recorded music that has at one point been made available, the proposal reflects the fact
that legal music download/streaming services have limited catalogues. However, the
proposal does not establish new incentives for the creation of music. Its focus on
remuneration, which has been primary since the SAC originally proposed an ISP levy, is
misguided. Strengthening the pecuniary incentive function of copyright may allow
songwriters to be compensated for file sharing, but it does little to create a broader array
of incentive mechanisms to encourage the production and distribution of intellectual
goods.
C. Innovation
i. The SAC’s Proposal and Infringement as Innovation
The SAC explicitly claims that its proposal will further innovation.62 It also stresses that
the benefits of monetizing online file sharing are not only economic but also cultural.63
However, the SAC’s conception of innovation is not without its own shortcomings. The
SAC explicitly links infringement with innovation, yet rather than argue that infringing
uses of copyrighted music allow the creation of new innovative intellectual goods, they
suggest that in situations where infringement occurs the opportunity exists to license and
legitimize new business models. They highlight both the unauthorized performance of
live music in Paris in the 1850s and the early American broadcast industry in the 1920s as
situations that eventually became licensed and now generate hundreds of billions of
dollars in revenues.64 It is true that the licensing and monetization of file sharing will
generate innovative business opportunities, but there is no evidence that the resulting
business models will support and enable new musicians. The Songwriters suggest that
ISPs will be able to develop new proprietary music services and value added services, but
it is not clear what incentives exist for ISPs to invest in struggling musicians. Monetizing
the value of existing content is distinct from encouraging the creation of new music, and
the SAC’s proposal is focused entirely on the former without enough attention to the
latter.
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ii. Legitimizing P2P Technology
Although the SAC proposal does little to encourage the creation of new music or
transformative re-use of existing musical works and sound recordings, it is commendable
in that it would legitimize peer-to-peer technology. P2P technology like the VCR and
CD burner is a dual use technology – it creates new forms of interaction and
entertainment, but also allows widespread copyright infringement.65 P2P applications
can be used just as easily to exchange non-infringing content as they can be copyrighted
works. In the case against the P2P service provider, Grokster (brought by MGM), Justice
Breyer noted that a wide range of non-infringing materials could be found including free
electronic books from Project Gutenberg, public domain software, licensed video content
provided with the consent of the rights holder, and notably authorized copies of music by
a range of artists including Wilco, Pearl Jam, Dave Matthews and John Mayer.66
Suppressing a disruptive, dual use technology in its infancy is not necessarily the best
approach. Had movie studios been successful in removing Betamax (and by extension
the VCR) from the consumer market, they would have eliminated a significant source of
future revenue. In 2003, box office receipts made up less than 20% of studios’ income,
while the home entertainment market, which had by then increasingly evolved towards
DVDs, made up over 80% of revenues.67 By legitimizing P2P the potential for future
innovative (and potentially profitable) uses is heightened. In this regard the SAC’s
proposal helps encourage future innovation.
iii. Supporting New Artists
While the SAC suggests that its proposal is to the benefit of new artists,68 this argument
is tenuous at best. New artists who are not yet signed to contracts can already use file
sharing to promote their music, and if they are the copyright holders then they can share
authorized copies of their music in an effort increase their fan base. Soulseek is a file
sharing technology designed for exactly this purpose.69 The SAC proposal adds nothing
for artists or consumers using Soulseek, though it does help Soulseek alleviate some of its
legal troubles.70 The content on Soulseek is already authorized so users gain nothing
from a $10 monthly fee and would likely opt out. For independent artists there is no
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immediate benefit either and their prospects within the music industry may be worsened.
If file sharing for major artists becomes licensed, unsigned artists who are willing to give
away their music for free in hopes of being discovered lose a major differentiating factor
from established artists (the fact that the music is free). When consumers are given free,
legal access to the entire catalogues of established artists and bands like U2, Metallica,
Britney Spears and Lady Gaga who have a significant degree of media attention it will
only become harder for obscure, unsigned artists to break through or generate a
significant number of downloads to support themselves through recording music though
some individuals will always seek out new and obscure artists. Furthermore, because the
SAC proposal suggests that revenues be prorated based on the number of downloads,71 it
will benefit established artists the most. An analogous example is available from
YouTube. In 2010 the most popular UGC video generated 61 million hits, but this is still
six times smaller than the number of hits received by the most popular video that year,
the music video for Justin Bieber’s song “Baby.”72 Without a detailed mechanism for
providing support for new starving artists the SAC’s proposal limits the degree of
innovation in music which will occur.
The SAC’s proposal presents mixed opportunities for innovation. It should be lauded for
attempting to legitimize file sharing technology; however, without providing users
additional rights or significant revenue streams for new artists it limits the degree to
which it promotes innovation in music.
D. Ideological Elements
i. Economic vs. Cultural Value of Music
Remuneration lies at the core of the SAC’s proposal. On the surface remuneration is a
plausible principle; individuals should be compensated for their labour. However, the
SAC’s proposal is seriously handicapped by conceptually linking monetization to the
other exclusionary rights in copyright. Copyright should not be conceived as simply a
remuneration system for creators, and must weigh the interests of society.73 The SAC
monthly fee does not allow downloaders to take existing music and repurpose it in their
own innovative and creative manner because several of the economic rights of copyright
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remain. Without allowing new creative uses of existing works in addition to file sharing,
the SAC proposal makes transformative users no better off than they currently are.
Remixers would continue to have to rely on hoping that their use of the work was
covered by fair dealing exceptions and they would have no ability to make transformative
uses of works protected by TPMs. Monetization should be decoupled from the
exclusionary, commodifying dimensions of copyright.
The focus on the monetization presents a second ideological difficulty for the SAC
proposal. It overemphasizes the economic dimension of copyright while undermining the
cultural element. On their website the SAC stresses the cultural importance of music.
They quote Canadian songwriter Christopher Ward stating, “Humanity’s need for music
is primal. The soundtracks of our lives accompany us through everything we do –
working, praying, dancing and procreating.”74 Yet attaching a right to remuneration to
the exclusionary economic rights in copyright only serves to further the commodification
of music. On the same webpage as Ward’s comments about the centrality of music to
everyday life, there is a comment by songwriter Joan Besen who simply suggests
infringing copyright is the same as stealing a physical good. Besen implies that music is
a generic commodity like sweaters, shoes, or groceries,75 completely undermining the
crucial socio-cultural aspect of music. While the SAC is clearly aware of the cultural
value of music their emphasis on remuneration downplays this value.
The SAC website contains a video testimonial by Randy Bachman in support of the SAC
proposal.76 He notes that individuals entering the music business will not be able to make
a living from it and should be prepared for a life of hard times.77 Although true, this
assessment is not new. Artists of all kinds have always faced dim prospects for broad
success. The problematic aspect of Bachman’s statement is that by focusing on the
limited likelihood of pecuniary success he casts writing and performing music in overly
economic terms. Individuals should not create music under the delusion that it will
necessarily result in great fortune; however, the lack of financial success does not mean
that there are not many other powerful motives for playing music. The SAC’s focus on
remuneration overshadows the personal and cultural aspects of playing music. In doing
so they take one of the most important means of expression and narrowly portray it as a
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situation where self-interested individuals should not engage in creating music because of
the poor pecuniary prospects. This instrumentalist and economic approach to viewing
music contrasts sharply with Ward’s insightful comments on how important music is to
humanity.
E. Conclusion
i. Outstanding Limitations and Weaknesses of the SAC Proposal
Although the Songwriters Association has put considerable effort into improving and
revising their proposal some significant limitations remain. Other than a brief mention
that file sharing traffic monitoring company Big Champagne ensures consumer privacy,78
there is a lack of discussion on the privacy dimensions of the SAC proposal and
specifically if ISPs will pass along subscriber information to collective licensing
agencies. This omission is in sharp contrast to the new U.S. copyright alerts system
where ISPs have pledged not to pass along user information to rights holders.79 The
proposal also fails to address the potential for internet users to pay the monthly fee once
and then copy/download a lifetimes worth of music and never pay the fee again. Since
the SAC proposal would allow drive cloning in addition to file sharing80 those paying the
monthly fee could copy a 2 terabyte (TB) drive worth of songs and get roughly half a
million tracks of music and have little need to pay the monthly fee in the future.81 Finally
and most importantly, although the SAC suggests that their proposal is uniquely suited to
music file sharing,82 if such a new revenue stream is devised for audio music it is likely
that film and television creators, publishers and rights holders would seek to establish
similar deals with ISPs. This outcome is particularly likely given that ACTRA, the
Directors Guild of Canada and the WGC have already called for an ISP levy to fund
Canadian content on the internet.83 How many different monthly fees would exist for file
sharing, and more importantly how would such licenses/fees affect the capacity of
broadband networks. Although these problems are not insurmountable, until they are
addressed (along with clarifying the exact amount of the monthly fee and the issue of
TPMs) the SAC proposal remains incomplete and in need of further development.
Evidence based policy analysis is acutely needed to address these issues in a more
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holistic manner.
ii. Lack of Incentive for the Creation of New Intellectual Goods
Another serious problem is that the proposal provides little in the way of incentives (or
legal rights) to create new content or support new artists, though it does provide
songwriters especially established ones with an additional revenue source. In this regard
the SAC proposal is more accurately represented as an additional revenue scheme rather
than a substantive alternative to copyright. The danger with both the SAC’s private
ordering approach and its previous suggestion of a levy is that consumers end up paying
twice.84 The proposal could be strengthened by either allowing monthly fee payers to
create new user-generated content from material they acquire or ensure that a substantive
portion of the revenue generated by the fee goes towards supporting and developing new
artists. The proposal should also be expanded to provide greater clarity on the issue of
TPMs. Those opting to pay a $10 monthly fee should also have to the right to circumvent
a TPM to share music, or else the monthly fee is of limited appeal and value to end users.
iii. SAC Proposal vs. Other Alternatives for Addressing File Sharing
Although there are considerable shortcomings with the SAC proposal, it cannot be
evaluated without some comparison to other alternatives for addressing file sharing. In
contrast to expansive and pervasive TPMs, such as the approached discussed by
Lunney,85 the SAC proposal is preferable. TPMs and legal protection for
anticircumvention measures grant considerable power to rights holders and do not confer
any new benefits to end users. Furthermore technical systems are always surmountable,
and reliance on TPMs will induce a socially wasteful cycle investment of time, capital
and human creativity in creating and defeating new digital locks. While there are several
shortcomings to the SAC proposal, it is preferable to a world where music and other
digital goods are protected by ever more complex technical means.
Contrasting the SAC proposal with the graduated response systems that were recently
adopted in the U.S. and several other countries presents a much more difficult case. Both
approaches recognize the centrality of ISPs in the issue of online file sharing.
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Unauthorized file sharing creates strong demand for broadband, and when users are billed
based on the volume of bandwidth they consume file sharing is particularly lucrative for
ISPs. The Center for Copyright Information, which administers the U.S. copyright alert
system, notes that 70% of users cease infringing activity once alerted that their activity is
illegal.86 For rights holders, such a system appears to provide clear benefits as they do
not have to surrender any of their existing rights. While the graduated response system
may stem illegal file sharing through a relatively simple education program, the SAC
proposal does benefit consumers by giving them the option to pay to file share.
Furthermore, the two approaches are not incompatible, and a graduated response system
combined with an optional monthly fee would represent a more comprehensive
alternative.
Although the SAC proposal contains promising elements and merits critical examination,
it is still incomplete. Because it only slightly modifies the current copyright system it is
more of an adjunct to copyright than an alternative, and it is not comprehensive enough to
completely replace the entire copyright system. Though it is a mechanism for dealing
with illegal file sharing and ensuring that artists and rights holders are compensated for
their labour, it is at best a very limited alternative to copyright.
II. Defensive Publishing
This case study examines defensive publishing as an alternative to patenting. It begins
with an overview of the early disclosure, and then examines the incentives and
disincentives for defensive publication, its ability to further innovation, and some of the
ideological dimensions of defensive publishing.
A. Overview
i. Context
Defensive publishing is an alternative to patenting that uses the patent system to prevent
information from being protected in a proprietary manner. By publishing information a
firm or individual can establish prior art in a specific area. Prior art prevents a patent
application covering the same or substantially similar information from meeting the
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novelty and non-obviousness requirements of patentability. Though conceptually simple,
defensive publishing is more complex in practice as establishing prior art requires that a
firm publish in a manner that will come to the attention of patent examiners and meet the
strict requirements of prior art.87

While scholarly literature has often suggested that

defensive publishing is incented by the desire to prolong patent races,88 the limited
empirical evidence on motives for defensive publishing suggests that a range of motives
incent disclosure.89 Defensive publishing in the form of technical disclosures published
by corporations has been practiced for over 50 years, although in the past decade there
has been a shift away from self-published disclosure bulletins towards internet based
defensive publishing services.90 However, because defensive publication can be pursued
in a variety of formats from a publication in an academic journal or trade press to an
intentionally abandoned patent application it is difficult to determine the scope of
defensive publication. It is even possible to defensively publish in a highly
inconspicuous and undetectable manner as U.S. case law has recognized that a single
copy of a doctoral dissertation published in a foreign language and held by a foreign
library can constitute prior art.91 However, such a publication venue would be poorly
suited for having patent examiners locate one’s work prior to granting a competitor a
patent.
ii. Defensive Publication and Corporate Technical Disclosure Publications
Corporate defensive publishing has its roots in IBM’s Technical Disclosure Bulletin first
published in 1958.92 Xerox adopted a defensive publication strategy in 1976 and this
strategy has since been emulated by several high technology firms including Siemens,
Sony, Motorola and Microsoft.93 In February 1998, IBM ceased publishing the Technical
Disclosure Bulletin instead making its disclosures available online for a fee from IP.com,
a defensive publishing company. IP.com’s prior art database contains not only the
complete collection of the Technical Disclosure Bulletin, but also complete collections of
the disclosure publications for the firms previously listed as well as the technical
publications of the Internet Society Request for Comments, National Institute of
Standards and Technology and the Software Patent Institute.94 While some firms still
defensively self-publish such as IBM’s Redbook series available for free on its website,95
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third party defensive publishing services have been gaining increasing popularity.
iii. Third Party Defensive Publication Services
Third party defensive publication services are dominated by two firms: Research
Disclosure and IP.com. The former has been in existence for over a half century,96 and
has the unique designation of being the only defensive publication service whose journal
must be searched for prior art by International Searching Authorities under rule
34.1(B)(III) of the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT).97 IP.com operates a prodigious
prior art database containing over 160,000 publications.98 For a fee both companies offer
electronic deposit in searchable databases as well as publishing disclosures in print
journals that are made available to patent offices around the world.99 While Research
Disclosure and IP.com dominate third party defensive publishing there are some other
defensive publishing services. Defensive Publications provides publishing services open
source projects.100 However, Defensive Publications itself relies on the services of
IP.com, although it is a costless service for authors as the publication fees are covered by
its sponsoring agency Linux Defenders.101 Peer Patent has recently announced that it will
set up its own free to use defensive publishing service.102 While new services may offer
costless mechanisms for defensive publishing, IP.com’s size and Research Disclosure’s
inclusion in the list of minimum publication for review under the rules of the PCT are
likely to ensure that these two firms dominate the third party defensive publishing
market.
iv. The United States’ Statutory Invention Registration Program
U.S. patent laws contain a defensive publication mechanism built directly into the patent
system. Initially defensive publications, which were considered prior art as of the date of
publication, could be pursued through the Defensive Publication Program that ran from
April of 1968 to May of 1985.103 The Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984 replaced
defensive publications with the Statutory Invention Registration (SIR) system codified in
35 U.S.C. 157.104 SIRs are not patents but do ensure freedom to operate, and like the
earlier defensive publications are considered prior art.105 SIRs, designated by USPTO
kind codes beginning with an “H,” do not provide recipients with rights to remuneration
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or to prevent infringement, thus they effectively place the knowledge covered in the
application in the public domain.106 Generally the information covered in SIRs is
published, although a mechanism does allow applicants to request that their SIR go
unpublished.107
Several factors undermine the effectiveness of SIRs. The 1999 American Inventor
Protection Act removed much of the necessity for the SIR program by stipulating that
patent applications would be published after 18 months subject to certain exceptions.108
This change allows firms to defensively publish simply through abandoning patent
applications. SIRs are not a costless procedure and applicants will pay between $920 and
$1,840 to have an SIR published.109 Finally, while the USPTO recognizes SIRs as
establishing prior art as of their filing date,110 foreign patent offices only recognize SIRs
as establishing prior art as of their publication date which is normally 18 months later.111
The SIR program has been of limited effectiveness. From 1986 to 1996 there was an
average of 145 SIRs granted each year with a high of 212 in 1987.112 However in the last
five years (2006 to 2010) the average has plummeted to just over 20 with only six SIRs
granted in 2009 and 17 in 2010.113 Furthermore the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force have
been the dominant receivers of SIRs with the Navy and Air Force receiving a plurality of
SIRs in three of the five most recent years.114 Given that in 2010 the number of SIRs
totaled less than 1/100th of 1% of U.S. utility patents granted, it is difficult to describe the
USPTO’s defensive publication mechanism as a successful alternative to patents. The
recent U.S. patent reform act (the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act) will eliminate the
SIR program as of March 16, 2013.115
v. Other Methods and Scope of Defensive Publishing
Self-published technical journals, third party defensive publishing services and SIRs are
only three of a range of means firms can defensively publish. Articles can be published
in trade press, academic periodicals or professional journals, but because corporations
lack control over the timing of publication and editorial process these avenues are less
effective. Corporations can also publish defensively in marketing materials or through
their corporate website, although concerns over establishing the authority and publishing
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date of such documents in a patent trial undermine the usefulness of these approaches. A
2002 survey for the Intellectual Property Owners Association provides some indication of
the popularity of various defensive publishing forums; however, the results, which are
summarized in the table below, reflect a very small sample of respondents.116
Table 2: Publication Method Used by Firms that Defensively Publish
Publication Method
Share (%)
Academic or Professional Journals
52
Trade Press
42
Marketing Materials
27
Third Party Publication Service
20
In House Journals
17
Corporate Website
14
Statutory Invention Registration
8
Other
5
117
Source: Cockburn and Henderson (2003).
Thus despite the limitations in academic, professional and trade publications these remain
the most popular publication venues from this small, 2002 survey. These results are
contrasted by a 2008 German study that found third party defensive publishing
companies were the most popular venue for defensive publication used by 37% of firms
in the study.118 The study also revealed that other forums for publication include
withdrawn patent applications, postings made on the factory gate, and disguised/obscure
publications.119 While there are numerous reasons to withdraw a patent application,
withdrawn applications also represent a cost effective means of establishing prior art and
securing freedom to operate.120 One respondent at a major German company even
admitted that in an effort to ensure competitors would not discover the disclosed
information publication occurred in a seemingly irrelevant journal in the Kirghiz
language.121
Empirical investigations provide no clear indication of the scope of defensive publication.
Johnson notes that prior to 2000 78% of the disclosures contained within the databases of
Research Disclosure and IP.com were from three companies (IBM, Motorola and
Siemens).122 There is evidence that the practice is being more widely used. The 2002
Intellectual Property Owners Association study found that less than 30% of companies
surveyed viewed defensive publication as an important strategic tool,123 but a German
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study that interviewed 37 different companies, including 29 of 30 companies on the DAX
(Deutsche Borse AG German Stock Index) 30, found that 70% of companies engaged in
defensive publication.124 IP.com proudly displays a long list of prominent corporations
using its services which includes Coca-Cola, Dow Chemical, Eastman Kodak, France
Telecom, General Electric, IBM, Lockheed Martin-Manassas, Siemens AG and Sony
Electronics, among others,125 while Research Disclosure claims that its service has been
used by 90% of the world’s leading companies.126 Given the variety of forums in which
defensive publishing can occur it is impossible to determine the exact scope of defensive
publishing. Despite the difficulties in determining the exact scope of defensive
publishing it is clear that it is an important alternative to traditional methods of protecting
innovation such as patents and secrecy. The next section examines the numerous reasons
firms forgo the potential of exclusionary rights and short term pecuniary gain to
defensively publish.
B. Incentives
IBM has led the world for nearly 20 consecutive years in obtaining the most U.S. patents
receiving more than 5,000 patents in 2010 alone,127 yet this same company has been at
the forefront of defensive publication announcing in 2009 that it will aim to publish over
3000 technical inventions a year forgoing proprietary rights.128 Why would a firm that
has been the most prolific patenting company over the past generation give away so much
information? It is because strong strategic incentives exist for defensive publishing;
however, unlike the patent system, defensive publication does not provide the
opportunity for short term pecuniary gain through exclusionary rights. Empirical studies
reveal that motives for defensive publishing include preserving freedom to operate,
defense publishing is less costly than patenting, some disclosures cover inventions that
may not be patentable, and patents can be of little value because of high enforcement
costs.129
Cost is a major factor in incenting defensive publishing. As of September 26, 2011, the
cost for applying, receiving and maintaining a U.S. utility patent will total over $11,000,
and this amount does not include any legal fees.
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Table 3: U.S. Utility Patent* Fees as of Sept. 26 2011
Fee
Cost (USD)
Basic Application Fee
$380
Search Fee
$620
Examination Fee
$250
Issue Fee
$1,130
Maintenance Due at 3.5 Years
$1,130
Maintenance Due at 7.5 Years
$2,850
Maintenance Due at 11.5 Years
$4,730
Total
$11,090*
* For patents with three or less claims under 100 pages in
length
Source: USPTO (2011).130
In addition it takes nearly three years from application to grant,131 while a defensive
publication can be done in an hour.132 Although it is possible to request an expedited
examination at the USPTO, the fee for doing so is $4,800.133 Research Disclosure
charges $120134 per page of publication,135 and IP.com charges $225 per publication136
which is substantially less than the $920 charged by the USPTO for a SIR. Defensive
publication also reduces litigation fees. Receiving a patent raises the possibility of being
litigated against which does not come with defensive publication, and a prominently
placed defensive publication can save a company from the time and expense of
invalidating a competitor’s patent. While cost reduction is a pecuniary incentive, it is of
a markedly different character than obtaining an patent right with the intention of then
being able to profit by having exclusive control over the technology covered.
One disincentive for defensive publishing is that publishing research findings provides
competitive intelligence on R&D activities to competitors. In an effort to mitigate this
problem both Research Disclosure and IP.com allow anonymous submissions.137 Fears
of disclosing research activities to rivals also motivates disguised defensive publications.
From a strategic perspective anonymous disclosures are superior to disguised
publications because patent examiners are not likely to find hidden publications.
Furthermore, while U.S. case law suggests that obscure publications may stand up at
trial,138 firms are often unwilling to go through the expense of litigation to invalidate
another’s patent.139
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The primary incentive for defensive publication, ensuring freedom to operate, may be
significantly weakened by the recently passed Leahy-Smith American Invents Act (also
known as the Patent Reform Act of 2011).140 Section 5 of the bill expands the prior
commercial use defense from covering only business methods to all patentable subject
matter.141 As long as prior use occurred in the U.S. and at least one year before either the
effective filing date of the claimed invention or the date at which the claimed invention
was disclosed to the public, the party using the invention has a new defense for
infringement subject to certain exceptions.142 Given that prior use can now constitute a
defense for infringement the impetus to defensively publish may be seriously lessened,
though as noted by Rantanen it is possible that the changes to the conditions for
patentability (35 U.S.C. § 102) in the America Invents Act may actually encourage more
defensive publication.143
It would be extremely naïve to suggest that defensive publication occurs because firms
want to contribute to the public good for altruistic motives. Defensive publishing is
engaged in because of the powerful strategic motives; however, the presence of strategic
motives does not imply that defensive publishing bears little difference from patenting.
Through defensive publishing firms assure themselves of freedom to operate and lower
costs. This approach stands in sharp contrast to patenting where firms gain an
exclusionary right that they can then use for pecuniary gain.
C. Innovation
i. Access to Knowledge
At first glance defensive publication appears to encourage innovation by placing
information in the public domain but without the exclusionary rights that limit use of
such knowledge; however, in practice, defensive publishing is a much more complex and
nuanced alternative to patenting.
One complicating factor is the diversity of forums for defensive publications. Disguised
defensive publications do little to further innovation because the information is disclosed
in an obtuse manner. Conversely disclosures in trade, academic and professional
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publications are much more likely to ensure broad access to information and further
innovation. The services of IP.com and Research Disclosure, which are becoming
increasingly dominant,144 are not freely accessible. Generally IP.com charges $40 to
download a document from its database, although some lengthy documents may cost
more, while others may be free.145 Research Disclosure charges $745 per year for a
subscription to its journal and $1,490 for a single license to access its database.146 While
these fees do limit access, they do not entirely undermine the ability for defensive
publications to encourage innovation. Trade, academic and professional journals
themselves often have a cost as well. Furthermore, as part of the IP.com prior art
database is searchable for free, and searches return an overview of the document without
requiring payment.147 Research Disclosure provides free access to recent disclosures.148
It is also important to note that the literature covered in defensive publications tends to be
highly technical in nature and not material that the lay population has a large appetite for
or ability to digest. Research Disclosure specifically notes that its publications are not
entertaining articles but concise descriptions of an invention.149 At the firm level the cost
for accessing these research disclosures is not prohibitive, and it is also far more likely
that firms, rather than individuals, can make innovative uses of the information
contained. While defensive publication through third party services does not provide as
broad access as simply placing information on a publicly available website, it does
provide access to information often in a manner more concise than long worded and
nebulous patent applications. Most importantly it places such information in the public
domain rather than commoditizing in the form a patent.
ii. Patent Quality
A second important function of defensive publication is to improve the quality of patents.
The greater the scope of the public domain and prior art the higher the bar for
patentability. The point is made succinctly by IBM which states:
Publication of technological information is one means to "promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts," the phrase in the U.S. Constitution giving the Congress the
power to enact patent laws. Publication protects inventors from allegations of
infringement by placing the intellectual property into the body of prior art. Publications
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also improve patent quality, since they can be cited by patent offices in limiting the scope
of patent applications. Publication also helps spur follow-on innovation that ensures
dynamic business growth.150

Patent quality is an acute problem. In its February 2011 update on the national innovation
strategy, the Obama administration specifically notes high quality patents improve
innovation, while low quality patents increase socially wasteful litigation and erect
barriers to innovation and creativity.151 While some modes of defensive publications and
disguised disclosures in particular do not immediately contribute to improving patent
quality as they may not be found by patent examiners, prominent disclosures, such as
those appearing in reputable journals, do. In the case of publications made through
Research Disclosure every patent office in the world receives a copy of their journal in
addition to having the journal listed in the PCT minimum documentation list.152 IP.com
provides its journal to the pentadic patent offices (USPTO, EPO, JPO State Intellectual
Property Office of the People’s Republic of China (SIPO) and Korean Intellectual
Property Office (KIPO)), as well as the patent offices of six of seven G7 countries (all but
Italy) and all four of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) in addition to
the Denver and New York Public Libraries, The British Library and Library of Congress
amongst others.153 This broad distribution ensures that patent examiners around the
world can better assess the state of prior art and thus improve patent quality.
iii. Empirical Evidence of Innovation
Though defensive publications are difficult to quantify, there is empirical evidence that
such disclosures encourage innovation. Ironically, a primary source for such evidence is
patents that reference disclosures. When material that is part of a disclosure database is
cited in a patent application it demonstrates that some of the information contained in the
disclosure has facilitated a new invention. Using the USPTO’s patent database (covering
patents issued since 1976), a search of patents referencing IP.com’s database reveals that
it has been cited in over 500 patents in the “Other References” section; Research
Disclosure has been cited over 8,500 times.154 In the case of these patents, earlier
defensive publications have enabled future innovations providing some empirical
evidence for the claim that defensive publications facilitate innovation. More
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importantly, disclosure databases also help improve patent quality that facilitates
innovation. IP.com has made its database available, free of charge, to Peer to Patent
reviewers allowing them to make better assessments of prior art which in turn helps
mitigate the problem of spurious patent applications for existing technologies.155
Although there are some limitations on access to the information disclosed in defensive
publications, such publications not only encourage innovative activity, but also do so
with fewer restrictions than patents.
D. Ideological Elements
i. The Commodification of Defensive Publishing
While defensive publishing offers considerable advantages over patenting with respect to
facilitating innovation, there is cause for a degree of concern that the process of defensive
publishing itself is becoming increasingly commodified. With the recently legislated
cancelation of the U.S. SIR program avenues for prominent defensive publications are
becoming increasingly restricted. Research Disclosure and IP.com, the two dominant
third party services, are for profit companies. While new services may appear, the size of
IP.com’s prior art database and Research Disclosures unique inclusion within the PCT
minimum literature suggest that it will be difficult to displace these two firms from being
the primary third party publishers. It is not the fact that these two firms charge to publish
– widely distributing disclosures in print and electronic form to numerous patent offices
is not a costless operation – but the limitations on access these firms impose that, to a
degree, undermine the effective of defensive publishing as an alternative patenting. As
noted by Arrow if innovation is paramount, then the optimal distribution is free
distribution.156 While there may be little mass demand for the information contained in
technical disclosures, greater costless access to such material is preferable. Ultimately
though, the commodification of defensive publishing as a service is superior to the
commodification of information in and of itself.
ii. Recognizing the Collective Nature of Invention
The great inventions of the 19th and early 20th century are often associated with a single
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inventor (or what Bell calls talented tinkerers) – Bessemer, Edison, Marconi, Bell, the
Wright brothers, and Ford.157 However, the landmark inventions since World War II
(such as satellites, home computers, the internet, cell phones) are not often credited to
individuals. Invention has become an increasingly collective activity requiring entire
R&D teams, marketers and visionary corporate leaders to turn laboratory results into
diffused innovations. Despite this change, the utilitarian justification for patents is
commonly framed around creating incentives for individuals. Defensive publishing
eschews this mythologizing. Both the academic literature on the subject and the
marketing materials of Research Disclosure and IP.com discuss defensive publishing as a
firm-level activity. While individual inventive and creative effort is still crucial, patents
and their alternatives should be framed collective undertakings (whether at firms,
universities or other organizations). The collective nature of invention stands in sharp
contrast to copyright where the individual may still play a commanding role.158
Reframing invention as a collective endeavour is crucial to crafting effective innovation
policy. Policymakers should ensure that individual inventors have means available to
them to help them diffuse and improve their innovations, but the breakthrough
innovations of the 21st century and beyond that will address major social, environmental,
and health problems are far more likely to come from corporate R&D labs and university
campuses than basements and garages. Patent rules that require that individuals be
named on patent applications only serve to reinforce the idea that invention is an
individualized activity. By framing invention in these terms it encourages expansionary
patents laws as the exclusionary rights of the patent are depicted as only way for the little
inventor to protect his rights from be appropriated by others. Defensive publishing not
only encourages innovation, but it also portrays invention for most often is – a
competitive corporate, environment where firms compete with each other to reduce costs
and generate new products and services.
E. Conclusion
Defensive publishing is an effective alternative to patenting, yet it is also important to
note that it is because of the patent system itself that the incentives to defensively publish
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exist. The fact that disclosure is premised on precluding the patents of others is the
greatest limitation of defensive publishing as an alternative – without a patent system to
incent early publication it is difficult to conceive of how or why pre-emptive publication
would take place. Thus defensive publication can never wholly replace the patent
system.
Although defensive publication exists as an alternative to patenting only because of
patenting, this limitation does not imply that it is not a useful alternative. Defensive
publication places knowledge in the public domain, and because it must be done so preemptively to be effective it speeds the rate of disclosure. In addition to providing access
to knowledge, with some limitation, it also facilitates innovation and improves the quality
of the patent system itself. This last quality is particularly important. Not only does
defensive publication encourage innovation, it actually forces the patent system to
address its most serious problem – the dearth of low quality patents. While defensive
publishing should raise some concerns with regards to the commodification of the
defensive publication process and cost barriers for access to some forms of disclosure, its
promotion of innovation, improvement of the patent system and recognition of the
collective nature of innovation make it an effective alternative to patenting even if it can
never hope to replace patenting.
III. The Effectiveness of Alternatives to IP
Alternatives to IP are not inherently superior to exclusionary rights. In some cases,
particularly TPMs, access may be restricted to an even greater degree and the creator or
distributor of the informational good holds an undue amount of control over the use of
the intellectual work. The most prominent alternatives (prizes, FOSS and OA scholarly
publishing) are successful because they draw on a range of incentives while still resulting
in innovative outcomes and facilitating access and use of the underlying information.
These same qualities are possessed by defensive publishing. The same cannot be said for
the SAC’s ISP monthly fee proposal. Its focus on remuneration, lack of new incentives
for creation and overly economic focus on music diminish its ability to function as an
alternative to the copyright system; however, it should be recognized that the proposal
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does address the problem of online file sharing.
Ultimately a crucial factor in the success of alternatives to IP is their adoption by
creators, authors and inventors. It is still unclear if the SAC’s proposal will ever become
more than a proposal. However, it should also be noted that the SAC has demonstrated a
history of allowing its proposal to evolve, and as such the potential does exist for it to
become a substantive alternative. In the case of defensive publishing, while IP.com’s
prior art database totals over 160,000 publications, this figure is still well below the
219,614 utility patents issued in the U.S. in 2010 alone.159 Furthermore, the recent
creation of a prior use defensive for patent infringement may seriously disincentivize
early disclosure with the negative consequence of increasing secrecy and decreasing the
amount of knowledge placed in the public domain. Without adoption in the case of the
SAC proposal or broader usage in the case of defensive publishing, these alternatives will
continue to exist at the margins of the IP system despite any usefulness they may have as
alternatives.
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Chapter Eight – Analysis, Discussion, Recommendations and
Conclusion
This chapter concludes the dissertation beginning with an analysis of the case studies that
examine whether the SAC proposal and defensive publishing constitute substantive
alternatives to IP. It then assesses the expansionary regime drawing particular attention
to the increasing signs of strain within the regime. The following sections review the
Canadian and U.S. policy outlook before offering final conclusions, recommendations
and questions for future research.
This chapter highlights several valuable insights that have been explicated in the course
of the analysis. It notes that even in substantive alternatives a degree of self-interested
incentives are still present, and offers the important clarification that the use of selfinterested incentives can form a part of substantive alternatives to IP. It stresses the
importance of access as both a normative dimension of substantive alternatives and as a
means for allowing a greater range of innovation. It also emphasizes a crucial limit on
substantive alternatives to IP, which is the fact that often they still rely on the IP system.
These findings along with an assessment of the expansionary IP regime and Canadian
and U.S. innovation policies inform the final conclusions and recommendations of the
dissertation that greater federal support must be given to substantive alternatives to IP.
I. Analysis of the Case Studies
The two case studies, the SAC monthly ISP fee and defensive publishing, are illustrative
of the diversity of alternatives to IP, and underscore several important strengths and
limitations of these alternatives. The following section examines both case studies
focusing on the incentive structures utilized, the innovatory outcomes, and the ideological
aspects of each alternative.
A. Incentives and Self-Interest
The primary incentive for the production of intellectual goods under IP is the potential for
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pecuniary gain facilitated by exclusionary rights. Both case studies demonstrate the
primacy of self-interested motives; however, they differ in how pecuniary motives are
emphasized. The SAC proposal is structured around monetizing file sharing (regardless
of the mode of file sharing). This focus on pecuniary motives contrasts with defensive
publication where corporations publish to ensure freedom to operate, reduce costs and
prevent competitors from gaining a competitive advantage. In each case self-interested
motives are primary, and in neither case is altruism or a concern for the public good the
primary incentive.
The presence of self-interested incentives is not unique to these alternatives to IP.
Although non-pecuniary in nature, an important set of incentives in FOSS and OA
publishing are the desire for enhanced reputation and recognition. Prizes, while also
having a reputational element, often include a pecuniary reward. A crucial question is
how does the utilization of self-interested incentives, both pecuniary and reputational,
undermine the desirability of alternatives to IP? In other words, is the suitability of
alternatives to IP diminished because they are not incented on solely altruistic motives?
The thesis posits that substantive alternatives employ a range of incentive structures
beyond pecuniary gain.1 Based on the analysis of the case studies, the SAC’s proposal
clearly does not meet this standard given that its core principle is monetization.
Defensive publishing clearly relies on self-interested motives such as ensuring freedom to
operate, but not necessarily pecuniary ones. However, the analysis of incentives
produced by IP in chapter four suggests that non-pecuniary, strategic incentives present
in IP are manifested in defensive publishing. At no point has this analysis discussed an
alternative that functions solely on altruistic motives, and as noted earlier2 even altruistic
behaviour can be considered self-interested. Based on these findings it is concluded that
with regards to incentive structures, the differences between IP and the alternatives
examined in this dissertation are differences in degree not kind as a degree of self-interest
is always present. In light of this finding the original thesis must be revised. Successful
and substantive alternatives to IP do rely on self-interested motives including pecuniary
ones; however, such alternatives differ from IP and non-substantive alternatives such as
the SAC proposal by making use of a greater range of non-pecuniary, self-interested
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incentives including reputational motives. The potential for pecuniary gain is not the sole
or dominant incentive, and exclusionary rights are not used to incent innovative activity.
The reliance on non-pecuniary self-interested incentives in substantive alternatives to IP
on its own does not diminish the ability of such alternatives to alleviate the problem of
the expansionary IP regime. While it may be possible to conceive of a world where
intellectual goods are produced solely out of a desire to share such work with others and
contribute to the public good, it would be impractical to suggest humans will engage in
creative and inventive behavior only for altruistic purposes. Non-pecuniary incentives
such as the desire for recognition serve an invaluable role facilitating the production and
distribution of intellectual goods, and should be employed to help mitigate the problems
of the commodification of intellectual work and the resulting diminution of access. Most
importantly a de-emphasis on pecuniary incentives and the single minded pursuit of one’s
narrow, economic self-interest is crucial to promoting progressive change.
B. Access, Exclusion and Commodification
The second axis on which IP can be differentiated from its alternatives is the degree to
which they facilitate access to intellectual works and the information contained within
them. In the case of IP there is a clear limitation of access to a given work and to a lesser
degree to the information contained (unlike secrecy where the informational content may
never be revealed). The fair dealing/use exceptions and idea-expression dichotomy in
copyright and disclosure requirement in patents ensure that the informational content of
an intellectual good is not absolutely controlled by the IP owner, though IP rights provide
generally effective controls to limit access to intellectual goods themselves.
The two case studies provide a greater degree of access than traditional IP mechanisms;
however, they do not provide unlimited and unfettered access. The SAC proposal would
significantly increase access to musical works, but stops short of actually allowing
anything more than access (specifically the ability to create transformative new works).
Defensive publication presents a much more complicated picture. For obscure
disclosures access is greatly limited as the information is not likely to be found. In the
case of IP.com and Research Disclosure access to the information has been commodified
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by these firms. Some other defensive publication venues are accessible without cost
(such as materials posted on the internet, corporate marketing materials, postings on
factory gates, and SIRs), while in other cases (academic and trade publications) there
remains a cost factor.
The lack of clarity regarding access among alternatives to IP is not unique to defensive
publication. In the case of open source software access to the source code is always
available, though the software itself may not be costless. Open access scholarly
publications are made available without cost, but there may be restrictions on use. In
both open source and open access even though one has access to the informational
content, it does not imply that one necessarily has the skill or knowledge base to utilize
the information made available. Prizes place the informational content in the public
domain, but transforming that information into a physical good or service still contains a
cost to produce or develop. Thus for many alternatives to IP, access is not completely
unconditional; however, there is a marked difference in kind, not degree, between
substantive alternatives and IP. The exclusionary rights of IP are principled upon
limiting access without which the incentive function of IP would be impaired. Though
some fetters on access remain in the case of alternatives, greater access is permitted. This
difference is fundamental, and none of the alternatives examined within this study limit
access in the same manner as IP. While there is heterogeneity with regards to how much
access alternatives afford, as a group alternatives to IP provide a significantly greater
degree of access to intellectual goods than IP. Providing access is crucial as it increases
the potential for future innovation. More importantly access is normatively preferable to
exclusion. The valuing of access in substantive alternatives is a crucial means by which
the ideology of intellectual goods is resisted. Furthermore the privileging of access over
exclusion is critical to facilitating innovation in social norms that is necessary to
overcoming the ideology of neoliberalism.
C. Innovation and Progress
The third criterion on which IP and its alternatives can be demarcated is the kind of
innovation they engender. IP-driven innovation is increasingly cast in terms of its ability
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to generate wealth and productivity gains. The SAC’s claim that their proposal is
innovative because it will monetize and license activity that is copyright infringement
does not differ from the discourse on IP in this regard. However, the SAC proposal does
nothing to encourage innovative uses of existing musical works. The case of the SAC
proposal contrasts with that of defensive publishing. The latter clearly facilitates
innovation, but the examination of incentives underlying defensive publishing suggests
that the social goal of progress is clearly secondary to enhancing one’s competitive
advantage. Though not the primary goal of defensive publication, such disclosures do
encourage social progress by improving patent quality, and therefore limiting the granting
of exclusionary rights to obvious and non-novel inventions. Furthermore, defensive
publication can be used to encourage political, social, moral and environmental progress.
When IBM announced in 2009 that it planned on increasing the number of technical
inventions it would not protect with patents, it clearly stated that such inventions would
be in the important social areas of health care, education, the environment, software
interoperability, and open source software.3 Of course this does not mean that all
defensive publications are premised on addressing social problems, and it is notable that
these are areas of technology where it may be more difficult to appropriate the outcomes,
but it does reveal that defensive publishing can be, and is, aimed at more than just
economic growth.
Other alternatives also demonstrate a concern for more than economic growth and
enhanced productivity. While the mission of Creative Commons is clearly cast in
economic terms (“to drive a new era of development, growth, and productivity,”4) the
goal of enabling universal access to the world’s research, education, and cultural
materials clearly goes beyond these narrow, instrumentalist economic goals. In the
biotechnology and health sectors prizes have been singled out by a number of proponents
including the WHO as means for addressing diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis.5
Other prizes such as those offered by the Clay Mathematics Institute or the U.S.
Department of Energy’s L Prize also address more than economic objectives.6 While IP
can serve broader social goals, rights holders have a tendency to treat exclusionary rights
instrumentally as mechanisms for generating profits.
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The thesis posits that substantive alternatives to IP emphasize innovation for more than
its simple economic attributes. The SAC proposal should not be considered a substantive
alternative because it fails to significantly differentiate itself from IP in this regard.
Given its focus on a remunerative incentive and the suggestion that the proposal will
generate profitable and innovative new business methods, it embodies the same
ideological approach as IP. By comparison defensive publishing is a substantive
alternative. While instrumentalist objectives are clearly important, they do not mitigate
the fact that defensive publishing can also advance progress, and that one of the earliest
and largest defensive publishers, IBM, clearly espouses this view. Conversely, while the
SAC proposal allows greater access than copyright, its incentive structure and economic
focus are largely identical to that of the IP regime. Conversely, defensive publishing is a
substantive alternative to IP. Though it does bear some similarities with the IP system, it
possesses significant differences that may result in not only increased access to
intellectual goods but, more importantly, socially purposive uses of such informational
goods and their intellectual content. However, while defensive publication is a
substantive alternative to IP, it is crucial to note that it is not a substitute for IP as it
necessarily relies on the patent system. The inability of defensive publishing and other
substantive alternatives such as FOSS and OA publishing to function as substitutes for IP
requires further attention and is dealt with in the next sub-section.
D. The Centrality of IP
A limitation of alternatives to IP is their indebtedness to intellectual property devices
themselves. The private ordering scheme found in the SAC proposal still requires the
copyright system. While it is possible that in the absence of artists, publishers and ISPs
may partner in an effort to distribute music, the SAC proposal is only an alteration of the
status quo, not a substantive alternative. Defensive publishing is also dependent on the
patent system to create the incentives to defensively publish, and absent the presence of
patents there is no clear indication of how or why defensive publishing would flourish
given that secrecy would appear an attractive option for appropriating the returns of
innovation. The ‘open’ alternatives to copyright, including FOSS and OA have been
relatively successful,7 but still require the combination of licenses and copyright to

267
function. Prizes, public financing, and patronage are capable of functioning as
alternatives without having to rely on IP, but this fact is hardly surprising given that these
alternatives have considerable historical roots. The centrality of IP to its alternatives
forces supporters of alternatives to face a crucial question: how much support should be
given to alternatives that can never fully displace the problem they are meant to address?
Ultimately the answer to such a question is dependent on one’s normative view and
ideology. If the primary purpose for supporting alternatives is to facilitate innovation,
then the success of FOSS and OA suggests that the IP system must be tolerated. Patents
and copyrights do spur innovation, though the maximalist approach does a poor job of
recognizing the inherent incentives for the production and distribution of intellectual
goods, IP’s disincentive effects and the deadweight loss generated by exclusionary rights.
Greater support for alternatives in addition to a more limited use of IP provides the policy
framework most likely to generate the highest levels of innovation. This policy balance
appears to present a further important question – what level of IP protection is necessary
to incent the maximum level of innovative activity. However, this question is illusory as
the minimum levels of protection spelled out in TRIPS, itself a product of the
expansionary regime, should suffice particularly given the empirical evidence that IP is at
best a moderate incentive for innovative activity.8
If the fundamental reason for advocating for alternatives to IP is to resist the logic of the
commodification of intellectual labour then support for a range of alternatives to IP
becomes more difficult. Many alternatives reject the logic of commodification, but not
all do, and the SAC proposal in particular further reinforces the concept of commodifying
intellectual work. However, by being reliant on the IP system alternatives such as FOSS,
OA and defensive publishing can never fully prevent commodification. Furthermore, it
has been posited that the greatest benefactors of intellectual goods whose access is not
restricted are private corporations which can exploit the unpaid labour of others.9 While
alternatives to IP can resist commodification in varying degrees, without a completely
different economic order profit seekers will always be able to exploit innovative activity
for wealth production. Although it is possible to envision a world where intellectual
goods are freely disseminated without restrictions on access or use, the current economic
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order that focuses on wealth creation and its supporting neoliberal policy environment
that extols private property and self-interest would have to be radically altered or entirely
eliminated to see such a vision come to fruition.
Despite this important and inherent limitation on many substantive alternatives to IP, it
does not diminish the value of such alternatives. In the long run the most valuable
contribution of substantive alternatives is not their facilitating of innovation, but their
ability to reject the normative and ideological dimensions of IP. A key factor in the
ascendency of neoliberalism and instrumentalist economic thought has been the ability of
its proponents to obtain ideological and normative adherents who view the
commodification of intellectual work as what ought to be. Supporting substantive
alternatives is not simply a means of encouraging greater levels of innovation. At its
essence it is a way of advancing a different ideological and normative stance that values
access, inclusion and progressive social change that can address the range of political,
social, moral, environmental and economic problems facing humankind.
II. Analysis of the Expansionary IP Regime
The presence and increasing prominence of alternatives to IP has not abated the
expansionary IP regime. However, there have been several recent defeats of
expansionary measures and increasing signs that expansive IP protections are pitting not
only countries that are net exporters of IP against those that are net importers, but also
different economic sectors against each other. In the case of copyright, expansionist
tendencies remain most pronounced. Both the Canadian and U.S. innovation policies
stress greater protection for copyright and have pending legislation that would further
strengthen copyright.10 Copyright-based industry groups such as the IIPA, the Copyright
Alliance in the U.S., and the Creators’ Copyright Coalition in Canada are unified in
calling for greater protections.11 However, attention must also be drawn to the recent
protests over the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA in the United States.12 While rights
holders were largely successful in the first decade of the 21st century in litigating against
either end users or firms that have facilitated infringement by users (notably, Napster,
Grokster, and LimeWire), the postponement and possible ultimate defeat of the
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PROTECT IP Act and SOPA is due in part to the fact that such legislation was opposed
by corporations increasingly important to the U.S. economy (e.g. Google, Amazon.com,
Facebook). Although the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA appear to be defeated, nothing
stops Congress from considering future bills with similar measures. Yet, when the push
for expansionary IP legislation starts to threaten newly established, innovative companies
Congress should not lose sight that the purpose of IP is to promote progress, not to
further enrich entrenched corporations. Indeed, this view was advanced by the White
House when it commented on the PROTECT IP Act and SOPA stating:
While we believe that online piracy by foreign websites is a serious problem that requires
serious legislative solutions, we will not support legislation that reduces freedom of
expression, increases cybersecurity risk, or undermines the dynamic, innovative global
internet13

As this quote demonstrates there is increasing recognition from the highest political
office in the globe that the maximalist approach to copyright has its own upper limits –
and that limit is imperiling innovation.
In the case of patents there are also indications that policymakers are recognizing that the
goal of innovation is more important than IP as a means of achieving that goal. The U.S.
has finally enacted long-awaited patent reform with a key aim of improving patent
quality and weeding out lower quality patents.14 The establishment of a burgeoning
number of Peer to Patent programs supported by national patent offices15 demonstrates
that even national patent offices are aware that the expansionary regime has had negative
effects including the creation of a massive application backlog and the approval of low
quality patents. The fissuring of the expansionary consensus with respect to patents stems
in part from the increasingly antagonistic set of legal battles between patent holders.
Low quality patents, forum shopping, defensive and offensive patent aggregation, and the
rise of non-practicing entities has resulted in a dizzying array of legal battles between
firms claiming exclusionary rights over similar intellectual goods. The problem has
become acute for smartphone and tablet computer manufactures, and provides an
illustrative example of how the expansionary patent regime is dampening innovation.16
The battles between Apple and Samsung in particular have been rancorous, but more
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importantly the subject matter being contested is increasingly trivial. It is pure lunacy to
have two major high technology companies devoting substantial resources to legal
departments to argue whether a science fiction film constitutes prior art in a case
involving a question of ownership on the ornamental design of a tablet computer in the
shape of a rectangle (with rounded corners).17 The problems in the smartphone/tablet
sector are reflective of the cumulative nature of innovation in these areas – a smartphone
may contain as many as 250,000 patented claims.18 While patents are particularly wellsuited for discrete products such as chemicals and pharmaceuticals, the case is not true
for complex products. Although the simple solution would appear to be creating one
class of patents for discrete products/sectors and another for complex products, TRIPS
requires that patents be available in all fields of technology and not discriminate based on
field of technology.19 The result is the fissuring of the expansionary patent regime with
the interests of the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors diverging from those of the
information technology sector.20
The tensions created by IP and its ability to inhibit innovation underscore the need for
alternatives. The patent system has demonstrated that the maximalist approach can
become a significant barrier to innovation. In the case of copyright, the success of
alternatives such as FOSS, OA, and other commons based ‘open’ alternatives
underscores that such mechanisms will be increasingly important for providing access to
intellectual goods. The limitations of the expansionist approach and the need for
alternatives to IP must be a central dimension of information policy. Furthermore,
governments must take a leadership role in supporting alternatives to IP. Bottom up
approaches such as FOSS, OA, and defensive publishing (with the exception of the soon
to be eliminated SIR program) can only go so far. Governments, themselves the source
of IP rights, are integral to both developing and financing alternatives to IP that will limit
the problems caused by the maximalist approach.
III. The Policy Outlook in Canada and the United States
The policy actions and outlooks by Canada and the United States differ sharply.
Although the U.S. has been the locus of the expansionary IP regime, in recent years it has
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demonstrated greater federal support for a range of alternatives to IP. The critical
importance of alternatives to IP appears to be largely ignored by the Canadian
government. While the pending copyright bill, Bill C-11, contains several provisions that
would benefit users,21 the pervasive protection given to TPMs not only undermines these
new provisions but also destabilizes the crucial balance between users and creators rights
by granting decoupling acts of TPM circumvention from acts of copyright infringement.
The government should be commended for appealing the Federal Court decision in the
Amazon.com ruling;22 however, at the time of writing there has been no indication that
the government will seek leave to appeal the Federal Court of Appeal decision to the
Supreme Court. Ultimately, a statutory exclusion of business methods from patentability
would be preferable. The government has also demonstrated a lack of leadership with
respect to supporting alternatives to IP. There is still no Canadian peer to patent project
despite numerous other nations advancing such initiatives.23 Unlike the U.S., which
mandates at least a degree of OA publishing through NIH funded projects,24 there are no
mechanisms in Canada to stipulate that federally funded research is made accessible. The
long-awaited digital economy strategy has still not been unveiled, although the
government has recently announced that it will reform the business R&D tax credit
program.25 Given the nation’s increasingly poor innovation performance relative to other
countries,26 it is imperative that the government not only reform the corporate R&D tax
credit, but also provide greater federal support for alternatives to IP. Canadian
policymakers should look south, not in an effort to determine how to fashion greater
expansionary IP rights, but to discover how greater federal support for alternatives to IP
can strengthen the country’s innovation ecosystem.
The policy outlook in the United States is considerably different than Canada. The
Obama administration’s innovation policy explicitly supports the use of prizes and the
federal government has developed an extensive open data portal (data.gov).27 Although
the SIR program will be eliminated in 2013, it has already proven to be a failure.28 It is
logical that the nation that was the epicenter of the expansionary IP regime has recently
turned to increased support for alternatives to IP. The increased policy support for
alternatives reflects the fact that innovation is best achieved by a policy framework that
utilizes a range of incentive structures for the production and distribution of intellectual
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goods, not just an over-reliance on IP. However, the increased support for alternatives in
the U.S. should not be viewed as a complete retreat from expansionary tendencies,
especially with regard to the recent cases of both ACTA and SOPA.
While the U.S. government has done considerably more to support alternatives to IP, it is
saddled with debt woes which have already undermined support for alternatives.29
Furthermore, as demonstrated by SOPA, the PROTECT IP Act, the Commercial Felony
Streaming Act, and the Research Works Act expansionary legislation continues to be
introduced in Congress.30 The Obama administration has clearly recognized that a
thriving innovation ecosystem requires more than just IP, and the government has made a
number of laudable steps in this direction. Furthermore, both the George W. Bush and
Obama administrations should be credited for supporting innovation programs that
addressed not only economic, but also social and environmental problems. However,
future success appears to be imperiled by the U.S.’s inability to achieve fiscal stability.
IV. Conclusions
Intellectual property appears as a solution to the problem of incenting innovative activity.
This dissertation neither challenges nor rejects this concept – IP is indeed an incentive for
innovation. However, as the analysis has revealed, the framing of IP as the solution is
highly problematic. Numerous incentives exist for the production and distribution of
intellectual goods, and empirical studies have robustly demonstrated that IP is not the
most preferred mechanism for appropriating the returns for innovation. IP also produces
numerous dynamic effects beyond incenting innovative behaviour, particularly
engendering the use of exclusionary rights for strategic purposes. Furthermore, the
construction of IP – using exclusionary rights to generate pecuniary incentives – results
in a narrow, instrumentalist approach to innovation which casts it in overly economic
terms and fails to recognize the important connections between innovation, access to
intellectual goods, and human progress. Finally, the inherent positive connotation of
innovation has been adopted by several information society proponents and futurologists
who often fail to fully appreciate the numerous negative consequences of IP.
Concomitantly, innovation and information age rhetoric has been skillfully deployed by
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corporations and governments to advance a neoliberal political agenda underpinned by
neoclassical economic thought that disproportionately emphasizes wealth creation and
productivity growth as the primary economic and social policy objective.
The analysis has also revealed that alternatives to IP can act as effective incentive
mechanisms, but their effectiveness to incent innovation and ability to address more than
economic objectives is not uniform. Some alternatives, such as the SAC’s proposal, do
not offer a substantive alternative to IP, while others such as defensive publishing, FOSS,
OA, and prizes do. Substantive alternatives are effective because they utilize a broader
range of incentive structures, facilitate greater access to intellectual works and their
informational content, and stimulate innovative behaviour for more than simply
economic purposes.
For policymakers the decision to continue expansionary trends or support alternatives is
ultimately normative. If the primary goal is wealth creation, then IP is ideal. If
innovation is to be maximized, augmenting the existing IP system with a significantly
greater degree of support for substantive alternatives is necessary. If the goal is the
complete rejection of the commodification of intellectual labour and the shaping of
innovative activity for instrumentalist, economic purposes, then IP should be rejected as
well as those alternatives that are forced to rely on the IP system. However, those who
seek to reject substantive alternatives to IP which still have to rely on IP devices should
be mindful of the fact that substantive alternatives serve a valuable purpose as a means of
advancing a socially progressive normative viewpoint. Because governments are the
creators of IP rights, they must also bear the responsibility for supporting alternatives if
they desire more than wealth creation. Failure to provide greater support for alternatives
will result in an exacerbation of the problems created by the expansionary IP regime and
lead to greater economic stratification, decreased access to knowledge, the further
entrenchment of dominant political powers and less innovation.
V. Recommendations and Questions for Future Research
The following section contains policy recommendations and questions for future
research. The recommendations described are illustrative of the kinds of policies that
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should be adopted, though it is not an exhaustive cataloguing of all possible policy
recommendations. That being said, all of the recommendations follow from the general
the analysis of IP and its alternatives that concludes greater support from governments
must be given to alternatives of intellectual property, and more evidence-based policy is
required in the area of innovation policy. Alternatives help mitigate the problems of the
expansionary IP regime, and support for alternatives should be coupled with a cessation
of the maximalist approach to IP rights.
i. Broadening Canadian Innovation Policy by Providing Greater Access to
Information and a Larger Range of Incentives for Innovative Activity.
Canadian innovation policy is overwhelmingly targeted at incenting innovation in the
business sector. While corporations have a crucial role to play in developing and
commercializing innovations, Canadian innovation policy should be broadened to enable
a greater range of creative and inventive activity. In this regard several steps should be
taken: 1) the development of new guidelines that would require federally funded
academic research to be published in an OA venue (akin to the NIH policy in the U.S.);
2) the expansion of fair dealing to cover not only education, parody and satire (as the
pending Bill C-11 would do), but to also specifically allow transformative uses of
copyrighted works; and 3) the establishment of a federal prize system (like challenge.gov
in the U.S.) to allow Canadians to contribute innovative solutions to pressing economic,
political, social, and environmental problems. Although Canadian policymakers should
not blindly mimic what is done in the U.S., the Canadian government should keep a keen
focus on what federal incentives the U.S. provides for producing and disseminating
intellectual goods. The Canadian government should not disadvantage its own citizens
by failing to support substantive alternatives to IP.
ii. Reintroduction and Passage of the Federal Research Public Access Act (FRPAA)
in the United States
Congress has twice failed to pass the Federal Research Public Access Act that would
ensure that billions of dollars in federally funded academic research be made accessible.
Furthermore, in the latest Congress a version of FRPAA has not even been introduced.
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Stemming from this recommendation, research is needed to determine why previous
attempts to pass FRPAA have been unsuccessful and what, if any, changes to previous
versions of FRPAA would be required to ensure future passage. Research in such regard
will require both a careful examination of the bill’s treatment in Congressional
subcommittees and an analysis of lobbying efforts both for and against the bill.
iii. A New International Framework to Support Defensive Publishing
The impending abolition of the SIR program in the U.S. is not reflective of the fact that
defensive publication remains an important and substantive alternative to patenting that
encourages innovation. However, the commodification of the defensive publication by
Research Disclosure and IP.com is troublesome. To address this concern an international
program should be established that facilitates innovation. In this regard the major
question for future research is how to achieve such a goal. As a starting point it would
seem that WIPO would appear a potential body that could facilitate a defensive
publishing system. Particular attention would have to be paid to how the program would
be financed and how access to the disclosures would be ensured.
iv. Establishing a World Innovation Organization
Building on the previous recommendation that identified WIPO as a potential
international organization that could undertake a global defensive publication system,
serious consideration should be given to creating a World Innovation Organization that
could coordinate support for alternatives to IP at an international level. This organization
should be situated within the U.N., and would have to work closely with several U.N.
bodies including WIPO, UNESCO, and the ITU. Alternatively, WIPO itself could be
transformed into the World Innovation Organization.31 A single, clearly identifiable,
international organization to promote innovation would have the ability to draw attention
to the importance of alternatives to IP in facilitating innovation. To further this
recommendation more research would be needed to determine how such an organization
should be structured relative to extant U.N. bodies and what process is necessary to create
such an organization.
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v. More Evidence-Based Innovation Policy
The final recommendation is that more evidence-based policy is needed in innovation
policy in general and in the cases of IP and its alternatives in particular. While greater
support for alternatives to IP is a starting point, it is only a guiding principle and only
with more empirical information can policymakers truly formulate superior innovation
policy. Greater empirical evidence and evidence-based policymaking is necessary to
ensure that 21st century information policy is capable of stimulating innovative activity
that will address the major political, social, economic and environmental problems facing
the globe.
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